Interesting External Papers

Willem Buiter's Revised Prescription

Willem Buiter has authored a paper Lessons from the North Atlantic Financial Crisis, which updates his previously reviewed ‘Lessons…’.

He states:

Very rapid growth of the broad monetary and credit aggregates could (and should) have been a warning sign that a financial bubble might be brewing. It was not considered worrying, probably because on the other side of these transactions were not primarily non-financial corporations and households but rather other, non-deposit-taking financial institutions. Leverage increased steadily in the financial sector (especially outside the commercial banks) and in the household sector. This was interpreted as financial deepening and further productivity and efficiency-enhancing financial sector development, rather than as a financial sector/household sector Ponzi game in which the expectations of future capital gains drove current capital values and made true earnings a side show.

One cause of the current crisis was securitization:

  • The greater opportunities for risk trading created by securitisation not only make it possible to hedge risk better (that is, to cover open positions); they also permit investors to seek out and take on additional risk, to further ‘unhedge’ risk and to create open positions not achievable before. … we can only be sure that the risk will end up with those most willing to bear it. There can be no guarantee that risk will end up being borne by those most able to bear it.
  • The ‘originate to distribute’ model destroys information compared to the ‘originate to hold’ model.
  • Securitisation also puts information in the wrong place. Whatever information is collected by the loan originator about the collateral value of the underlying assets and the credit worthiness of the ultimate borrower, remains with the originator …
  • Finally, there appears to be genuine irrationality afoot in the markets during periods of euphoria. Even non-diversifiable risk that is traded away is treated as though it no longer exists.

and proposes the following solutions:

  • Simpler structures … Central banks could accept as collateral in repos or at the discount window only reasonably transparent classes of ABS.
  • Unpicking’ securitisation (doing original credit analysis of the underlying) … This ‘solution’ is the ultimate admission of defeat in the securitisation process.
  • Retention of equity tranche by originator. … It could be made a regulatory requirement for the originator of
    residential mortgages, car loans etc. to retain the equity tranche of the securitised loans.
    Alternatively, the ownership of the equity tranche could be required to be made public
    information, permitting the market to draw its own conclusions.

  • External ratings. … This ‘solution’ to the information problem, however, brought with it a whole slew of new problems.

And that slew of new problems is then analyzed and discussed – it is virtually identical to the prior paper, which was discussed at length there, so I’ll skip over that.

The next section deals with the procyclical effects of leverage and bank regulation:

This pattern of procyclical leverage is reinforced through the Basel capital adequacy requirements. Banks have to hold a certain minimal fraction of their risk-weighted assets as capital. Credit ratings are procyclical. Consequently, a given amount of capital can support a larger stock of assets when the economy is booming then when it is slumping. This further reinforces the procyclical behaviour of leverage.

While I will agree that credit ratings are procyclical – the upgrade/downgrade ratio varies with the health of the economy, rather than being constant through a cycle, which is the ideal – I don’t think this element of his argument is particularly well documented; the effect, while there, is (in normal times) fairly small. It is certainly true, though, that credit ratings of non-AAA sub-prime RMBS have precipituously declined in a manner well-correlated to their prices and the housing market!

However, Dr. Buiter does not propose a solution for this problem, only further study and a re-opening of the Basel II accord.

He further attacks excessive disintermediation in the financial system and is in favour of most off-balance sheet vehicles being brought back on the balance sheet of their financial sponsors, claiming that their role is of regulatory arbitrage and tax-avoidance, rather than a more legitimate business purpose.

Bonuses paid to employees also come under attack, particularly when these are based on short-term performance and unrealized capital gains. It is interesting to consider this problem in light of his recommendation that issuers retain the equity tranche of securitizations … realizing the capital gain on a highly profitable undertaking could become a matter of decades! It is disappointing that there is no evidence presented in support of the idea that bonus sizes were a direct contributing factor to the crunch.

The remainder of the paper deals with macro-economic analysis which, while interesting, will not be reviewed here.

Market Action

May 29, 2008

Accrued Interest opines on the future of CDOs.

