Margin debt in the US is declining:
NYSE margin debt surged from $182 billion to $505 billion in the six years ended in June 2015, roughly tracing the trajectory of the S&P 500, which tripled over the period. The biggest gains came in 2013, with credit rising 35 percent as U.S. stocks climbed 30 percent for the best returns in 16 years.
Since June, it’s been the other way around, with margin debt falling 6.3 percent to $473 billion at the NYSE’s last update, which covered August. The S&P 500 slid 4.4 percent at the end of that period as stocks entered a correction.
I’ll need to be convinced that this means anything as a market-timing indicator, as is often proclaimed but I’ll accept it as a rough measure of retail sentiment. It interested me due to a BIS working paper by Fernando Avalos, Ramon Moreno and Tania Romero titled Leverage on the buy side:
This paper investigates the microeconomic determinants of leverage decisions by asset managers. Investment funds (the “buy side”) have significantly increased their share of global capital flows in recent years. Unconventional monetary policies in advanced economies have squeezed returns while reducing borrowing costs, which in principle creates an incentive for asset managers to use more leverage. We start by studying the recent behaviour of fund leverage in different asset categories at an aggregate level. Leverage appears to have increased significantly in funds focused on the fixed income markets of emerging economies. Then we analyse the microeconomic factors that shape the leverage decision. In line with theory, we find that leverage rises with expected returns, and falls with market risk and borrowing costs. Transaction costs are also mentioned in the literature as another factor that should inhibit leverage. Lacking the requisite data, we introduce as proxies changes in capital controls and macroprudential policies, because they tend to affect expected returns in comparable ways. We find that tighter capital controls on inflows increase leverage rather than decrease it, but that macroprudential measures have no discernible effect. Finally, we discuss these results and their policy implications.
…
Funds dedicated to global markets or advanced economies had little debt in their capital structure, whereas debt in leveraged EME fixed income funds was close to 30 percent of AUM towards the end of our sample period. The leverage ratio of EME fixed income funds surged after 2009 before falling abruptly back in 2014, although current levels are still much higher than before the surge. The number of funds using leverage is relatively small in our sample, but their size is about three times that of their unleveraged peers. They control more than 30 percent of AUM in their sector (down from 50 percent around 2010), making them quite significant players in their target markets.
Meanwhile Fed officials seem anxious to emphasize that their hesitation in hiking rates in September due to concerns over global risks (discussed yesterday) should not be taken as an indication of what will happen in the year’s remaining two FOMC meetings:
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond President Jeffrey Lacker said the U.S. is already at full employment and the central bank may risk overheating the economy as it attempts to drive additional job gains.
With the unemployment rate at 5.1 percent, the central bank has achieved its goal and “exhausted relevant slack in the labor market,” the Richmond Fed chief said.
“We’re there,” Lacker said in an interview in his office Thursday, referring to the central bank’s mandate to lower joblessness to the level consistent with stable price pressures. The median forecast of that rate among Fed officials is 4.9 percent, according to estimates released following last month’s meeting of the policy-making Federal Open Market Committee.
“Pushing on to wring more slack out — there is some risks associated with that,” said Lacker. Inflation pressures may emerge with a lag, but the “risks can be very real.”
The Richmond Fed chief dissented at the FOMC’s September meeting, preferring a 0.25 percentage point increase in the federal funds rate.
And Dudley of the NY Fed provided supporting fire:
Federal Reserve Bank of New York President William C. Dudley said he expects the U.S. central bank to raise interest rates by December, echoing comments by fellow regional Fed chief Dennis Lockart in Atlanta, while cautioning that this was not a pledge to action and will depend on the economy staying on track.
Dudley told CNBC television in an interview Friday that he was still in the 2015 liftoff camp.
“Based on my forecast, yes I am, but it’s a forecast. And we’re going to get a lot of data between now and December,” he said. “It’s not a commitment.”
