Category: Market Action

The BoC maintained the policy rate:

The Bank of Canada today held its target for the overnight rate at 4½%, with the Bank Rate at 4¾% and the deposit rate at 4½%. The Bank is also continuing its policy of quantitative tightening.

Global economic developments have evolved broadly in line with the outlook in the January Monetary Policy Report (MPR). Global growth continues to slow, and inflation, while still too high, is coming down due primarily to lower energy prices. In the United States and Europe, near-term outlooks for growth and inflation are both somewhat higher than expected in January. In particular, labour markets remain tight, and elevated core inflation is persisting. Growth in China is rebounding in the first quarter. Commodity prices have evolved roughly in line with the Bank’s expectations, but the strength of China’s recovery and the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine remain key sources of upside risk. Financial conditions have tightened since January, and the US dollar has strengthened.

In Canada, economic growth came in flat in the fourth quarter of 2022, lower than the Bank projected. With consumption, government spending and net exports all increasing, the weaker-than-expected GDP was largely because of a sizeable slowdown in inventory investment. Restrictive monetary policy continues to weigh on household spending, and business investment has weakened alongside slowing domestic and foreign demand.

The labour market remains very tight. Employment growth has been surprisingly strong, the unemployment rate remains near historic lows, and job vacancies are elevated. Wages continue to grow at 4% to 5%, while productivity has declined in recent quarters.

Inflation eased to 5.9% in January, reflecting lower price increases for energy, durable goods and some services. Price increases for food and shelter remain high, causing continued hardship for Canadians. With weak economic growth for the next couple of quarters, pressures in product and labour markets are expected to ease. This should moderate wage growth and also increase competitive pressures, making it more difficult for businesses to pass on higher costs to consumers.

Overall, the latest data remains in line with the Bank’s expectation that CPI inflation will come down to around 3% in the middle of this year. Year-over-year measures of core inflation ticked down to about 5%, and 3-month measures are around 3½%. Both will need to come down further, as will short-term inflation expectations, to return inflation to the 2% target.

At its January decision, the Governing Council indicated that it expected to hold the policy interest rate at its current level, conditional on economic developments evolving broadly in line with the MPR outlook. Based on its assessment of recent data, Governing Council decided to maintain the policy rate at 4½%. Quantitative tightening is complementing this restrictive stance. Governing Council will continue to assess economic developments and the impact of past interest rate increases, and is prepared to increase the policy rate further if needed to return inflation to the 2% target. The Bank remains resolute in its commitment to restoring price stability for Canadians.

Mark Rendell of the G&M comments:

Interest rate swaps, which capture market expectations about future rate hikes, are pricing in another quarter-point rate increase this summer, and no rate cuts before the end of the year.
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Much of the decline in inflation has come from falling oil prices, as well as a drop in durable goods inflation, thanks to lower shipping costs and less consumer demand. For inflation to keep falling, there will also need to be a slowdown in service price inflation, which is driven to a large extent by wages.

Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, gave a speech titled The Quick and the Dead: building up cyber resilience in the financial sector:

The Euro Cyber Resilience Board for pan-European Financial Infrastructures (ECRB) has played a key role in protecting the security and integrity of the financial system from these threats. The last three years have shown that we can work under adverse conditions towards a common goal. Our financial infrastructures have proven their resilience to cyber threats. But this does not mean we can become complacent or any less vigilant in the face of cyber threats. We simply cannot afford to fall behind the curve: cybersecurity must be the backbone of digital finance.

Today I will take stock of the ECRB’s work. I will then discuss current cyber threats and emerging risks before outlining the implications for our work in the future.
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The recent cyberattack on the third-party provider ION Cleared Derivatives shows how an attack on one software provider may cascade onto their clients. In this specific case, the disruptions to the trading and clearing of financial derivatives remained limited, but we cannot ignore scenarios where the attacks could have propagated quickly, disrupting the financial system.

This case signalled the need for financial entities to review their third-party providers, the providers of these third-parties, their cyber resilience levels and the systemic impact that may ensue from a cyberattack on any of these providers. In particular, it is vital to assess critical service dependencies on third-party products and services which could be disrupted or even terminated as a result of a cyberattack. Mitigating measures need to be put in place.
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Ransomware attacks are growing more sophisticated and damaging, which in turn may enable ransomware threat actors to obtain even more resources. 2022 was one of the most active years for ransomware activity. However, it was also the first year that the majority of victims of ransomware attacks decided not to pay up, which indicates that the approach towards ransomware attacks is changing.

Authorities globally are stepping up their efforts to counter ransomware. For instance, the G7 issued
Fundamental Principles on Ransomware Resilience in October 2022.

We need to tackle ransomware attacks from various angles.

First, every firm must be ready to repel ransomware attacks, either through the use of proper cyber hygiene practices or by ensuring that data is backed up regularly and is kept up-to-date and tamper-proof.

Second, enforcement agencies need to conduct forensic analyses, locate attackers and join forces to prosecute them.

Third, crypto-assets – especially unbacked crypto-assets, which are used to make ransomware payments owing to the anonymity and money laundering possibilities they offer – need to be strictly regulated. Similarly, crypto-asset transfers must be traceable.

The proposed EU Regulation for Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) and revision to the Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds, which extends the “travel rule” to crypto-assets, are important steps. However, to be effective and prevent regulatory arbitrage, regulation must be stepped up globally. Implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) guidance for crypto-assets and its enforcement at international level are therefore crucial.
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Even if we do not realise it, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is already widespread. We use AI every day, including on our phones, in our homes and at the workplace. And firms use it to harness big data.

AI can help to strengthen cybersecurity, for instance, by improving the detection of highly sophisticated cyberattacks through its ability to identify abnormal system behaviour compared with an established baseline. This is the kind of potential that we need to leverage.

But AI can also multiply cyber risks by, for instance, helping malicious individuals, even those who have limited or no technical skills, draft very convincing phishing emails or identify topics that will achieve the maximum engagement from those being targeted. To make matters worse, AI can even create and fix code that can be used to exploit and compromise the endpoint. This opens up new possibilities for malicious individuals to use AI to launch cyberattacks. Although AI development firms try to install safeguards to prevent its unethical use, they can be circumvented.