Naked Capitalism collects some opinions on credit conditions.

Bloomberg reports on LIBOR reporting problems.

Bloomberg reports on how OIS is overtaking LIBOR as a measure.

Lou Crandall comments (a long time ago) on how LIBOR overtook US T-Bills as a measure.

Jeffrey Frankel defends his thesis that low real interest rates cause commodities to rise.

Standard & Poor’s points out that sub-prime borrowers bought cheap houses, which have less volatile prices than expensive ones … the mortgage carry quickly becomes comparable to renting, no matter how far underwater you are.

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services’ current ratings on the 2006 subprime U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) vintage reflect, in part, an assumed loss severity of 45%. That assumption includes our estimate that, based on our views on the current housing market environment, foreclosure costs and market value declines account for losses of 26.3% and 18.7%, respectively, in the loan balances of these mortgages. We project a 19% aggregate loss for subprime mortgages backing U.S. RMBS sold in 2006 based on assumptions for foreclosure and loss severity. The 19% assumption is the product of projected foreclosures of approximately 42% and the assumed loss severity of 45%.

Standard & Poor’s current house price decline assumption is 33.4%, which is a 72% increase over the maximum price decline of 19.4% observed to date (see table 1). We believe this assumption appropriately protects against forecasted price declines through the housing downturn.

Dates have been set for the redemption of FAL.PR.A & FAL.PR.H; the post has been updated.

Plans – well, rumours of plans, anyway – are moving forward for a CDS Clearinghouse. I have updated my most recent post on the issue.

For those fascinated with all aspects of the David Berry affair, I’ve had a look at the career of Cecilia Williams, Scotia’s compliance officer, and have updated the most recent relevant post.

In case you missed the announcements amidst the Bank Capitalization posts, note that RY.PR.K has been called for redemption and TD has a new Fixed Reset, 5+160 … and the argument about the structure’s merits rages on. It takes two to make a market!

Good volume on the day, with some nice sized blocks going through for some Operating Retractibles. Prices were down … surely, people can’t be selling straights to buy fixed-resets?

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.33% 4.34% 50,628 16.3 1 -0.0786% 1,113.7
Fixed-Floater 4.83% 4.64% 64,513 16.07 7 +0.4845% 1,035.9
Floater 4.03% 4.07% 62,575 17.20 2 +1.3074% 937.7
Op. Retract 4.83% 2.50% 89,958 2.71 15 -0.0374% 1,056.3
Split-Share 5.27% 5.40% 69,117 4.15 13 -0.0021% 1,058.9
Interest Bearing 6.13% 6.12% 52,229 3.81 3 -0.0997% 1,112.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.89% 5.12% 128,420 3.49 9 +0.1534% 1,025.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.67% 5.71% 291,078 14.31 63 -0.2370% 925.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.4119% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.56% based on a bid of 20.25 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.3158% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.2309% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.65% based on a bid of 20.06 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.0120% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 20.54 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount +1.0989% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.1156% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.72% based on a bid of 22.66 and a limitMaturity.
CL.PR.B PerpetualPremium +1.4805% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 1.97% based on a bid of 25.70 and a call 2008-6-28 at 25.75.
BAM.PR.K Floater +3.0985%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 265,200 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 21.00, then another 213,800 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 20.92 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.N OpRet 150,000 Desjardins crossed two lots of 75,000 each, both at 26.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.89% based on a bid of 26.01 and a softMaturity 2014-1-30 at 25.00.
CM.PR.A OpRet 106,494 TD crossed 44,300 at 26.10, then Desjardins crossed 50,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -3.94% based on a bid of 26.06 and a call 2008-6-28 at 25.75.
CM.PR.R OpRet 104,510 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 26.20. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -6.44% based on a bid of 26.10 and a call 2008-6-28 at 25.75.
TD.PR.R PerpetualDiscount (for now!) 61,904 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 25.14. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.69% based on a bid of 25.10 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty-one other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Regulatory Capital

