Market Action

September 7, 2010

The US government is creaking slowly towards GSE reform:

A Dodd-Frank mandated Treasury study on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is almost certain to be the first step in federal legislation to reform government-sponsored enterprises and the secondary mortgage market. The study, which must be submitted to Congress by the end of January 2011, was mandated by an amendment offered by Senator Chris Dodd, Chair of the Banking Committee, codified as section 1074, as the Senate was beating back an amendment offered by Senator John McCain that would have either ended the conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie or disbanded them with no reasonable alternative offered.

All that being said, there is a growing consensus that the 112th Congress must pass legislation reforming the GSEs.

Mary Schapiro spoke about market structure today:

May 6 was clearly a market failure, and it brought to the fore concerns about our equity market structure. The staffs of the SEC and CFTC are finalizing a joint report on our inquiry into the day’s events that will be published in the coming weeks.

But we have not waited for the report to begin taking steps to address weaknesses identified on May 6.

There will doubtless be some who consider this admirable.

To understand where individual investors are coming from, we must truly recognize the impact of severe price volatility on their interests: one example is the use and impact of stop loss orders on May 6. Stop loss orders are designed to help limit losses by selling a stock when it drops below a specified price, and are a safety tool used by many individual investors to limit losses.

The fundamental premise of these orders is to rely on the integrity of market prices to signal when the investor should sell a holding. On May 6, this reliance proved misplaced and the use of this tool backfired.

A staggering total of more than $2 billion in individual investor stop loss orders is estimated to have been triggered during the half hour between 2:30 and 3 p.m. on May 6. As a hypothetical illustration, if each of those orders were executed at a very conservative estimate of 10 percent less than the closing price, then those individual investors suffered losses of more than $200 million compared to the closing price on that day.

This is the first time I’ve seen a number. OK, so users of stop loss orders lost a lot of money, which is now in the hands of less stupid people better able to allocate capital. So what? Isn’t this what markets are supposed to do?

We should consider the relevance today of a basic premise of the old specialist obligations — that the professional trading firms with the best access to the markets (and therefore the greatest capacity to affect trading for good or for ill) should be subject to obligations to trade in ways that support the stability and fairness of the markets.

For example, the stocks with broken trades on May 6 highlight the fact that the order book liquidity in those stocks completely disappeared, if only briefly, and caused trades to occur at absurd prices. Where were the high frequency trading firms that typically dominate liquidity provision in those stocks?

I anticipate that the May 6 report will discuss the reasons that caused these firms to pull back, which they believed to be in their interest. The issue, however, is whether the firms that effectively act as market makers during normal times should have any obligation to support the market in reasonable ways in tough times.

This is craziness. In the first place, specialists and market-makers have a lot more advantages than mere “access”. In the second place, it will be remembered that these paragons of virtue stepped back during the crash of 1987, as well.

It looks like the established order of do-nothing incompetents has renewed its hegemony over the SEC!

Reverberations over Greek debt continue:

Four months after the 110 billion- euro ($140 billion) bailout for Greece, the nation still hasn’t disclosed the full details of secret financial transactions it used to conceal debt.

“We have not seen the real documents,” Walter Radermacher, head of the European Union’s statistics agency Eurostat, said in a Sept. 2 interview in his Luxembourg office. Eurostat first requested the contracts in February.

Radermacher vows new toughness when officials from his staff head to Greece this month to come up with a “solid estimate” of the total value of debt hidden by the opaque contracts. “This is a new era,” he said.

Greece is the only euro country that lied about using these complex swap contracts after Eurostat told countries to report them in 2008, Radermacher, 58, said.

“You might say this is triumph of hope over experience,” [Yannis Stournaras, director general of the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research in Athens] said, adding that the blame should be shared with the European Commission, which didn’t intervene despite years of warnings by Eurostat of problems with Greek data.

“We addressed the issue several times in meetings of finance ministers and we asked for enhanced powers for Eurostat in 2005, which we didn’t receive at the time,” said Amadeu Altafaj, a spokesman for the Commission.

In April 2009, the European Central Bank identified a Greek swap operation of unusual terms, according to a confidential ECB document dated March 3, 2010, obtained by Bloomberg News. The ECB said its executive board prepared internal reports on the swaps. ECB spokesman Niels Buenemann declined to comment on it.

Greece began using this type of contract for the 2001 budget year to avoid recording a spike in debt the first year after it adopted the euro, Stournaras said. It continued to use them after 2001 and increased their use after 2004, he said.