…
Last month’s FOMC decision, and a disappointing September U.S. employment report, has sapped investors’ confidence the Fed will be able to raise rates this year, as Fed Chair Janet Yellen has said she expects will be warranted. The probability of a 2015 hike is now priced around 40 percent in federal funds futures markets, compared to above 60 percent ahead of last month’s Fed meeting, based on the assumption that the effective fed funds rate will be 0.375 percent after liftoff.Dudley said the key to liftoff will be whether the labor market continues to improve, thereby putting more upward pressure on wages and inflation. Last month’s jobs report was “definitely weaker,” but even monthly gains of 120,000 or 150,000 are enough to continue to push the U.S. unemployment rate lower, he said.
Lockhart says the same:
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Dennis Lockhart said the first interest rate increase since 2006 will likely be warranted later this month or in December.
“The economy remains on a satisfactory track, and, speaking for myself, I see a liftoff decision later this year at the October or December FOMC meetings as likely appropriate,” Lockhart said in prepared remarks Friday in New York, referring to the Federal Open Market Committee.
…
“The ambiguity of the moment reinforces the need to closely watch the vital signs of the economy over the coming weeks to determine if the outlook has changed,” he said.Lockhart, who has never dissented, said consumer activity will be a key signal that the U.S. economy can sustain its momentum despite the global slowdown.
“The consumer-based dimension of the economy has been robust for several months,” Lockhart said to the Society of American Business Editors and Writers, even as manufacturing and exports have been hurt by a stronger U.S. dollar.
The Atlanta Fed’s tracking estimate for the third quarter is a “relatively soft 1.1 percent,” though much of the weakness is due to a swing in inventories.
Alan Kreuger of Princeton wrote an op-ed in the NYT advocating a $12 minimum wage:
I am frequently asked, “How high can the minimum wage go without jeopardizing employment of low-wage workers? And at what level would further minimum wage increases result in more job losses than wage gains, lowering the earnings of low-wage workers as a whole?”
Although available research cannot precisely answer these questions, I am confident that a federal minimum wage that rises to around $12 an hour over the next five years or so would not have a meaningful negative effect on United States employment. One reason for this judgment is that around 140 research projects commissioned by Britain’s independent Low Pay Commission have found that the minimum wage “has led to higher than average wage increases for the lowest paid, with little evidence of adverse effects on employment or the economy.” A $12-per-hour minimum wage in the United States phased in over several years would be in the same ballpark as Britain’s minimum wage today.
But $15 an hour is beyond international experience, and could well be counterproductive. Although some high-wage cities and states could probably absorb a $15-an-hour minimum wage with little or no job loss, it is far from clear that the same could be said for every state, city and town in the United States.
I think the emphasis on the redistributive effects of the minimum wage are misguided; we should not be asking how to maximize the minimum wage subject to avoiding job losses; but rather, how to increase the minimum wage in order to force higher productivity at the low end of the job scale. I’m not suggesting that all productivity gains in the economy should be reflected in the minimum wage – that’s obviously a ridiculous argument – but some of the gains can be enforced.
Brookfield Renewable Energy Partners L.P., proud indirect issuer of BRF.PR.A, BRF.PR.B, BRF.PR.C, BRF.PR.E and BRF.PR.F, has announced:
an agreement to acquire a hydroelectric portfolio in Pennsylvania from Talen Energy for $860 million. Brookfield Renewable will acquire and fund the transaction with institutional partners and maintain an economic interest in the portfolio of approximately 40 percent. A portion of the purchase price will be funded with third party investment grade, non-recourse financing expected to close concurrently with the transaction.
The portfolio consists of two facilities, the 252 MW Holtwood station on the Susquehanna River and the 40 MW Wallenpaupack station on Lake Wallenpaupack in the Pocono Mountains, with a combined expected average annual generation of approximately 1.1 million megawatt hours. The acquisition provides a strong fit with Brookfield Renewable’s 417 MW Safe Harbor facility located eight miles upstream from Holtwood. All output is currently sold into PJM and the portfolio benefits from a diverse revenue stream including energy, capacity, renewable energy credits and ancillary services. Both Holtwood and Wallenpaupack have long-term FERC operating licenses through 2030 and 2045, respectively.