Bank Capitalization Summary : 2Q08

The Big-Six banks have now all released their 2Q08 financials. The results may now be summarized, with the links pointing to the PrefBlog posts reporting on the quarterly reports:

Big-6 Capitalization Summary
2Q08
  Note RY BNS BMO TD CM NA
Equity Capital A 17,527 16,113 13,499 15,069 9,078 3,534
Preferreds Outstanding B 2,555 2,210 1,696 1,675 2,931 573
Issuance Capacity C 1,321 1,936 1,644 3,039 954 270
Equity / Risk Weighted Assets D 7.03% 7.36% 7.24% 8.43% 7.91% 6.81%
Tier 1 Ratio E 9.5% 9.6% 9.4% 9.1% 10.5% 9.2%
A is a measure of the size of the bank
B is … um … how many are outstanding
C is how many more (million CAD) they could issue if they so chose
D is a measure of the safety of the preferreds – the first loss buffer, expressed as a percentage of their Risk-Weighted Assets. Higher is better. It may be increased by issuing common (or making some money and keeping it); preferred issuance will not change it.
E is the number that OSFI and fixed-income investors will be watching. Higher is better, and it may be increased by issuing preferreds.
Regulatory Capital

NA Capitalization : 2Q08

NA has released its Second Quarter 2008 Report and Supplementary Package, so it’s time to recalculate how much room they have to issue new preferred shares – assuming they want to!

Step One is to analyze their Tier 1 Capital, reproducing the prior format:

NA Capital Structure
October, 2007
& April, 2008
  4Q07 2Q08
Total Tier 1 Capital 4,442 5,089
Common Shareholders’ Equity 95.0% 87.3%
Preferred Shares 9.0% 11.3%
Innovative Tier 1 Capital Instruments 11.4% 15.0%
Non-Controlling Interests in Subsidiaries 0.4% 0.3%
Goodwill -15.8% -13.9%

Next, the issuance capacity (from Part 3 of the introductory series):

NA
Tier 1 Issuance Capacity
October 2007
& April 2008
  4Q07 2Q08
Equity Capital (A) 3,534 3,753
Non-Equity Tier 1 Limit (B=A/3), 4Q07
(B=0.428*A), 2Q08
1,178 1,606
Innovative Tier 1 Capital (C) 508 763
Preferred Limit (D=B-C) 670 843
Preferred Actual (E) 400 573
New Issuance Capacity (F=D-E) 270 270
Items A, C & E are taken from the table
“Risk Adjusted Capital Ratiosl”
of the supplementary information;
Note that Item A includes everything except preferred shares and innovative capital instruments


Item B is as per OSFI Guidelines; the limit was recently increased.
Items D & F are my calculations

and the all important Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios!

NA
Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios
October 2007
& April 2008
  Note 2007 2Q08
Equity Capital A 3,534 3,753
Risk-Weighted Assets B 49,336 55,143
Equity/RWA C=A/B 7.16% 6.81%
Tier 1 Ratio D 9.0% 9.2%
Capital Ratio E 12.4% 13.3%
Assets to Capital Multiple F 18.6x 16.7x
A is taken from the table “Issuance Capacity”, above
B, D & E are taken from RY’s Supplementary Report
C is my calculation
F is taken from the OSFI site for 4Q07. The 2Q08 figure is approximated by subtracting goodwill of 707 from total assets of 123,608 to obtain adjusted assets of 122,901 and dividing by 7,353 total capital.

National Bank does not disclose its Assets-to-Capital Multiple. Their Report to Shareholders simply states:

In addition to regulatory capital ratios, banks are expected to meet an assets-to-capital multiple test. The assets-to-capital multiple is calculated by dividing a bank’s total assets, including specified off-balance sheet items, by its total capital. Under this test, total assets should not be greater than 23 times the total capital. The Bank met the assets-to-capital multiple test in the second quarter of 2008.

Regulatory Capital

RY Capitalization : 2Q08

RY has released its Second Quarter 2008 Report and Supplementary Package, so it’s time to recalculate how much room they have to issue new preferred shares – assuming they want to!