Andrew Hauser, Executive Director for Markets of the Bank of England, gave a speech at the Chicago Booth Initiative on Global Markets’ Workshop on Market Dysfunction titled Looking through a glass
onion: lessons from the 2022 LDI intervention:

If the mayhem in financial markets in Spring 2020 had been a genuine one-off, that might have been the end of things. But what Lorie and I wanted to highlight was that, while Covid itself may have been truly exceptional, the financial market propagation mechanisms that turned that shock into a nascent systemic liquidity crisis reflected more structural trends: an increasing reliance by the real economy on core capital markets rather than banks; constraints on market intermediation capacity; and a range of unresolved vulnerabilities in non-bank firms that played an ever-growing role in those markets. In short, even if nothing as awful as Covid ever happened again, market dysfunction at a scale capable of threatening systemic stability could recur – and in all likelihood, would do so. And central banks needed to be ready to play their part.
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In my remarks today, I want to discuss four main lessons that I take from those events: The LDI operations were successful, but highlight many questions for the future. For me, three in particular stand out:

1. The changing nature of systemic liquidity risk: though focus naturally alights on the idiosyncrasies of the autumn fiscal announcements and the UK LDI sector, the real import lies in the features the events had in common with the dash for cash and other similar developments: another reminder, if more were needed, that we face a new era of liquidity risk, originating outside the banking system, that can amplify shocks, destabilise core markets and undermine monetary and financial stability.

2. Public backstops vs private self insurance: as a central bank it fell to us to provide a public backstop to prevent systemic liquidity risk from undermining monetary and financial stability. At the same time, the events revealed material weaknesses in pension fund and LDI risk management. Given the costs involved, we must ensure public backstops do not end up substituting for a failure to achieve the appropriate level of private insurance against liquidity risk here and elsewhere in the non-bank sector.

3. Ensuring we have central bank tools that are effective: to backstop these new forms of systemic liquidity risk effectively, central banks need the right tools – to detect risks in a timely way; and to respond. In the LDI case, early warning required the use of qualitative as well as quantitative market intelligence. Effective response required the use of a buy/sell facility. Lending directly to non-banks would not have worked in this case. But it has many desirable properties for other scenarios, and is a high priority for future work.

4. Calibrating central bank tools to minimise risk: backstop facilities must be carefully designed if they are to be effective in removing the threat to systemic stability while minimising risks to the stance of monetary policy, to public funds, and to the incentives of market participants. In the LDI case, we sought to achieve that by grounding the objectives of the tool in restoring financial stability, targeting it on the parts of the market most in need of assistance, pricing it as a backstop to ensure we bought no more than needed, and ensuring it was strictly time limited, in its operation and in its unwind.

The LDI operations were successful, but highlight many questions for the future. For me, three in
particular stand out:

• Where do societies want to draw the line between public and private insurance against systemic liquidity in non-banks, and how do they ensure regulatory and central bank facility thinking develops in a co-ordinated way?
• What is the right mix of central bank tools between buy/sell and lending/repo facilities? Where lending is preferred, which firms do we need to reach to maintain stability; how do ensure we can reach them (legally and operationally); and what terms and conditions should they face?
• What are the pros and cons of establishing standing facilities, whose terms and conditions are known in advance; versus simply ensuring we are ready to act in a more discretionary ways as/when required?

In terms of the intervention tool itself, we would have much preferred to rely solely on collateralised
lending. But this wasn’t viable, for the simple reason that there was no-one either willing to, or capable of, borrowing from us at sufficient speed to staunch the firesale dynamic. The LDI funds themselves needed less leverage not more. The pension funds that invested in the LDI funds had collateral, but many lacked the ability to borrow, and anyway were too numerous and preoccupied in time-consuming processes aimed at reaching formal decisions as to whether to recapitalise their investments to act at the speed required. We had many ways to provide liquidity to the banks,[12] but they were already flush with liquidity, and no better placed than we were to pass liquidity on, either to pension schemes or LDI funds.[13] In the circumstances we faced, therefore, a buy/sell tool proved the only way to stop firesale dynamics in a timely manner (Figure 3).

This is clearly not where we want to be in the steady state. Collateralised lending programmes targeted directly at an appropriate set of non-banks would be materially less risky, to public money and to market incentives; they would pose fewer potential conflicts with monetary policy; and could be put in place ahead of potential shocks, with well-understood operational, collateral and pricing terms. Developing viable options for such facilities is therefore a high priority on our work programme. There are at least three key sets of operational design questions to tackle. First, which non-banks do you need to be able to get liquidity to, in order to stem potential systemic shocks effectively? Second, are those non-banks able to borrow (or can we devise mechanisms to allow them to do so), both in terms of their legal remits, and in terms of their operational arrangements? And, third, what terms and conditions would we want to impose on borrowers, including pricing, collateral requirements and any access conditions – including regulatory status? I have to say that my instincts are that finding a workable group of non-bank entities that are (a) collectively systemically important enough to allow us to maintain stability, (b) legally and operationally able to borrow at sufficient size and speed, and (c) willing to meet the conditions of a borrowing programme, could be challenging. But some central banks, for instance the Canadians,[14] have made important progress in this area – and we will be learning from them and others.

Footnote 14 is: See for instance: Canada: Contingent Term Repo Facility (yale.edu) and COVID-19 crisis: Liquidity management at Canada’s largest public pension funds (bankofcanada.ca).
And, just to put things in perspective:

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.37%, equivalent to 8.28% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates yielded 5.17% on 2023-2-28 and since then the closing price has changed from 14.83 to 15.00, an increase of 115bp in price, with a Duration of 12.26 (BMO doesn’t specify whether this is Macaulay or Modified Duration; I will assume Modified) which implies a decline in yield of about 9bp since 2/28 to 5.08%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) has widened substantially to about 320bp from the 295bp reported March 1.

TXPR closed at 567.37, down 0.51% on the day. Volume today was 1.50-million, third-highest of the past 21 trading days.

CPD closed at 11.27, down 0.35% on the day. Volume was 93,900, above the median of the past 21 trading days.

ZPR closed at 9.39, down 0.42% on the day. Volume was 247,320, second-highest of the past 21 trading days.

Five-year Canada yields were at 3.59% today.

Life wasn’t exactly rosy in other markets, which the pundits attribute to Powell’s testimony to Congress:

Of Wall Street’s three major indexes, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost most ground with a 1.7% decline, while the S&P 500 fell 1.5% and the Nasdaq Composite lost almost 1.3%. The S&P/TSX Composite Index lost 1.2%.

Powell sent stock investors fleeing when he told U.S. lawmakers earlier in the day that the Fed is prepared to hike rates in larger steps if future economic data suggests tougher measures are needed to control rising prices.

The remarks followed recent data showing an unexpected inflation increase in January and an unusually large jobs gain for the month.

Traders dramatically raised their bets for a 50-basis-point rate hike in March after Powell’s comments, with money market futures last pricing in a more than 70% chance of such a move, up from around 31% on Monday, according to CME Group’s FedWatch tool.
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The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 574.98 points to 32,856.46; the S&P 500 lost 62.05 points to 3,986.37; and the Nasdaq Composite dropped 145.40 points to 11,530.33.