Under guidance set out in 2008 by Eurostat, any upfront payments linked to a swap must be counted as a loan.

Germany, Italy, Poland and Belgium, like Greece, received upfront payments from derivatives, Radermacher said at a hearing at the European Parliament in April. The difference, he said in the September interview, was that when Eurostat asked the other countries about the contracts in 2008, they provided the data and adjusted their debt figures.

See? As I said at the time, this was a case of willful blindness by European bureaucrats and politicians, for which they frantically tried to blame Goldman Sachs when the shit finally hit the fan.

On September 2 I indulged myself with a rant on the Lori Douglas case and found it remarkable that tenure-track law professors couldn’t mount an actual argument. An ink-stained wretch, Judith Timson, managed it in the Globe on Friday, arguing (arguing!) in a column titled The net killed sexual privacy that Douglas showed poor judgment in allowing the photos to be taken and that this poor judgment disqualifies her from the judiciary.

Well, it’s a murky area and it’s very easy to add increments to the situation until most people will agree that the conduct is inappropriate, with nobody agreeing on which increment tipped the scale. But to stick with the situation as it is, I have to disagree and I’m going to disagree on the grounds that “judgment” is too broad a term – even if I allow for the sake of an argument that her judgment was poor in that instance and I’m not convinced it was.

Judgment is not fungible. There are lots of people whose judgment I would trust absolutely on some matters, but not on others. I see fixed income portfolios from lots of people that simply don’t make any sense at all – and it doesn’t affect my respect for their knowledge within their field of specialization. If Ms. Douglas showed “poor judgment” in the matter of her sexual relationship with her spouse (and I’m not saying she did), I don’t believe you can draw any conclusions about her judgment on the bench.

BUt OK. For the sake of an argument, let’s concede not just the first point – that allowing risque pictures to be take shows poor judgment – but the second one as well – that this poor judgment will be reflected in the judge’s judicial skills. I’m still not convinced that the Ms. Douglas deserves to lose her job, because I’m not sure whether there’s a net benefit to this.

If we insist on asking about the bare existence of naughty pictures as part of a prospective judge’s background check, we’re going to get lied to. A lot. Some people will honestly forget, some will figure it’s so long ago it doesn’t matter, some will figure it’s none of our business and some honestly won’t know. In such a case, what we are doing is increasing the chance for blackmail: if the pictures come to light, the judge will lose his job. I am by no means convinced that the change in standards is a net benefit.

Additionally, by loading down the process with many specific rules, we’re in danger of establishing “Gotcha Regulation”, the same that exists in the securities business. Do the bosses want to get rid of somebody? Put enough people on the case and it’s easy enough to find some rule that was broken.

Still: well done Ms. Timson for providing an actual argument! I wonder if she’s considered applying to law school? Not as a student; I mean, for a tenured position, job for life. status, pay, benefits … she could do a lot worse, and can obviously apply logic better than many of the incumbents.

Why am I spending time on this issue? Why is it is important? Because bureaucrats have contempt for the judicial process:

Wendy Vanstralen, 47, has been charged under the province’s stunt driving legislation.

Her truck has been impounded for a week, and she has also lost her licence for seven days.

Ms. Vanstralen is due in court Nov. 2.

… and that’s a scary thing. Especially when bank regulation is heading the same way.

It was quite a good day on the Canadian preferred share market; volume was good, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 16bp and FixedResets gaining 13bp … taking the YTW on the latter index down to 3.08%. Next stop: three percent! MFC continued to be highlighted on the volume table.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0756 % 2,036.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0756 % 3,085.0
Floater 2.73 % 3.24 % 56,932 19.05 3 0.0756 % 2,198.9
OpRet 4.88 % 2.93 % 95,608 0.23 9 0.0601 % 2,359.2
SplitShare 5.97 % -37.64 % 65,698 0.09 2 0.3099 % 2,357.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0601 % 2,157.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.55 % 123,348 5.38 14 0.1044 % 1,971.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.68 % 5.75 % 189,036 14.21 63 0.1625 % 1,914.9
FixedReset 5.26 % 3.08 % 271,205 3.33 47 0.1299 % 2,259.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-07
Maturity Price : 19.16
Evaluated at bid price : 19.16
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.40
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet 248,948 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 100,000 each, both at 25.00. Nesbitt bought 14,200 from anonymous at 25.00; Desjardins crossed 17,800 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 70,512 TD crossed 30,900 at 18.34.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-07
Maturity Price : 18.33
Evaluated at bid price : 18.33
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 58,400 Desjardins crossed 15,900 at 26.60; TD crossed 15,200 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.62
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 57,500 RBC crossed 55,000 at 28.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 57,210 RBC crossed 53,900 at 27.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.40
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 56,675 RBC crossed blocks of 35,300 and 20,700, both at 28.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.16
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
MAPF

MAPF Performance: August 2010

The fund had a good month in August, outperforming its benchmark and the passive funds despite being hurt by holdings in MFC.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close August 31 was $11.0637.