Step One is to analyze their Tier 1 Capital, reproducing the prior format:

RY Capital Structure
October, 2007
& April, 2008
  4Q07 2Q08
Total Tier 1 Capital 23,383 23,708
Common Shareholders’ Equity 95.2% 99.8%
Preferred Shares 10.0% 10.8%
Innovative Tier 1 Capital Instruments 14.9% 15.3%
Non-Controlling Interests in Subsidiaries 0.1% 0.1%
Goodwill -20.3% -26.0%

Next, the issuance capacity (from Part 3 of the introductory series):

RY
Tier 1 Issuance Capacity
October 2007
& April 2008
  4Q07 2Q08
Equity Capital (A) 17,545 17,527
Non-Equity Tier 1 Limit (B=A/3), 4Q07
(B=0.428*A), 2Q08
5,848 7,502
Innovative Tier 1 Capital (C) 3,494 3,626
Preferred Limit (D=B-C) 2,354 3,876
Preferred Actual (E) 2,344 2,555
New Issuance Capacity (F=D-E) 10 1,321
Items A, C & E are taken from the table
“Regulatory Capital”
of the supplementary information;
Note that Item A includes everything except preferred shares and innovative capital instruments


Item B is as per OSFI Guidelines; the limit was recently increased.
Items D & F are my calculations

and the all important Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios!

RY
Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios
October 2007
& April 2008
  Note 2007 2Q08
Equity Capital A 17,545 17,527
Risk-Weighted Assets B 247,635 249,242
Equity/RWA C=A/B 7.09% 7.03%
Tier 1 Ratio D 9.4% 9.5%
Capital Ratio E 11.5% 11.5%
Assets to Capital Multiple F 19.8x 20.1x
A is taken from the table “Issuance Capacity”, above
B, D, E & F are taken from RY’s Supplementary Report
C is my calculation.

I am pleased to see that RY has commenced disclosing their Assets-to-Capital multiple – the undisclosed-but-high figure for 1Q08 made me very curious! They note that “Effective Q2/08, the OSFI amended the treatment of the general allowance in the calculation of Basel II Asset-to-capital multiple. Comparative ratios have not been revised.”

This amendment is available in an Advisory dated April 2008 … which I will now have to puzzle over.

Issue Comments

RY.PR.K to be Redeemed

Royal Bank has announced:

that on August 22, 2008, it will redeem all of its issued and outstanding Non-Cumulative First Preferred Shares Series N (the “Series N shares”) for cash at a redemption price of $25.00 per share.

There are 12,000,000 shares of Series N outstanding, representing $300 million of capital. The redemption of the Series N shares will be financed out of the general corporate funds of Royal Bank of Canada.

Separately from the redemption price, the final quarterly dividend of $0.29375 per share for the Series N shares will be paid in the usual manner on August 22, 2008 to shareholders of record on July 24, 2008.

RY.PR.K has been a member of the HIMIPref™ Operating Retractible Index continuously since it was issued 1998-4-27. It’s habit of trading with a low or negative Yield-to-Worst has been an annoyance for quite some time!

Regulatory Capital

CM Capitalization : 2Q08

CIBC (Stock symbol CM … I can never quite decide how to present it!) has released its Second Quarter 2008 Report and Supplementary Package, so it’s time to recalculate how much room they have to issue new preferred shares – assuming they want to!

Step One is to analyze their Tier 1 Capital, reproducing the prior format:

CM Capital Structure
October, 2007
& April, 2008
  4Q07 2Q08
Total Tier 1 Capital 12,379 12,009
Common Shareholders’ Equity 90.1% 90.3%
Preferred Shares 23.7% 24.4%
Innovative Tier 1 Capital Instruments 0% 0%
Non-Controlling Interests in Subsidiaries 1.1% 1.2%
Goodwill -14.9% -16.0%

Next, the issuance capacity (from Part 3 of the introductory series):

CM
Tier 1 Issuance Capacity
October 2007
& April 2008
  4Q07 2Q08
Equity Capital (A) 9,448 9,078
Non-Equity Tier 1 Limit (B=A/3), 4Q07
(B=0.428*A), 2Q08
3,149 3,885
Innovative Tier 1 Capital (C) 0 0
Preferred Limit (D=B-C) 3,149 3,885
Preferred Actual (E) 2,931 2,931
New Issuance Capacity (F=D-E) 218 954
Items A, C & E are taken from the table
“Regulatory Capital”
of the supplementary information;
Note that Item A includes Goodwill, FX losses, non-controlling interest, Gains on sale of securitizations and 50/50 deductions


Item B is as per OSFI Guidelines; the limit was recently increased.
Items D & F are my calculations

and the all important Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios!