All 11 major S&P sectors closed lower, led by economically sensitive financials which finished down 2.5%. Declining least was the consumer staples index, down 0.97%.
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Meanwhile, the yield on two-year Treasury notes, which best reflects short-term rate expectations, hit 5% for the first time since July 2007.
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The Toronto Stock Exchange’s S&P/TSX composite index ended down 239.26 points at 20,275.54, its lowest closing level since last Wednesday

The NYT reported:

Mr. Powell, in remarks before the Senate Banking Committee, also noted that the Fed’s fight against inflation was “very likely” to come at some cost to the labor market.

His comments were the clearest acknowledgment yet that recent reports showing inflation remains stubborn and the job market remains resilient are likely to shake up the policy trajectory for America’s central bank.
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But a number of recent economic reports have suggested that inflation did not weaken as much as expected last year and remained faster than expected in January, while other data showed hiring remains strong and consumer spending picked up at the start of the year.

While some of that momentum could have owed to mild January weather — conditions allowed for shopping trips and construction — Mr. Powell said the unexpected strength would probably require a stronger policy response from the Fed.

“The process of getting inflation back down to 2 percent has a long way to go and is likely to be bumpy,” he told the committee. “The latest economic data have come in stronger than expected, which suggests that the ultimate level of interest rates is likely to be higher than previously anticipated.”

Fed officials projected in December that rates would rise to a peak of 5 to 5.25 percent, with a few penciling in a slightly higher 5.25 to 5.5 percent. Mr. Powell suggested that the peak rate would need to be adjusted by more than that, without specifying how much more.

The Boston Fed has released a “Current Policy Perspective” by John Sabelhaus and Jeffrey P. Thompson titled “The Limited Role of Intergenerational Transfers for Understanding Racial Wealth Disparities”:

Transfers of wealth between generations—whether through inheritances or inter vivos gifts—are less important in explaining racial disparities in wealth than might be expected. While this factor looms large in the media’s discussions of racial inequality, it explains relatively little of the disparities evident in the data. One reason is that most people, regardless of race, receive no inheritance or other transfer of substantial value. In addition, most recipients of inheritances ultimately consume those bequests and do not plan to leave substantial gifts to their offspring. Further, the assets that account for a large majority of most households’ wealth (employment-based retirement plans and home equity) are not inherited and accumulate slowly over families’ working lives.

Using nonparametric decomposition techniques, we show that intergenerational transfers explain only a modest portion of disparities between white and non-white families. This finding is consistent with prior research, but we improve upon the existing literature in a variety of ways, including augmenting the wealth measure in the Survey of Consumer Finances to account for the value of defined benefit pensions, adding controls for lifetime earnings and the availability and generosity of employer-provided pensions, and capturing some inheritances and inter vivos transfers that are not typically reflected in most studies. When no other controls are included, we find that differences in intergenerational transfers account for 13 to 16 percent of white/non-white private wealth gaps. When we control for lifetime earnings, workplace pensions, and a handful of additional human capital variables, the marginal contribution of intergenerational transfers shrinks considerably, but the combined portion of the racial wealth gap that is explained rises to 80 to 90 percent. Policymakers interested in helping households build wealth are advised to look to ways that would enable them to boost the earnings that they receive over their lifetime.

The Canadian Securities Administrators are touting a software update for SEDAR. I have sent them an eMail with a question:

I understand that improvements to SEDAR “will produce better data for all stakeholders, so that analysts, investors, governments, academics and others can easily access and analyze robust data from the system to gain deeper insights into the state of the Canadian capital markets.” ( https://www.securities-administrators.ca/about-sedar/sedar-frequently-asked-questions/ )

Will the new system allow direct linking to any specific document at will by any of these analysts, investors, governments, academics and others without the necessity of obtaining written permission? Will access to an API make it possible for these users to devise their own search and download routines?

Please advise.

Sincerely,

Feel free to send them an eMail of your own!

The IMF has published an article by MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER titled RETHINKING MONETARY POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD:

Although financial stability remains an important concern, there are important differences between the current environment and the one that followed the global financial crisis:

• Public debt is now high, so any interest rate increase to fend off inflation threats makes servicing the debt more expensive—with immediate and large adverse fiscal implications for the government. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis in early 2020, it is also evident that fiscal policy can be a significant driver of inflation.
• Instead of deflationary pressures, most countries are experiencing excessive inflation. That means there is now a clear trade-off between a monetary policy that tries to reduce aggregate demand by raising interest rates and one that aims to ensure financial stability.
• The nature and frequency of shocks have changed. Historically shocks were mostly from increases or decreases in demand—with the prominent exception of the supply shocks during the so-called stagflation of the 1970s. Now there are many shocks: demand vs. supply, specific risks vs. systemic risks, transitory vs. permanent. It is difficult to identify the true nature of these shocks in time to respond. Central bankers need to be more humble.

The low interest rates and less extreme public debt levels that prevailed after the global crisis permitted central banks to ignore what were then relatively inconsequential interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. The period following the 2008 crisis was one of monetary dominance—that is, central banks could freely set interest rates and pursue their objectives independent of fiscal policy.
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A key question for policy is what determines the winner of any contest between fiscal and monetary dominance. Legal guarantees of central bank independence are insufficient, by themselves, to guarantee monetary dominance: legislatures can threaten to change laws and international treaties can be ignored, which could cause a central bank to hold off its preferred policy. To promote monetary dominance, the central bank must remain well capitalized: if it requires frequent recapitalization from the government, the central bank looks weak and risks losing public support. Central banks with large balance sheets that contain many risky assets and pay interest on the reserves to private banks may have large losses as interest rates rise. Those losses could result in increased pressure from fiscal authorities to refrain from raising interest rates.

I haven’t written about drones for a long time. Let’s fix that:

The global commercial drone market hit US$8.15-billion in 2022, and it will rise to US$47.38-billion by 2030, according to Strategic Market Research – and North America is the leading market for commercial drone applications. The combination of automation with drone technology brings together two rapidly advancing fields in new and increasingly complex ways. The global autonomous drone market is expected to be worth US$56.5-billion US by 2030, up from US$15.5-billion today, according to a report by Markets N Research.

Those applications cut across industries, with both technological advances and growing adoption in the construction, agricultural and logistics industries driving the market.
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Drones also offer significant potential advantages for delivery services, says Dan O’Toole, CEO and founder of Dronedek, which is developing smart technology-enabled mailboxes for autonomous drone deliveries.

As they mature, drone delivery services can offer cost and time savings over traditional methods, with added benefits like cutting the number of vehicles on the road and reducing labour needs, Mr. O’Toole says. Data released by McKinsey earlier this year indicated the number of daily drone deliveries continues to grow and that as it matures, the tech has the potential to lower both costs and carbon emissions compared with other forms of delivery transport.