Returns to August 31, 2010
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +1.66% +1.31% +1.12%
Three Months +10.34% +6.17% +5.35%
One Year +9.49% +6.26% +5.08%
Two Years (annualized) +31.76% +7.35% +5.48% *
Three Years (annualized) +19.66% +2.90% +1.20%
Four Years (annualized) +15.36% +2.26%  
Five Years (annualized) +13.41% +2.54%  
Six Years (annualized) +12.23% +2.94%  
Seven Years (annualized) +13.04% +3.36%  
Eight Years (annualized) +13.70% +3.74%  
Nine Years (annualized) +12.95% +3.68%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns. The figure shown is the square root of product of the current one-year return and the similar figure reported for August 2009.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.39%, +6.23% and +6.42%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.14%, +5.56% & +3.61% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for AIC Preferred Income Fund (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.74%, +5.21% & +3.65%, respectively

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

My personal benchmark for a “good year” is index+500bp before fees; a glance at the annualized performance to June, 2010 shows that I’ve been able to meet that goal five times out of nine attempts.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There have been a lot of strongly motivated market participants in the past year, generating a lot of noise! The conditions of the past two years may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

As mentioned, the fund was hurt by a significant position in MFC shares, but this was more than offset by an overweight position in PerpetualDiscounts and, more particularly, more deeply discounted PerpetualDiscounts. If we look at returns for the month in the sector, plotted against their 2010-7-30 bid price, we get, essentially, a mess:


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The slope of the regression line is -0.23%/dollar, but the adjusted R-Square is only 6.2%.

… but when we disaggregate the date, we see things of greater interest:


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The regression on CM has adjusted R-Square = 92%, slope = -0.62%/$; GWO -14.4% and -0.12%/$; PWF 46% and -0.32%/$.

Further analysis of the data using the Straight Perpetual Implied Volatility Calculator produces the following table:

Fits to Implied Volatility
Issuer 2010-08-31 2010-07-30
Yield Volatility Yield Volatility
PWF 5.85% 9% 5.89% 9%
CM 5.46% 11% 5.77% 0.01%
GWO 5.77% 10% 5.82% 10%
CM 2010-07-30

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CM 2010-08-31

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GWO 2010-07-30

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GWO 2010-08-31

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PWF 2010-07-30

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PWF 2010-08-31

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There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.1883 0.3926
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.1883 0.4203
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.1883 0.4448
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.1883 0.4389
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.1883 $0.4449
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.1883 $0.5054
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.1883 $0.6206
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.1883 $0.6423
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.1883 $0.6524
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.1883 $0.6278
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0000 $0.6182
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0000 $0.6231
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.0000 $0.6329
August 2010 11.0637 5.81% 1.002 5.798% 1.0000 $0.6415
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.

Significant positions were held in Fixed-Reset issues on June 30; all of which (with the exception of YPG.PR.C) currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par at the first possible opportunity. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.88% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: August 2010 analysis (which is in excess of the 5.69% index yield on August 31). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $11.0637 * 0.0588 = 0.6505, down from the 0.6545 reported in May 2010 (the best comparator due to the influence of dividends earned but not yet distributed).

It is no surprise that this estimate is down, since there will be a drag on the calculation in up-markets due to presence of shorter-term issues (or, at least, presumed shorter term issues!); the question is whether the positive effect of these issues in down markets will outweight their negative effect in up-markets – all I can say is … it has in the past!

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition: August 2010

Turnover declined in August to an anemic 13%.

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may be thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2010-8-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 0.6% (-2.3) 6.99% 6.79
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 86.7% (+4.1) 5.88% 14.10
Fixed-Reset 8.9% (-1.2) 4.11% 3.43
Scraps (FixedReset) 4.0% (-0.2) 6.77% 12.59
Cash -0.2% (-0.4) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.77% 13.08
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from July month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

During the month, almost the entire remaining position of BNA.PR.C, a split share based on BAM.A, was swapped into BAM.PR.N, a PerpetualDiscount.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2010-8-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 62.0% (-10.6)
Pfd-2(high) 19.4% (+11.2)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 14.8% (-0.1)
Pfd-3(high) 4.0% (-0.2)
Cash -0.2% (-0.4)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end.