CM
Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios
October 2007
& April 2008
  Note 2007 2Q08
Equity Capital A 9,448 9,078
Risk-Weighted Assets B 127,424 114,767
Equity/RWA C=A/B 7.41% 7.91%
Tier 1 Ratio D 9.7% 10.5%
Capital Ratio E 13.9% 14.4%
Assets to Capital Multiple F 19.0x 19.3x
A is taken from the table “Issuance Capacity”, above
B, D & E are taken from CM’s Supplementary Report
C is my calculation.
F is from Page 26 of the quarterly report
Miscellaneous News

Fixed-Resets : Critchley Likes, Ruggins Doesn't

Barry Critchley of the Financial Post has written another column, reiterating his earlier praise of the structure. In the current column, BNS Offers Investors Better Deal he states:

But in five years, investors know that the yield on the new fixed-rate pref will be set at the same spread over Canada bonds as was the original pref share. (Every five years, investors have the ability to move in and out of fixed or floating pref shares.)

In this way, the issuer won’t benefit from any improvement in credit spreads over the five-year period.

This is not correct. If credit spreads improve significantly, the issue will be called. One of the Big Black Marks against this structure is the 5-year call at par; the standard provisions for a normal fixed rate issues are a 5-year-call at a premium, declining to a 9-year call at par. Those extra four years are very important.

Of more interest are the reported comments of Len Ruggins … but I might just be saying that because I agree with him!

In response to an earlier column that focused on Scotia’s original deal, Ruggins called and gave his thoughts. In short, he didn’t like the earlier deal because the issuer is paying a yield that is lower than what it would have paid had it chosen to issue a perpetual pref share.

“The bank has issued a Tier 1 security that will most likely be redeemed in five years’ time [because] a regular bank perpetual [issued today] would require a dividend in excess of 5%.

“If market interest rates and dividend yields return to a more normal level in 2013 it is unlikely that the banks will reset the rate on these prefs. I would have bought this issue, if the bank had said that it would not be callable for, say, 20 years, thereby paying a very good dividend which is reset every five years. I’ll bet that during the last year of this issue, the pref will trade on the assumption that it is going to be called regardless of where the Canada bond is trading,” said Ruggins.

Hat tip to Assiduous Reader tobyone who brought the column to my attention.

Newly Assiduous Reader meander likes the structure, as he explains in his comment on the new issue TD+160. As for myself, I will stick to my previously published analysis: these issues, at these rates, are trading as pretend-five-year money. If they actually WERE five year money, I’d be scooping them up by the hatfull. If there was a 20-year no-call period and I could actually be assured of receiving these headline spreads for a lengthy period … back up the truck!

But since the credit risk is actually perpetual and my absolute best case scenario is that it’s five year money … I’ll wait until I’m actually paid to take on that credit risk.

Or, to put it another way … look at Table #1 in my previously published analysis: would you have bought this structure in February ’07 if the fixed rate had been 4.0% with a +60bp reset? If so, how would you feel?

Fixed-Resets – according to me – share the sales and investment philosophy of Principal Protected Notes:

  • Yes, in bad times there is a degree of risk mitigation
  • At all other times, you pay through the nose for it
New Issues

New Issue: TD Perpetual Fixed-Floating-Reset 5% + 160bp

And now there are four.