“Drones could become an important part of the delivery supply chain,” the report reads, noting that more than 2,000 commercial drone deliveries took place each day in early 2022.

Yes! We want drone delivery! It’s 4am! Where’s my pizza?

Good news from the justice system!

After a 17-year court battle, an Ontario judge has ruled in favour of retail investors who suffered losses as two Canadian companies had let big investors make profitable, improper trades in a number of their funds.

Ontario Superior Court Justice Markus Koehnen in February found that both CI Mutual Funds Inc. and AIC Limited, which is now known as AIC Global Holdings Inc., breached their duty of care to prevent market-timing trades in their funds.
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The class action includes any investors who held money in AIC funds from Jan. 1, 1999, to Sept. 30, 2003, or CI Mutual funds from Sept. 1, 1998, to Sept. 30, 2003. Counsel for the plaintiffs estimate damages to investors could total as much as $674-million.

“There was ample evidence before me to demonstrate that the standard of care during the class period required the defendants to be aware of the dangers of frequent trading in and out of their funds and take reasonable steps to prevent it,” Justice Koehnen said in the court decision. “The harm that frequent trading causes to long-term unitholders has been known for decades.”
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Justice Koehnen said in his decision that mutual fund prospectuses – documents that are provided to investors upon purchasing a fund – warned that frequent trading caused harm to funds and could result in fees of up to 2 per cent being charged to participants.

Despite the contents of their prospectuses, the defendants not only failed to take steps to prevent frequent trading or charge the fees set out in their prospectuses when it occurred, they facilitated the practice by entering into “switch agreements” that allowed certain investors to switch in and out of funds for a much lesser fee of only 0.2 per cent.

The press always gets the issue wrong. The issue isn’t frequent trading, per se, but allowing trades based on stale prices. The fund companies were either crooked or stupid: I don’t care which, I’m just hoping they get bankrupted by the judgement.

The New York Fed has updated the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index:

• Global supply chain pressures decreased considerably in February and are now below the historical average.
• There were significant downward contributions by the majority of the factors, with the largest negative contribution from European Area delivery times.
• The GSCPI’s recent movements suggest that global supply chain conditions have returned to normal after experiencing temporary setbacks around the turn of the year.

BIS has released a working paper by Sonya Zhu titled Volume dynamics around FOMC announcements:

Focus
From 1994 to 2011, about 80% of excess returns in the equity market could be obtained in the 24 hours before scheduled Federal Open Committee (FOMC) announcements. In the standard economic paradigm, price is determined through trading between buyers and sellers. The 1987 market crash demonstrated that the mechanics of trading can significantly affect market prices. To shed light on the price formation process, this paper studies the volume dynamics around FOMC announcements.

Contribution
I quantify the volume changes in the stock market around FOMC announcements using intraday data. Most studies that analyse the impact of FOMC announcements on the stock market concentrate on price dynamics. In comparison, the evidence on volume dynamics is scant. I also link the FOMC volume dynamics to a theory of discretionary liquidity trading. Lastly, I examine the FOMC volume dynamics for individual stocks and link it to firm characteristics.

Findings
Turnover volume in the stock market decreases before FOMC announcements and increases afterward. Additionally, absolute order imbalance increases ahead of FOMC announcements, especially when the announcements are accompanied by policy rate changes. These findings are consistent with a theory in which some liquidity traders strategically choose to avoid trading at times when private information is present in the market. The FOMC volume dynamics are also found to be more pronounced for stocks that are more exposed to discretionary liquidity trading. On average, one third of the pre-FOMC price drift can be attributed to the volume dynamics and liquidity shocks.

Abstract
The stock market volume decreases in anticipation of FOMC announcements and increases afterward. I develop a stylized model and attribute the volume dynamics to discretionary liquidity trading resulting from the presence of private information. Consistent with the model’s prediction, I find information asymmetry increases ahead of FOMC announcements, especially before policy rate changes. Using firm-level high-frequency data, I also find, in the cross-section, that volume changes around these events are particularly stronger for stocks that are more exposed to discretionary liquidity trading. Volume dynamics and liquidity shocks can explain around one third of the pre-FOMC price drift

The Boston Fed has released a Research Department Working Paper by Lara Loewenstein and Paul S. Willen titled House Prices and Rents in the 21st Century:

This paper introduces a framework for interpreting fluctuations in house prices using a new data set of transactions involving single-family and small multifamily homes. The data set includes information on owner- and renter-occupied properties, and it includes sale and rent transactions. The data enable the authors to measure price growth on both types of properties and to calculate a price-to-rent ratio using only renter-occupied properties—properties that are explicitly comparable.

The authors look at the potential drivers of house-price and rent movements during their sample period of 2001 through 2021. These include increases in preferences for housing (preference shocks) and beliefs about future house-price price growth (expectation shocks). Expectation shocks, which generate self-fulfilling price increases, are often the cause of housing bubbles.

While each of the shocks that the authors examine can increase house prices, their implications for the prices of renter-occupied housing, owner-occupied housing, and rent differ. By examining changes in rent, in the price-to-rent ratio, and in the ratio between the prices of owner-occupied houses and renter-occupied houses (the price-to-price ratio), the authors assess which type of shock can best explain the house-price booms of the early 2020s and the early 2000s.

Key Findings

The sources of growth in house prices varied during the sample period. Early in the period, the price-to-rent ratio and the price-to-price ratio determined house-price growth, while rent growth was relatively minimal. But in the latter years, rent growth became more important and was the main driver of house-price growth during the boom at the start of this decade.

According to theory, positive expectation shocks raise the price-to-rent ratio as households and investors buy houses partly in anticipation of future capital gains. Expectation shocks are a plausible explanation for the boom of the 2000s but not for the boom of the 2020s.

An increase in preferences for housing raises both rents and houses prices, according to theory, leaving the price-to-rent ratio unchanged. As noted above, rent growth was the main driver of house-price growth at the start of this decade. The authors find that of the 15 percentage point growth in house prices in 2021, about two-thirds came from nominal rent growth and only about one-quarter came from growth in the price-to-rent ratio. They therefore conclude that a preference shock is a plausible explanation for the boom.

US factory orders fell, but but by less than expected:

Factory orders dropped 1.6% after increasing 1.7% in December. Economists polled by Reuters had forecast orders declining 1.8%. Orders rose 4.3% on a year-on-year basis in January.
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The drop in factory orders in January mostly reflected a 13.3% decline in transportation equipment, which followed a 15.8% jump in December. Transportation equipment orders were weighed down by a 54.5% tumble in orders for civilian aircraft. Motor vehicle orders increased 1.3%.

Orders for machinery shot up 1.6%, while bookings for computers and electronic products rose 0.6%. Orders for electrical equipment, appliances and components surged 1.3%. There were also gains in orders for primary metals, fabricated metal products, as well as defense aircraft.