DBRS comments:
DBRS Limited (DBRS) today notes that Brookfield Renewable Energy Partners L.P. (BREP or the Company, rated BBB (high)) has announced its acquisition of a 292-megawatt (MW) hydroelectric portfolio in Pennsylvania (the Acquisition). The Acquisition is not expected to have a material impact on BREP’s rating. DBRS views the Acquisition as modestly negative to BREP’s business risk assessment (BRA), as the generation output from the acquired assets (representing approximately 4% of total pro-forma generation) is exposed to the merchant power market. However, DBRS expects BREP to prudently finance the Acquisition in order to be in line with DBRS’s 20% deconsolidated debt-to-capital threshold and to maintain a financial risk assessment (FRA) that remains supportive of the current rating.
TransCanada also announced an acquisition:
TransCanada Corporation (TSX:TRP)(NYSE:TRP) (TransCanada) today announced that it has reached an agreement to acquire the Ironwood natural gas fired, combined cycle power plant in Lebanon, Pennsylvania, with a nameplate capacity of 778 megawatts (MW), from Talen Energy Corporation (NYSE:TLN) for US$654 million. At closing, US$42 million in debt will be assumed and then repaid within 45 days of closing out of funds placed into escrow by the seller.
“This acquisition presents a unique opportunity in the current market environment and is a natural extension of our U.S. northeast power business, strengthening our overall portfolio of assets in the region,” said Russ Girling, TransCanada’s president and chief executive officer. “This relatively new and highly efficient gas-fired power plant provides us with a solid platform from which to continue to grow our already substantial wholesale, commercial and industrial customer base in this market area.”
Sure beats trying to promote Keystone! Jim Polson and Rebecca Penty of Bloomberg comment:
Companies from the Great White North are attracted by fast-growing power demand in parts of the U.S. and a regulatory model that allows bigger profits for utility monopolies. Their purchases are propping up sale values of U.S. independent producers amid a slowdown in the sector, according to UBS Securities LLC.
…
Canadian energy companies, pension funds and private equity firms are also more willing than U.S. utility owners to bank on the volatile earnings from power plants that sell into U.S. wholesale markets, said Kit Konolige, senior utility analyst for Bloomberg Intelligence. TransCanada and Brookfield bought so-called merchant plants that had been owned by PPL Corp. before it spun off Talen Energy Corp. in June to focus on more predictable utility businesses.And it’s not just power that Canadians are after. They’re also buying up U.S. oil and natural gas properties. Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, the country’s largest pension fund, said Thursday it isn’t done shopping for energy assets after committing almost $2 billion to the industry in the last two weeks. That includes a purchase announced Thursday of oil and gas producing properties in Colorado from Encana Corp.
Talen extracted “top dollar” for its deals this week, UBS analysts led by Julien Dumoulin-Smith wrote in a note.
So there’s lots of capital leaving Canada to buy power plants in the States. One has to wonder whether a more business-friendly regulatory environment would allow further increases in electricity exports while keeping the bucks and jobs up here:
U.S. electricity trade with Canada is increasing, providing more economic and reliability benefits to both the United States and Canada. Although the amount of electricity imported over the Canadian border is a small part of the overall U.S. power supply, the transmission connections linking Canada and the United States are an important component of the electricity markets in northern states.
Overall, Canada is a net exporter of electricity to the United States, and most of its power needs are met by hydroelectricity. Large hydroelectric projects in British Columbia, Manitoba, Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador have significantly increased the country’s generation capacity. On a net basis, Canada exports electricity mainly to New England, New York, and the Midwest states, while the United States exports electricity primarily from the Pacific Northwest states to the Canadian province of British Columbia.
As everybody knows, my company uses proprietary software (HIMIPref™) to examine the market for trade opportunities. Recently, PrefBlog’s corporate espionage department obtained information regarding hardware used for a similar purpose by other preferred share investors:
It was another hideous day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 24bp, FixedResets losing 96bp and DeemedRetractibles down 29bp; the YTW on FixedResets is, incredibly, edging closer to the 5.00% mark. The Performance Highlights table is, of course, lengthy, with three MFC issues notable losers. Volume was well above average.
For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.
Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread
Here’s TRP:
Implied Volatility remained ridiculous.
TRP.PR.A, which resets 2019-12-31 at +192, is bid at 14.75 to be $0.65 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +154, is $0.59 cheap at its bid price of 11.81.