Hard on the heels of their second quarter report comes a new issue announcement:

it has entered into an agreement with a group of underwriters led by TD Securities Inc. for an issue of 8 million non-cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series S (the “Series S Shares”), carrying a face value of $25.00 per share, to raise gross proceeds of $200 million. TD intends to file in Canada a prospectus supplement to its January 11, 2007 base shelf prospectus in respect of this issue.
TD has also granted the underwriters an option to purchase, on the same terms, up to an additional 2 million Series S Shares. This option is exercisable in whole or in part by the underwriters at any time up to two business days prior to closing. The maximum gross proceeds raised under the offering will be $250 million should this option be exercised in full.
The Series S Shares will yield 5.00% per cent annually, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of the TD, for the initial period ending July 31, 2013. Thereafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years at a level of 160 basis points over the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield.
Holders of the Series S Shares will have the right to convert their shares into Non-cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series T (the “Series T Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on July 31, 2013, and on July 31 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series T Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating dividends, as and when declared by the
Board of Directors of TD, equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 160 basis points.
The issue qualifies as Tier 1 capital for TD and the expected closing date is June 11, 2008.

Issue: Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares, Series S

Size: 8-million shares @ $25.00 = $200-million

Greenshoe: 2-million shares (= $50-million) up to two days prior to closing.

Ratings: DBRS: Pfd-1; S&P: P-1(low); Moody’s: Aa2

Dividends: 5.00% until first Exchange Date; reset to 5-Year Canadas + 160bp every exchange date.

Convertible: Back & forth between Series T Floaters every exchange date. Series T pays 90-day T-Bills + 160bp

Exchange Date: July 31, 2013 and every five years thereafter

Redemption: Series S & Series T redeemable every exchange date at $25.00. Series T redeemable any other time at $25.50.

Rank: Parri Passu with all other preferreds, senior to common

Closing: June 11, 2008

Well … if I didn’t like the other ones, I’m not going to like these ones! But it looks like the structure is popular, so I guess I’d better start going over the HIMIPref™ code and determining just what will need to be done before I can add them to the universe.

As I’ve stated before … I’ll be adding the class to HIMIPref™ as soon as there are enough outstanding so that one could reasonably expect to execute profitable trades within the class.

Update, 2013-6-22: This trades as TD.PR.S

Market Action

May 28, 2008

It seems like most of the interesting news lately has been sufficiently important to merit separate posts, so these daily reviews have been suffering!

Today Mishkin announced his resignation from the Fed Board:

Mishkin, 57, on a leave of absence from [Columbia University], will step down as of Aug. 31, the Fed said in a statement today, also releasing his letter of resignation to President George W. Bush.

The departure may create an unprecedented third vacancy on the seven-member Fed Board of Governors this year as the central bank tries to ease the credit crisis. The vacancies mean that a new U.S. president to be inaugurated in January may have an opportunity to influence monetary and regulatory policy by nominating new members to the board.

Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd, a Democrat from Connecticut, has already delayed a confirmation vote for three board nominees for more than a year. After gaining support from the committee, the nominations would go to the full Senate for a vote of final approval.

Hey, who cares about the direction of the world’s most important Central Bank when when there are political games that can be played?

It’s not like the Fed doesn’t have a plateful of problems – JPMorgan is calling for US Inflation of over 5%

Not bad, with long treasuries at 4.6%, eh? Fisher is continuing his anti-inflation drum-beating:

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher said he expects the central bank would raise the benchmark U.S. interest rate should the public begin to expect greater gains in consumer prices.

“If inflationary developments and, more important, inflation expectations continue to worsen, I would expect a change of course in monetary policy to occur sooner rather than later, even in the face of an anemic” economy, Fisher said today in the text of a speech in San Francisco.

Fed bank presidents, including Gary Stern of Minneapolis and Thomas Hoenig of Kansas City, have expressed growing concern this month about rising prices. Fisher, 59, is the only member of the Federal Open Market Committee to dissent three times from decisions to lower the overnight bank-lending rate, favoring either no change or less aggressive reduction.