Shipments of manufactured goods increased 0.7%, the biggest gain since August, after falling 0.6% in December. The stock of manufactured goods at factories was unchanged after rising 0.4% in December. While that bodes well for future production, that could chip at gross domestic product this quarter.

Unfilled orders at factories were unchanged as a jump in unfinished work for computers and related products were offset by decreases in consumer goods.

Here’s a sign of the times from Vancouver:

Nearly six years after Vancouver became the largest city in Canada to commit to a living wage, councillors voted to end the initiative.

In a closed-door meeting in January, council approved the action and directed staff to implement what it calls a “fair wage,” by calculating the average of five years of living wages.

The city says in a statement that the living wage rate for 2023 would have gone up more than 17 per cent to just above $24 an hour, immediately influencing its pay structure.
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The living wage is the hourly amount two adults working full time must earn to support the basic needs of a family of four, but it does not cover debt repayment or savings for retirement.

The hourly living wage for Metro Vancouver is set at $24.08, but Anastasia French, with Living Wage for Families BC, says Vancouver’s change will cut earnings for its workers and contractors to at least $20.90 an hour.

We wouldn’t want to hike the property tax now, would we? But it could also be a good-faith effort to incorporate the subsidizing effect of rent control into the Living Wage calculation. The discussion of the calculation is interesting:

The BC living wage calculation has relied on the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) annual rental market survey for our estimate of rent, using its data for median monthly rent for units with three or more bedrooms in the primary rental market.

This number has always represented a very modest rent budget in Metro Vancouver and understated the financial pressures faced by families that have to move because it aggregates the rents paid by long-term tenants who have benefitted from BC’s rent control measures and those who have recently moved and typically pay higher rents. However, as vacancy rates have declined and housing prices spiked in Metro Vancouver and many other BC communities over the last 14 years, the difference in rents that new and long-term tenants are paying has sharply widened. Further complicating matters, the CMHC data only include purpose-built rental units, which are referred to as the primary rental market. The secondary rental market (i.e., renting privately owned houses and condos or basement and other secondary suites) has grown significantly since the living wage methodology was first developed but is not captured in the median rent figure.

As a result, the CMHC data on primary rental market median rents became an increasingly less reliable measure of the rents families are paying, and it now no longer reflects a realistic rent budget for a family with two young children (and likely hasn’t for the last few years). This is true both in Metro Vancouver and elsewhere in BC, as we heard loud and clear from our community calculation partners during the 2021 round of living wage calculations. To develop a more realistic estimate of the rent cost faced by families, we used 2016 census data to estimate the “moving penalty” faced by households who had to find housing within the previous year. We use the 2016 census data to estimate this moving penalty because it is the latest census data available at the time of writing.

The census data confirm that families with children move frequently. Within the previous year, 25 per cent of BC couple families with children had moved.6

These families paid considerably higher median rents—12 per cent higher in 2016 compared to the overall median (i.e., including longer-term and new tenancies). The data also show that the moving penalty is higher for households living in three-bedroom housing than for those living in one- or two-bedroom units.

We apply this moving penalty to the CMHC median rental figures for 2022 to get a more reliable estimate of the rent cost pressures faced by families in BC.

For Metro Vancouver, the moving penalty increases the living wage family’s rent costs from $1,952 (the CMHC median rent figure) to $2,186 monthly.

So if I’m reading that right, the Living Wage people are assuming that their model family moves each and every year and never gets any benefit at all from rent control. That doesn’t sound right. The basic idea sounds good, but it seems to me that their implementation assumption is a little extreme.

I have long thought that rent control has the unanticipated result of decreasing labour mobility, so it’s nice to see the concept get a nod here. I don’t advocate eliminating rent control; but I think the annual allowable increase should be inflation plus an increment (say, 1%?), rather than inflation with a cap or even a freeze, depending on which way the wind is blowing.

On a positive note, TC Energy’s pumped storage project took a step forward:

TC Energy Corporation (TSX, NYSE: TRP) (TC Energy or the Company) announced today that Meaford Municipal Council passed a resolution of support for the Company’s proposed Ontario Pumped Storage Project subject to conditions outlined below.

This development project is a transformative 1,000-megawatt clean energy storage facility, proposed for construction on the Department of National Defence’s 4th Canadian Division Training Centre in Meaford, Ontario. As one of Canada’s largest energy storage proposals, the project would provide safe, reliable power, support made-in-Ontario economic growth, and aid in the transition to emission-free power generation.
…
The Meaford Council’s support is contingent on TC Energy fulfilling the following conditions: 1) Reasonable cost recovery by TC Energy for all costs incurred by the Municipality; 2) Development of a regulatory plan to address the Municipality’s role throughout the project’s lifecycle; 3) Successful negotiation of a Community Benefits Agreement with the Municipality; and 4) Completion of all applicable federal and provincial environmental assessment processes and obtain all associated permits and approvals.

The IMF has published an article by Claudio Borio titled MONETARY POLICY UNDER TEST:

In the latest Bank for International Settlements Annual Economic Report, we offer a different perspective on the inflation process, one that yields a more sobering message. It sees inflation as a two-regime process—a low- and a high-inflation regime —with self-reinforcing transitions from low to high.

Inflation behaves very differently in the two regimes.

When inflation has settled at a low level, what we measure as increases in the overall price level mostly reflect price changes in specific sectors that are only loosely correlated with one another. Those price changes tend to leave but a temporary imprint on the inflation rate itself. Equally important, wages and prices, which are at the core of the inflation process, are only loosely linked to each other. As a result, inflation has certain self-stabilizing properties.

By contrast, a high-inflation regime has no such properties. The importance of the common component of price changes is much greater, wages and prices are more tightly linked, and inflation is especially sensitive to changes in salient prices, such as those of food and energy, as well as to fluctuations in the exchange rate.

The European inflation report was mixed:

Consumer prices in the 20 countries that use the euro as their currency rose at an annual rate of 8.5 percent in February, down slightly from January’s rate of 8.6 percent. Year-over-year rates have been declining since reaching a peak 10.6 percent in October.

But some of the largest economies showed troubling increases, and core inflation — a measure that excludes the most erratic categories like food and energy — rose to a record high of 5.6 percent in February, from 5.3 percent.