The fit deteriorated today for MFC, with Implied Volatility plummeting; this isn’t really surprising, given the large losses experienced by the three MFC issues at the extreme bad end of the Performance Highlights table.
Most expensive is MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, bid at 21.38 to be 0.71 rich, while MFC.PR.K resetting at +222bp on 2018-9-19, is bid at 16.55 to be 0.78 cheap.
The fit on the BAM issues continues to be horrible!
The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 15.00 to be $0.90 cheap. BAM.PF.G, resetting at +284bp on 2020-6-30 is bid at 19.30 and appears to be $0.69 rich.
Implied Volatility jumped today and is ridiculously high.
FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 16.81, looks $0.36 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.G, with a spread of +213bp and resetting 2018-9-1, is bid at 16.49 and is $0.30 cheap.
Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -0.99%, with two outliers above 0.00% and two below -2.00%. The distribution is bimodal, with bank NVCC non-compliant pairs averaging -1.51% and other issues averaging -0.26%. There are three junk outliers above 0.00%.
Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?
| HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
| Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
| Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.5992 % | 1,583.6 |
| FixedFloater | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.5992 % | 2,768.9 |
| Floater | 4.69 % | 4.72 % | 62,933 | 16.04 | 3 | 0.5992 % | 1,683.5 |
| OpRet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0526 % | 2,764.0 |
| SplitShare | 4.34 % | 5.07 % | 72,442 | 3.00 | 5 | 0.0526 % | 3,239.3 |
| Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0526 % | 2,527.4 |
| Perpetual-Premium | 5.95 % | 5.90 % | 59,045 | 14.00 | 5 | -0.3955 % | 2,448.5 |
| Perpetual-Discount | 5.76 % | 5.84 % | 78,228 | 14.16 | 33 | -0.2373 % | 2,472.5 |
| FixedReset | 5.36 % | 4.95 % | 196,608 | 14.88 | 76 | -0.9550 % | 1,903.2 |
| Deemed-Retractible | 5.34 % | 5.38 % | 101,730 | 5.47 | 33 | -0.2883 % | 2,494.3 |
| FloatingReset | 2.66 % | 4.75 % | 63,342 | 5.83 | 9 | 0.1447 % | 2,046.3 |
| Performance Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
| MFC.PR.K | FixedReset | -6.87 % | Not entirely real, but the issue did indeed have a bad day! It traded 33,613 shares in a range of 16.81-17.83, but it appears that the bid simply vanished shortly before the close, with 100 shares trading at 17.02 at 3:40; the next trade was 100 shares, 16.83, 3:53; and the final trade 100 shares, 16.81, 3:53. This issue also made the volume highlights, with RBC buying 19,800 from Scotia at 17.75, timestamped 11:35. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 16.55 Bid-YTW : 8.82 % |
| MFC.PR.L | FixedReset | -6.51 % | Real enough! The issue traded 20,593 shares in a range of 16.70-17.77 before closing at 16.65-00. The day ended with two trade bursts; one set, timestamped 3:33-3:34, totalled 2900 shares in nine trades, starting at 17.00 and ending at 16.97; but 1300 of these shares traded at 16.78. The second set, timestamped 3:53-3:54, totalled 1500 shares in seven trades, starting at 16.78 and ending at 16.70. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 16.65 Bid-YTW : 8.85 % |
| MFC.PR.M | FixedReset | -4.78 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 18.11 Bid-YTW : 7.87 % |
| RY.PR.J | FixedReset | -4.51 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 18.42 Evaluated at bid price : 18.42 Bid-YTW : 4.96 % |
| BAM.PR.T | FixedReset | -4.38 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 15.70 Evaluated at bid price : 15.70 Bid-YTW : 5.29 % |
| PWF.PR.T | FixedReset | -4.06 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 19.60 Evaluated at bid price : 19.60 Bid-YTW : 4.34 % |
| MFC.PR.N | FixedReset | -3.74 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 18.01 Bid-YTW : 7.87 % |
| BMO.PR.T | FixedReset | -3.74 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 17.52 Evaluated at bid price : 17.52 Bid-YTW : 4.73 % |