The shift of about 11% (net) of the portfolio from Pfd-1(low) to Pfd-2(high) was set in motion by the downgrade of MFC early in the month. As at 2010-7-30, the fund held 16.2% of its portfolio in MFC issues; this figure was 14.7% at month end. The decline was due to both the poor performance of MFC issues in August, and to the fact that these shares went ex-dividend on August 13. A net reduction of less than 0.2% in portfolio weight resulted from a net disposition of MFC shares that occurred when a swap from MFC.PR.C to MFC.PR.B could not be executed in its entirety.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2010-8-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.0% (0)
$50,000 – $100,000 11.9% (+9.1)
$100,000 – $200,000 25.5% (-12.0)
$200,000 – $300,000 31.1% (+2.7)
>$300,000 31.7% (+0.6)
Cash -0.2% (-0.4)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from July month-end.

The increase in holdings of issues with an average daily trading value of less than $100,000 (as defined by HIMIPref™) was due not to trades but to changes in the market: the fund maintains positions in W.PR.J and PWF.PR.L, both of which saw this metric decline from just over the line to just under during August.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 17, 2009, and published in the September, 2009, PrefLetter. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a higher
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to PerpetualDiscounts
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is now about equally exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower
Interesting External Papers

BIS Releases Quarterly Review, September 2010

The Bank for International Settlements has released its BIS Quarterly Review, September 2010 with sections on:

  • Overview: growth concerns take centre stage
  • Highlights of international banking and financial market activity
  • Debt reduction after crises
  • The collapse of international bank finance during the crisis: evidence from syndicated loan markets
  • Options for meeting the demand for international liquidity during financial crises
  • Bank structure, funding risk and the transmission of shocks across countries: concepts and measurement

They note:

Increasing growth concerns led investors to remain cautious. Nevertheless, prices rose in both equity and corporate bond markets in response to the improved conditions in euro sovereign debt markets, positive US and European corporate earnings announcements and greater clarity on the regulatory agenda (Graph 5, left-hand panel). Equity volatility also declined (Graph 5, centre panel). Given the significant drops earlier in the year, however, North American and European equity markets remained flat or below their levels at the beginning of the year. In contrast, there were gains for some Latin American markets and large losses for Chinese, Japanese and Australian markets.

Despite unchanged credit spreads (Graph 5, right-hand panel), both investment grade and high-yield corporate bonds generated large returns due to falling risk-free rates (Graph 6, left-hand panel). The superior performance of bond markets relative to equity markets was mirrored in global investment flows. In the United States, large outflows from equity mutual funds from May to July were offset by large inflows to bond mutual funds (Graph 6, centre panel). These inflows picked up again during July.

And here’s an interesting tid-bit:

One of the few developed economies (in addition to Greece) that bucked the trend of lower net issuance was Canada. Canadian residents raised $30 billion on the international debt market, about three times as much as in the previous quarter and the highest since the second quarter of 2008. Canadian financial institutions issued approximately $19 billion. Canadian provincial governments, led by Ontario, also borrowed sizeable amounts ($9 billion), whereas non-financial corporations issued $2 billion, slightly less than in the previous quarter.

The paper on syndicated loans shows some trends that I consider rather alarming:

Changes in syndication arrangements may be indicative of credit supply constraints. For instance, syndicated loan transactions in the form of “club deals” gained importance, increasing from 12% of total issuance in 2008 to 17% in 2009 (Graph 5, left-hand panel). A club deal is a loan syndicated by a small number of participating banks, which are not entitled to transfer their portion of the loan to a third party (White & Case (2003)). Such smaller syndicates result in lower restructuring and monitoring costs, and are thus preferred by lead arrangers when default is more likely. From this perspective, greater use of club deals might be an indication of both growing bank risk aversion and higher credit risk at a time of greatly increased economic uncertainty. This is consistent with Esty and Megginson (2003), who find that syndicate size is positively related to the strength of creditor rights and the reliability of legal enforcement.


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The concept of private placements, with issues being continually forced from the public into more private structures, increases the opacity of the securities market. Many issues are forced there as a result of prospectus and reporting requirements for the public markets; I don’t think anybody’s ever done a cost/benefit analysis for the addition of further pages to prospectuses or for things like Sarbox and TRACE: it sounds good at the time, so it just happens.