Interesting things are happening with mortgages:

New data from CIBC show that $52-billion worth of mortgages – the equivalent of 20 per cent of the bank’s $263-billion residential loan portfolio – were in a position where the borrower’s monthly payment was not high enough to cover even the interest portion of the loans. The bank has allowed these borrowers to stretch out the length of time it takes to pay off the loan, which is known as the amortization period. As well, borrowers are adding unpaid interest onto their original loan or principal.
…
CIBC’s filing, for the first quarter that ended in January, is the only one to provide increased transparency on the impact of higher interest rates on its variable-rate portfolio. The same filing said that in the fourth quarter, $39-billion worth of mortgages were negatively amortizing. That grew to $52-billion in the first quarter, said the footnote in the filing. Last summer, the bank said its borrowers were not yet putting unpaid interest onto the principal.
…
The most recent quarterly filings from the big banks show that a chunk of their mortgage loans have amortization periods of more than 30 years.

At BMO, the proportion of residential mortgages with amortization periods longer than 30 years reached 32.4 per cent in January. At CIBC, the percentage was 30 per cent. At TD it was 29.3 per cent and at Royal Bank of Canada, it was 25 per cent, according to their regulatory filings.

BIS has released a bulletin by Sarah Bell, Michael Chui, Tamara Gomes, Paul Moser-Boehm and Albert Pierres Tejada titled Why are central banks reporting losses? Does it matter?:

Key takeaways

• • Rising interest rates are reducing profits or even leading to losses at some central banks, especially those that purchased domestic currency assets for macroeconomic and financial stability objectives.
• • Losses and negative equity do not directly affect the ability of central banks to operate effectively.
• • In normal times and in crises, central banks should be judged on whether they fulfil their mandates.
• • Central banks can underscore their continued ability to achieve policy objectives by clearly explaining the reasons for losses and highlighting the overall benefits of their policy measures.

Central banks can mitigate the risk of misperception through effective communication to their stakeholders. They can clarify the context for potential losses, noting how the measures were undertaken to ensure price and economic stability over the medium and long-term for the benefit of households and businesses, which incidentally boosted economy-wide income and hence the overall tax base. In their public communications, central banks can prepare stakeholders for losses at the outset of policy interventions, explaining that APPs or other programmes carry financial risk. And they can reiterate these messages when losses are imminent, explaining how central bank finances work and that losses are not relevant for policy. Several central banks have already done so when publishing their recent financial statements or through other public communications.11

To conclude, a central bank’s credibility depends on its ability to achieve its mandates. Losses do not jeopardise that ability and are sometimes the price to pay for achieving those aims (Nordstrom and Vredin (2022)). To maintain the public’s trust and to preserve central bank legitimacy now and in the long run, stakeholders should appreciate that central banks’ policy mandates come before profits.

TD Bank’s acquisition of New Horizons might be in trouble:

TD-T … prospects of closing a major acquisition in the United States took a hit Wednesday after its merger partner, FHN-N … , disclosed that the deal is struggling to receive regulatory blessings in a timely manner.

In an annual filing, First Horizon, which is based in Memphis, Tenn., disclosed that TD TD-T … recently told its management team that TD does not expect to get the required regulatory approvals in time to complete the deal before May 27, which is when their merger agreement is set to expire.
…
First Horizon disclosed in its annual filing Wednesday that “receipt of regulatory approvals for the pending TD merger has taken longer than originally anticipated.”

First Horizon’s shares closed down 11 per cent to US$22.14. TD agreed to pay US$25 a share in a deal worth US$13.4-billion.

The IMF looks at its recent inflation forecasts:

The IMF produces and publishes its World Economic Outlook forecasts on a quarterly basis—these include GDP growth and inflation. We recently dissected the errors in our core inflation forecasts for the world’s economies—that is, forecasts of inflation stripped of the volatile effects of food and energy price swings.
…
We consider four factors that, with the benefit of hindsight, help us rationalize inflation underpredictions. First, as the pandemic shock hit, policymakers were quick to provide fiscal support to avoid deep scarring from the crisis. Still, forecasts projected some scarring, and output gap projections for 2021 foresaw a large contraction in economic activity compared with potential. Only in retrospect did it become clear that the output slump, relative to potential, was not as dire. Most world economies—almost 80 percent of world GDP—are now known to have had smaller output gaps than projected in early 2021, an indication that the rapid recovery in demand exceeded expectations.
…
Second, the strong demand recovery met highly strained supply chains. Supply chain bottlenecks are normally caused by either demand or supply shocks, rarely a combination of the two.
…
Third, the demand-supply imbalances were amplified by the shift in demand from services to goods during the early lockdown period as the leisure and hospitality sector mostly ceased functioning. This temporarily reversed a trend seen over the past couple of decades of goods inflation that was lower than services inflation.
…
Fourth, unprecedented labor market tightness, which persists to this day in some advanced economies, confounded some of the previous factors. Measured by the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, labor markets have been particularly tight in Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US, significantly correlating with the magnitude of these countries’ core inflation forecast errors.
…
One peculiar feature of the policy response to the pandemic in 2020 was the aggressive fiscal stimulus, which according to some observers resembled wartime spending. Importantly, this stimulus was part of the forecasters’ information set at the time. Our analysis shows that the size of the COVID-19 fiscal stimulus packages announced by different governments in 2020 correlates positively with core inflation forecast errors in advanced economies in 2021.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.31%, equivalent to 8.20% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates yielded 5.25% on 2023-2-24 and since then the closing price has changed from 14.72 to 14.74, an increase of 13bp in price, with a Duration of 12.20 (BMO doesn’t specify whether this is Macaulay or Modified Duration; I will assume Modified) which implies a decline in yield of about 1bp since 2/24 to 5.24%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) has widened slightly (and perhaps spuriously) to about 295bp from the 290bp reported February 22.

Mixed news on the economy:

On Tuesday, Statistics Canada said real gross domestic product was unchanged in the fourth quarter of 2022 after five consecutive quarters of growth.
…
After two quarters of record inventories, businesses accumulated less inventories in the fourth quarter, weighing significantly on real GDP growth.

Real business investment also declined for a third consecutive quarter as higher interest rates weakened housing investment in 2022.

In December, the economy contracted by 0.1 per cent as goods-producing industries declined.
…
A preliminary estimate from Statistics Canada suggests the economy bounced back in January, posting 0.3 per cent growth in real GDP.

Last month, the economy added 150,000 jobs, suggesting there’s still steam on the hiring front.

Economic models are getting more complicated:

But traditional models ignore income and wealth inequalities and assume that what’s good for the typical consumer, as defined by the models, must be good for the broader economy.

A newly developed class of quantitative models is particularly suited to guiding central bankers across this new monetary policy territory, in which the wealth and income distributions are a central consideration. Known as HANK models, they combine heterogeneous agent models (macroeconomists’ workhorse framework for studying income and wealth distributions) with New Keynesian models (the basic framework for studying monetary policy and movements in aggregate demand).