| TD.PF.D | FixedReset | -3.30 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 18.73 Evaluated at bid price : 18.73 Bid-YTW : 4.86 % |
| RY.PR.Z | FixedReset | -3.30 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 18.18 Evaluated at bid price : 18.18 Bid-YTW : 4.53 % |
| SLF.PR.H | FixedReset | -3.03 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 16.00 Bid-YTW : 8.96 % |
| RY.PR.H | FixedReset | -2.99 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 18.14 Evaluated at bid price : 18.14 Bid-YTW : 4.59 % |
| BMO.PR.W | FixedReset | -2.73 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 17.49 Evaluated at bid price : 17.49 Bid-YTW : 4.70 % |
| CM.PR.Q | FixedReset | -2.68 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 19.27 Evaluated at bid price : 19.27 Bid-YTW : 4.73 % |
| RY.PR.M | FixedReset | -2.67 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 18.25 Evaluated at bid price : 18.25 Bid-YTW : 4.88 % |
| CM.PR.O | FixedReset | -2.65 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 18.02 Evaluated at bid price : 18.02 Bid-YTW : 4.64 % |
| TD.PF.E | FixedReset | -2.45 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 19.52 Evaluated at bid price : 19.52 Bid-YTW : 4.78 % |
| PWF.PR.P | FixedReset | -2.29 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 13.68 Evaluated at bid price : 13.68 Bid-YTW : 4.51 % |
| NA.PR.S | FixedReset | -2.21 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 17.66 Evaluated at bid price : 17.66 Bid-YTW : 4.84 % |
| SLF.PR.G | FixedReset | -2.07 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 14.20 Bid-YTW : 9.36 % |
| TD.PF.B | FixedReset | -2.03 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 17.85 Evaluated at bid price : 17.85 Bid-YTW : 4.58 % |
| CU.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | -1.96 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 22.19 Evaluated at bid price : 22.55 Bid-YTW : 5.91 % |
| TD.PF.A | FixedReset | -1.92 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 17.85 Evaluated at bid price : 17.85 Bid-YTW : 4.59 % |
| TD.PF.C | FixedReset | -1.90 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 17.51 Evaluated at bid price : 17.51 Bid-YTW : 4.66 % |
| RY.PR.N | Perpetual-Discount | -1.67 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 22.04 Evaluated at bid price : 22.36 Bid-YTW : 5.63 % |
| BMO.PR.S | FixedReset | -1.60 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 18.50 Evaluated at bid price : 18.50 Bid-YTW : 4.59 % |
| PWF.PR.K | Perpetual-Discount | -1.39 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 21.25 Evaluated at bid price : 21.25 Bid-YTW : 5.84 % |
| HSE.PR.G | FixedReset | -1.29 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 21.83 Evaluated at bid price : 22.26 Bid-YTW : 4.99 % |
| FTS.PR.G | FixedReset | -1.26 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 16.49 Evaluated at bid price : 16.49 Bid-YTW : 4.81 % |
| CM.PR.P | FixedReset | -1.24 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 17.50 Evaluated at bid price : 17.50 Bid-YTW : 4.66 % |
| TRP.PR.D | FixedReset | -1.20 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 15.63 Evaluated at bid price : 15.63 Bid-YTW : 5.44 % |
| BAM.PR.N | Perpetual-Discount | -1.19 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 19.88 Evaluated at bid price : 19.88 Bid-YTW : 6.03 % |
| BMO.PR.Y | FixedReset | -1.19 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 19.08 Evaluated at bid price : 19.08 Bid-YTW : 4.90 % |
| GWO.PR.R | Deemed-Retractible | -1.19 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 20.80 Bid-YTW : 7.39 % |
| RY.PR.W | Perpetual-Discount | -1.18 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 22.40 Evaluated at bid price : 22.66 Bid-YTW : 5.47 % |
| SLF.PR.J | FloatingReset | -1.17 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 12.65 Bid-YTW : 10.14 % |
| IFC.PR.A | FixedReset | -1.17 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 15.22 Bid-YTW : 9.62 % |