There’s an interesting and rather heretical piece on VoxEU by Cournand and Heinemann titled Can Central Banks Talk too Much?:

Public information is a double-edged sword: it conveys valuable information, but it leads agents pursuing coordination to condition their actions on public announcements more than optimal. In this respect, Morris and Shin (2002) have shown that noisy public announcements may be detrimental to welfare. They conclude that central banks should commit to withholding relevant information or deliberately reduce its precision. This result has received a great deal of attention in the academic literature, in the financial press (see for example the Economist (2004)), and among central banks.

Far from being perfect, all these means of communication allow the central bank to provide partially public information and avoid market overreactions to information of poor quality. To some extent, these means play a role in the actual policy of central banks already. Therefore, our results give a rationale for central banks releasing partially public information in addition to official publications. Our main result shows that these means of partial publicity should only be employed for announcements of low precision.

In other words … the bond market is excitable, so let’s just feed it pablum.

I don’t like the idea: it’s too big-brotherish. Much better would be the use of fan charts, as mentioned on January 18 with other methods of conveying the idea that such-and-such information is only a best guess. Excitable bond markets are great! A long term investor with half a brain can make good money out of them! Why should I – or any other PrefBlog reader – seek to prevent cowboys from losing all their clients’ money?

As reported by Bloomberg, S&P today downgraded a swath of Alt-A paper:

The classes affected by the negative rating actions represent an issuance amount of approximately $33.95 billion, or about 13.92% of the par amount of U.S. RMBS transactions backed by Alt-A mortgage loans rated by Standard & Poor’s in the first half of 2007.

Due to current market conditions,
we are assuming that it will take approximately 15 months to liquidate loans in foreclosure and approximately eight months to liquidate loans categorized as real estate owned (REO). In addition, we are assuming a loss severity of 34% for U.S. Alt-A RMBS transactions backed by fixed-rate and long-rest hybrid (fixed-rate period of at least five years) loan collateral issued in 2007. We are assuming a loss severity of 35% for transactions issued in 2007 that are backed by mortgage loans that have a negative amortization feature. We are also assuming a loss severity of 35% for transactions backed by adjustable-rate and short-rest hybrid loan collateral (fixed-rate period of less than five years).

Monthly performance data reveal that delinquencies and foreclosures continue to accumulate for the 2007-vintage U.S. Alt-A RMBS transactions. As of the April 2008 distribution date, serious delinquencies (90-day, foreclosures, and REOs) among all U.S. Alt-A RMBS transactions issued during 2007 were 6.64%, up 64.76% since January 2008. During this same time, cumulative realized losses for 2007-vintage Alt-A deals increased to 0.08% from 0.02%.

The analysis performed during this review has allowed Standard & Poor’s to project losses for each of the three types of Alt-A transactions issued during the first half of 2007. We project aggregate lifetime losses of 8.15%-8.65% of the original balance for the transactions with negative amortizing collateral. We project aggregate lifetime losses of 6.40%-6.90% for the transactions backed by fixed-rate and long-reset hybrid collateral. Finally, we project
aggregate lifetime losses of 7.00%-7.50% for the transactions backed by adjustable-rate and short-rest hybrid collateral.

Unless we observe a significant change in the macroeconomic environment, Standard & Poor’s considers today’s actions, except for the CreditWatch placements, to be the last major changes to the ratings on the U.S. Alt-A RMBS classes issued during the first half of 2007.

Moody’s has released a report (available to subscribers only) regarding the CDS market. According to their press release:

“The notion that credit default swaps represent this $62 trillion long credit exposure is not an accurate depiction of the market nor particularly helpful to investors in determining where the true risks lie,” says Moody’s AVP/Analyst Alexander Yavorsky, one of the authors of the report, referring to the oft-cited figure for the notional amount of CDS contracts outstanding.

Yavorsky says a more useful number when looking at the CDS market is the gross replacement value, of outstanding contracts, which at just over $2 trillion is under 3.5% of the notional amount.

More concerning to Moody’s than an increase in underlying credit losses is the potential for market disruption through the failure of a major bank or broker-dealer.