HANK models impart new lessons about redistribution and the heterogeneous effects of monetary policy and shed new light on traditional central bank objectives of inflation control and output stabilization. Here are four broad lessons, and some preliminary thoughts, on how HANK models may illuminate our current high-inflation environment.
…
The relative size of indirect versus direct channels depends mainly on the aggregate marginal propensity to consume (MPC), which measures how much of a household’s increase in income gets spent and how much is saved. In traditional models, which try to predict the impact of monetary policy on the typical consumer, the MPC is tiny, and consequently the indirect channels are insignificant. HANK models, instead, are built to be consistent with empirical evidence on consumption and saving behavior. Their aggregate MPC is roughly 10 times larger, and thus the various indirect effects dominate the transmission mechanism.
…
Many channels of monetary policy have divergent, and sometimes opposing, effects on different households. For example, the direct effects of interest rate changes depend on households’ balance sheets: rate cuts benefit debtors, whose interest payments decrease (such as households with adjustable-rate mortgages) and hurt savers, whose interest income falls. Monetary policy also has heterogeneous effects through its impact on inflation. First, inflation benefits households with lots of nominal debt that is revalued downward. Second, prices rise more for some goods than for others, and different households consume these goods in unequal proportions. Finally, the indirect effects of monetary policy on household disposable income are uneven because some households are more exposed to fluctuations in aggregate economic activity than others.
…
By introducing income and wealth inequality, HANK models reestablish a strong link between the two, showing how monetary policy leaves consequential “fiscal footprints.” When the central bank raises interest rates, the treasury’s borrowing costs increase, and the increase must be funded by raising taxes or lowering expenditures, now or in the future, or through future inflation. In HANK models, the details of how and when the government makes up this fiscal shortfall, and which households bear the burden, have a tremendous influence on the overall effects of interest rate hikes.
…
Studies of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in HANK models agree that the benefits of aggregate stabilization are dwarfed by the gains from directly alleviating hardship. Optimal policies in HANK models almost always favor redistributing toward hand-to-mouth households in downturns.

One may be tempted to read this as endorsement of using monetary policy to share prosperity and mitigate adversities. But monetary policy is a blunt tool for redistribution or insurance. HANK models tell us that fiscal policy is likely better suited for this task because it can be targeted more precisely to those in need of support.

The BoC has released a Staff Analytical Note by Ramisha Asghar, James Fudurich and Jane Voll titled Firms’ inflation expectations and price-setting behaviour in Canada: Evidence from a business survey:

Implementing effective monetary policy could be more challenging for central banks if firms expect inflation to be high. Tightening monetary policy slows price growth by reducing overall demand, slowing cost increases and raising competitive pressure on firms. But high inflation expectations may encourage large price increases if firms believe that cost growth will remain high after a tightening of monetary policy. If left unchecked, high inflation and elevated inflation expectations could cause a wage-price spiral, anchoring high inflation with harmful economic consequences.1 Because of this risk, understanding whether high inflation expectations are influencing firms’ price-setting behaviour is critical to know for an inflationtargeting central bank.

We investigate whether the recent period of high inflation has changed how Canadian firms set prices for their products and services.
…
We find little evidence that firms’ price setting is directly based on high inflation expectations. However, we find that widespread growth in input prices during a period of strong customer demand and reduced competition may have contributed to price increases that were larger than usual. This may explain some of the inflationary pressure observed in 2021 and early 2022. Furthermore, early evidence suggests that in the second half of 2022, price-setting behaviour was gradually returning to pre-pandemic practices, supporting a path for inflation to return to the inflation-control target range. However, the risk remains that high inflation may start to be reflected directly in output prices, which would make it more difficult for monetary policy to reduce inflation.

OMERS had a good year … as long as their valuation of private equity is accurate!

The return OMERS reported for 2022 fell short of an internal benchmark of 7.2 per cent that was set at the end of 2021, when market conditions looked rosier. But it compares favourably with widespread investment losses across the sector after stock and bond prices plunged in the first half of last year.

Last week, Quebec-based pension giant Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec reported a 5.6-per-cent loss in 2022. On average, Canadian defined pension plans performed much worse, with an average annual loss of 10.3 per cent, as measured by a typical mix of publicly held stocks and bonds tracked by Royal Bank of Canada’s RBC I&TS All Plan Universe.
…
Over 10 years, OMERS has averaged returns of 7.5 per cent, after expenses, which beat its multiyear benchmark of 7.4 per cent. The fund had assets of $124.2-billion as of Dec. 31, up from $119.5-billion at the end of June.
…
Though OMERS suffered losses in its equity and bond portfolios, which fell 5.4 per cent for the year, they were offset by returns from its investments in private assets, which include infrastructure, real estate and private equity.

Private equity investments returned 13.7 per cent, ahead of an internal benchmark of 11.2 per cent, and the companies OMERS invests in through the portfolio broadly held their valuations during the year. Infrastructure investments gained 12.5 per cent, beating a 7.7-per-cent benchmark. And real estate investments gained 13.6 per cent, topping a 7.1-per-cent benchmark.

Canaccord shareholders want more money:

A special committee of Canaccord Genuity Inc.’s CF-T +0.79%increase
board of directors has said a bid to take the independent Canadian investment bank private is too low, after a group of the company’s senior leaders officially launched the takeover attempt early Monday.

More than 50 members of the company’s management team, including chief executive Dan Daviau and board chair David Kassie, first announced plans last month to collectively launch the takeover bid, for $11.25 a share. The management group’s offer values the company at roughly $1.13-billion, despite a subsequent valuation prepared by Royal Bank of Canada RY-T +0.60%increase
for the special committee that found Canaccord to be worth significantly more.

While the offer price represents a nearly 42-per-cent premium over the 20-day average price of Canaccord’s stock as of Jan. 6 – the last trading day before the management group announced its intention to take the company private – it is roughly 32 per cent below Canaccord’s November, 2021, value of $16.52 a share. Canaccord stock has been consistently trading above the proposed offer price since the planned takeover bid was made public on Jan. 9, suggesting investors expect the initial offer price to rise.

My Facebook feed lit up today with people as far south as Montana, Wyoming and Illinois posting glorious, once-in-a-lifetime shots of the Aurora Borealis:

Pictures shared online showed a bright green glow that seemed to be radiating from the grassy hilltops of Scotland. Others showed pink shades filling the sky behind the Neolithic site of Stonehenge in England and above the sharp cliffs on the coast of Ireland. The northern lights were seen across Sussex and Wales; above a cemetery; and from bedroom windows, backyards, a university and even planes.

It is quite common for northern lights to be spotted in Scotland and parts of Northern England, but it is much rarer to see them in southern parts of England. The display on Sunday was one of the best in a very long time, according to the BBC’s weather watchers, a crowdsourced weather club.
…
The northern lights are produced by charged particles from the sun that hit Earth’s magnetic field. They are generally visible by the poles, but if the geomagnetic storm is particularly strong, the particles can travel farther south, experts told The New York Times this year.