| BMO.PR.R | FloatingReset | -1.10 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 21.50 Bid-YTW : 4.63 % |
| MFC.PR.B | Deemed-Retractible | -1.08 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 20.18 Bid-YTW : 7.67 % |
| RY.PR.P | Perpetual-Discount | -1.04 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 23.40 Evaluated at bid price : 23.70 Bid-YTW : 5.57 % |
| RY.PR.O | Perpetual-Discount | -1.02 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 22.00 Evaluated at bid price : 22.30 Bid-YTW : 5.60 % |
| RY.PR.C | Deemed-Retractible | -1.01 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.55 Bid-YTW : 5.07 % |
| FTS.PR.H | FixedReset | 1.09 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 13.85 Evaluated at bid price : 13.85 Bid-YTW : 4.30 % |
| BAM.PF.G | FixedReset | 1.15 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 19.30 Evaluated at bid price : 19.30 Bid-YTW : 5.10 % |
| TRP.PR.E | FixedReset | 1.31 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 16.25 Evaluated at bid price : 16.25 Bid-YTW : 5.32 % |
| MFC.PR.J | FixedReset | 1.31 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 18.53 Bid-YTW : 7.64 % |
| TRP.PR.A | FixedReset | 1.37 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 14.75 Evaluated at bid price : 14.75 Bid-YTW : 4.95 % |
| POW.PR.A | Perpetual-Discount | 1.53 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 23.59 Evaluated at bid price : 23.86 Bid-YTW : 5.89 % |
| MFC.PR.H | FixedReset | 1.57 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 21.38 Bid-YTW : 6.24 % |
| BAM.PF.F | FixedReset | 1.59 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 19.15 Evaluated at bid price : 19.15 Bid-YTW : 5.12 % |
| GWO.PR.N | FixedReset | 1.82 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 14.00 Bid-YTW : 9.48 % |
| BAM.PF.A | FixedReset | 2.01 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 18.79 Evaluated at bid price : 18.79 Bid-YTW : 5.21 % |
| BMO.PR.M | FixedReset | 2.13 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.00 Bid-YTW : 3.73 % |
| TD.PR.T | FloatingReset | 2.59 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 21.40 Bid-YTW : 4.56 % |
| Volume Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
| RY.PR.J | FixedReset | 63,708 | TD bought 10,900 from RBC at 19.00. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 18.42 Evaluated at bid price : 18.42 Bid-YTW : 4.96 % |
| BAM.PF.H | FixedReset | 63,340 | Recent new issue. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 23.12 Evaluated at bid price : 24.92 Bid-YTW : 4.97 % |
| CM.PR.Q | FixedReset | 46,975 | TD crossed 10,000 at 19.75. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 19.27 Evaluated at bid price : 19.27 Bid-YTW : 4.73 % |
| BAM.PF.A | FixedReset | 35,504 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 18.79 Evaluated at bid price : 18.79 Bid-YTW : 5.21 % |
| RY.PR.P | Perpetual-Discount | 34,438 | Recent new issue. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-10-09 Maturity Price : 23.40 Evaluated at bid price : 23.70 Bid-YTW : 5.57 % |
| MFC.PR.K | FixedReset | 33,613 | RBC bought 19,800 from Scotia at 19,800. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 16.55 Bid-YTW : 8.82 % |
| There were 45 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. | |||
| Wide Spread Highlights | ||
| Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
| BAM.PR.C | Floater | Quote: 10.00 – 11.49 Spot Rate : 1.4900 Average : 0.8503 YTW SCENARIO |
| RY.PR.J | FixedReset | Quote: 18.42 – 18.90 Spot Rate : 0.4800 Average : 0.2762 YTW SCENARIO |
| MFC.PR.H | FixedReset | Quote: 21.38 – 21.99 Spot Rate : 0.6100 Average : 0.4179 YTW SCENARIO |
| RY.PR.H | FixedReset | Quote: 18.14 – 18.68 Spot Rate : 0.5400 Average : 0.3497 YTW SCENARIO |
| BNS.PR.C | FloatingReset | Quote: 21.26 – 21.84 Spot Rate : 0.5800 Average : 0.3931 YTW SCENARIO |
| TRP.PR.E | FixedReset | Quote: 16.25 – 17.00 Spot Rate : 0.7500 Average : 0.5922 YTW SCENARIO |














