If a large CDS counterparty failed, this would very likely have a substantial market-wide re-pricing effect on the cost of CDS protection, and, by extension, the underlying cash bonds. The effect of this would be especially problematic for firms needing to replace the CDS trades they had with the failed counterparty. Until the trades were replaced — an operationally challenging and unprecedented undertaking — the firms that lost protection would be left with unhedged exposures amid what is likely to be a very volatile market environment.

Moody’s also notes, however, that the systemic importance of the largest CDS dealers provides powerful incentives to regulators to prevent their disorderly failure, as demonstrated by the recent case of Bear Stearns. The more important the role played by an institution the more likely regulators will consider it to be too systemically important to fail.

The Canada Pension Plan released its 2008 Annual Report, showing a benchmark portfolio of 25% Canadian Equities, 40% Foreign Equities, 25% Fixed Income and 10% Canadian Real Return Bonds; benchmark performance for the year was -2.7% as foreign equities got hammered. They outperformed by 241bp; actual allocations – as reported – were 23.5% Canadian Equities, 39.2% Foreign Equities, 24.3% Fixed Income and 11.7% “Inflation Sensitive Assets”, which includes real-estate and infrastructure, not just RRBs.

So … it’s only one year and you’d have to do a whole lot more work before you took a view on their skill …. but it shows what you can do when you have a captive client and don’t have to worry about explaining the latest headline. For example:

As a result, in September, we committed a total of US$2 billion ($2 billion) in funds managed by Apollo Management and the Blackstone Group to begin to establish a diversified portfolio of senior secured loans that were available at significant discounts to face value, of which approximately US$667 million ($666 million) has been invested to date. The CPP Investment Board had both the liquidity and knowledge needed to prudently purchase this senior performing debt at discounted prices and we are confident that this investment will deliver superior long term risk-adjusted returns.

The second example is our investment in distressed mortgage funds to take advantage of heavily discounted prices following the credit crisis. During the fiscal year, we committed a total of $750 million to two distressed mortgage funds run by very experienced fund managers, Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO) and BlackRock, Inc. To date, approximately US$500 million ($513 million) has been invested.

It appears probable, therefore, that at least part of the CPP money was involved in the Hapaolim / PIMCO deal mentioned May 22 – which I suggested was a fantastic buy for PIMCO. You won’t find too many pension plans doing that sort of thing … first, it involved fund management hiring an external specialist (which, for most firms, involves sharing the fee) and second, everybody knows that all sub-prime securities are level-3 toxic trash that will go to zero soon, if not negative. It said so in the paper yesterday!

Volume was normal today, with no particularly violent price trends apparent.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.37% 3.37% 52,379 0.08 1 +0.3840% 1,114.6
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.69% 63,968 16.01 7 -0.4083% 1,030.9
Floater 4.08% 4.13% 62,999 17.10 2 +1.1541% 925.6
Op. Retract 4.82% 2.39% 89,315 2.69 15 -0.0762% 1,056.7
Split-Share 5.27% 5.42% 69,232 4.15 13 -0.0486% 1,058.9
Interest Bearing 6.12% 6.09% 53,543 3.81 3 +0.7086% 1,113.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.88% 5.51% 129,584 2.89 9 +0.0396% 1,023.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.65% 5.70% 291,408 14.33 63 -0.0290% 927.8
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -1.8565%  
DFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.0952% Asset coverage of 2.5+:1 as of May 15 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.94% based on a bid of 10.18 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.0952% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.89% based on a bid of 20.77 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.0120% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 20.54 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.7759% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 22.80 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +2.1875% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of May 23 according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.62% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.66 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.B Floater +2.2671%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.A OpRet 356,755 Nesbitt crossed 200,000 at 26.10, then another 150,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -6.38% based on a bid of 26.11 and a call 2008-6-27 at 25.75.
CM.PR.R OpRet 269,290 Nesbitt crossed 200,000 at 26.20, then another 65,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -7.0401% based on a bid of 26.11 and a call 2008-6-27 at 25.75.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 87,764 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 20.86 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 61,300 RBC crossed 25,900 at 21.55, then the same amount at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 21.52 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 57,268 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 20.85. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 20.82 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.