The European Space Agency said that Sunday night, an expulsion of material from the sun arrived at Earth just as a high-speed solar wind stream whipped through the space around our planet.

Here’s one of my favourites, taken last night in Red Lake, Ontario:

So American inflation fears picked up:

Inflation remains stubbornly elevated and unexpectedly picked up in January, a fresh reading of the Fed’s preferred index showed, underscoring the daunting challenge facing central bankers as they try to wrestle price increases back to a normal pace.

After six months of more or less consistently cooling down, the Personal Consumption Expenditures price measure climbed 5.4 percent in January from a year earlier, an unexpected pickup from 5.3 percent the prior month and substantially more than the 5 percent economists had expected.

Even after stripping out food and fuel prices, both of which jump around a lot, the price index climbed by 4.7 percent in the year through last month — also a pickup, and more than expected in a Bloomberg survey of economists.
…
Personal spending, which spans both goods and services, climbed by 1.8 percent in January. That compared to a slight 0.1 percent decline in December, and was more than the 1.4 percent increase that economists had anticipated. Even after adjusting for quick inflation, consumer spending rose at a hearty pace last month.

And there was some cheerful historical data put together:

In research released on a day when inflation data showed an unexpected spike, the authors found that over 16 episodes of “disinflation” engineered by central banks in the United States, Germany, Canada and the United Kingdom, “we find no instance in which a significant central bank-induced disinflation occurred without a recession.”

The researchers included Brandeis International Business School professor Stephen Cecchetti, who is a former top economist at the Bank for International Settlements; Michael Feroli, chief economist at J.P. Morgan; and Columbia Business School professor Frederic Mishkin, who is a former Fed governor and long-time research collaborator with former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke.

The findings were presented on Friday at a conference organized by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, and drew pushback from Fed officials who reviewed and commented on it.

“I don’t see that we have to have this trade-off between labour and price stability. I am greedy,” Cleveland Fed President Loretta Mester said in remarks to CNBC.

In a paper issued in response to the research, she argued that the recessions associated with past disinflation may have been the result of central banks tightening policy more than necessary, not that a recession was needed to bring price increases into line.

“The implication is that policy-makers need to be attentive to the lagged effects of policy actions as they bring inflation down,” Mester said.

And the BoC has released a Staff Analytical Note by Cyrus Minwalla, John Miedema, Sebastian Hernandez and Alexandra Sutton-Lalani titled A central bank digital currency for offline payments:

• An offline central bank digital currency (CBDC) is a digital complement to bank notes. It enables transactions without the internet while still allowing online purchases when internet connectivity is available.
• The design of an offline CBDC depends on the duration of the offline period. Intermittent offline refers to a temporary internet outage, such as that caused by a failure of telecommunications infrastructure. Extended offline refers a lengthy and indeterminate outage, likely caused by a storm or other weather event. It also refers to the situation in remote regions that do not have reliable or affordable internet.
• Regardless of the length of the offline period, an offline CBDC must be spent or transferred using a digital device—for example, a smartphone with a custom application, or a purpose-designed universal access device (UAD).
• An offline CBDC offers users benefits such as enhanced resilience and better accessibility features. It could also preserve the privacy typically associated with offline payments.
• To minimize the risk of theft or loss, an offline CBDC may require secure hardware with controls to guard against unauthorized tampering, as well as a user-specific personal identification number (PIN), password or biometric authentication stored on the device itself.
• A balance must be struck between compliance, security requirements and user needs. A suitable balance may be defined by optimally selecting limits on holdings, transaction amounts and the duration of offline functionality. Adopting a security posture in terms of limits, controls and functionality, where risks are sufficiently mitigated, is still a challenge for technology available today.

The BoC has released a working paper by Jonathan Chiu, Emre Ozdenoren, Kathy Yuan and Shengxing Zhang titled On the Fragility of DeFi Lending:

We develop a dynamic model of decentralized finance (DeFi) lending that incorporates two/these key features: 1) borrowing and lending are decentralized, anonymous, overcollateralized and backed by the market value of crypto assets where contract terms are pre-specified and rigid; and 2) information friction exists between borrowers and lenders. We identify a price-liquidity feedback: the market outcome in any given period depends on agents’ expectations about lending activities in future periods, with higher price expectations leading to more lending and higher prices in that period. Given the rigidity inherent to smart contracts, this feedback leads to multiple self-fulfilling equilibria where DeFi lending and asset prices move with market sentiment. We show that flexible updates of smart contracts can restore equilibrium uniqueness. This finding highlights the difficulty of achieving stability and efficiency in a decentralized environment without a liquidity backstop.
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Decentralized finance (DeFi) is an umbrella term for a variety of financial service protocols and applications (e.g., decentralized exchanges, lending platforms, asset management) that operate on blockchain technology. They are anonymous permission-less financial arrangements implemented via smart contracts — immutable, deterministic computer programs—on a blockchain that have been designed to replace traditional financial intermediaries (TradFi)
…
The growth of decentralized finance has been substantial since the “DeFi Summer” of 2020. According to data aggregator DeFiLlama, the total value locked (TVL) of DeFi had risen to 230 billion U.S. dollars as of April 2022, up from less than one billion two years prior to that time. As DeFi grows in scale and scope and becomes more extensively connected to the real economy, its vulnerabilities might undermine financial-sector stability (Aramonte, Huang, and Schrimpf (2021)). As a result, policymakers and regulators have raised concerns about the implications of DeFi for financial stability (FSB 2022; IOSCO 2022).2 Yet formal economic analysis of this issue remains very limited. In this paper, we examine DeFi lending protocols—an important component of the DeFi eco-system—and the sources and implications of their instability. For example, DeFi lending is much more volatile than traditional lending.3 In addition, Aramonte et al. (2022) argue that DeFi lending generates “pro-cyclicality,” the co-movement between crypto prices and lending activities.
…
In this paper, we study sources of fragility in DeFi lending caused by several of its fundamental features. These features are informational frictions, such as asymmetric information about collateral quality, oracle problems, and rigid contract terms. We demonstrate the inherent instability of DeFi lending that results from price-liquidity feedback exacerbated by informational frictions, leading to self-fulfilling sentimentdriven cycles. Stability requires flexible and state-contingent smart contracts. To achieve that end, a smart contract may take a complex form. Such a contract also requires a reliable oracle to feed realtime hard and soft information from the off-chain world. Alternatively, DeFi lending could abandon complete decentralization and re-introduce human intervention to provide real-time risk management— an arrangement that would force the protocol to rely on a trusted third party. Our finding highlights a trilemma faced by DeFi protocols: the difficulty involved in achieving simplicity in smart contracts and stability in asset prices while maintaining a high degree of decentralization.