The authors conclude, in part:

The results raise at least two issues. The first concerns the extent to which constraints in syndicated loan supply can be expected to ease in the near term. dysfunctional securitisation markets might constrain the ability of banks to place syndicated loans in the secondary market for a while. Moreover, repairing bank balance sheets takes time. But the sensitivity of syndicated loan supply to changes in bank CDS spreads may suggest that measures that alleviate concerns about banks’ soundness and ease bank funding pressures could have significant positive effects on credit supply even in the near term.

Second, recent developments in syndicated loan markets might be indicative of structural changes in credit markets. The gradual return to more normal functioning of the corporate bond markets could have eased funding constraints for banks and corporations. In particular, those with an investment grade rating might be more reliant on market finance in the future. Moreover, looking forward, emerging market banks may play a much bigger role in syndicated loan markets, and in international banking more generally, than in the past. The syndicated loan market with its role in financing trade and mergers and acquisitions might be one key area of expansion for these banks.

OK, so my question is: to what extent could making life easier for public issuers reduce the dependence of credit supply to non-financial firms on the (perceived) credit quality of the banks?

Index Construction / Reporting

Index Performance: August 2010

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for August, 2010, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
August 2010
Three Months
to
August 31, 2010
Ratchet -2.04% *** -1.99% ***
FixFloat -2.04% ** +0.05% **
Floater -2.04% -2.23%
OpRet +0.42% +2.11%
SplitShare +3.65% +7.48%
Interest +0.42%**** +2.11%****
PerpetualPremium +1.68%* +8.25%*
PerpetualDiscount +2.40% +10.72%
FixedReset +1.13% +4.57%
* The last member of the PerpetualPremium index was transferred to PerpetualDiscount at the May, 2010, rebalancing; the June performance is set equal to the PerpetualDiscount index; the index was repopulated (from the PerpetualDiscount index) at the June rebalancing.
** The last member of the FixedFloater index was transferred to Scraps at the June, 2010, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index
*** The last member of the RatchetRate index was transferred to Scraps at the July, 2010, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index
**** The last member of the InterestBearing index was transferred to Scraps at the June, 2009, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the OperatingRetractible index
Passive Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD +1.12% +5.36%
DPS.UN +1.29% +6.90%
Index
BMO-CM 50 +1.31% +6.16%
TXPR Total Return +1.29% +5.74%

There was another month of significant tracking error for CPD, as it implemented the July 2010 TXPR Rebalancing.

The pre-tax interest equivalent spread of PerpetualDiscounts over Long Corporates (which I also refer to as the Seniority Spread) ended the month at 265bp, a significant decline from the 275bp recorded at July month-end. Long corporate yields declined to 5.3% from 5.5% during the period while PerpetualDiscounts had the same decline in dividend terms, from 5.89% to 5.69%, which became a larger move in interest-equivalent terms, from 8.25% to 7.97%. I would be happier with long corporates in the 6.00-6.25% range, but what do I know? The market has never shown any particular interest in my happiness.

Long Corporates have simply been on wheels:


Click for Big

Charts related to the Seniority Spread and the Bozo Spread (PerpetualDiscount Current Yield less FixedReset Current Yield) are published in PrefLetter.

The trailing year returns are starting to look a bit more normal.


Click for big

But I suggest that eventually yields will make a difference:


Click for big

FixedResets set an all time low in median weighted average yield-to-worst during the month … this is going to end in tears.

And look, I know the index yield for Floaters shows discontinuities – it’s a result of index rebalancings due to volume shifting the mid point back and forth between the two BAM issues and either one of the PWF or the TRI issues. Give me better data and I’ll give you a better graph!

Floaters have had a wild ride; the latest decline is presumably due to the idea that the BoC will be slower rather than faster in hiking the overnight rate:


Click for big

FixedReset volume declined during the month after their burst of activity in April when they performed poorly. Volume may be under-reported due to the influence of Alternative Trading Systems (as discussed in the November PrefLetter), but I am biding my time before incorporating ATS volumes into the calculations, to see if the effect is transient or not.


Click for big

Compositions of the passive funds were discussed in the September, 2009, edition of PrefLetter.

Claymore has published NAV and distribution data (problems with the page in IE8 can be kludged by using compatibility view) for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to August 31, 2010
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
May 31, 2010 16.26      
June 25 16.47 0.21 +2.58% +2.58%
June 30 16.47 0.00 0.00%
July 27 16.62 0.069 +1.33% +1.57%
July 30 16.66 0.00 +0.24%
August 26 16.76 0.069 +1.01% +1.12%
August 31, 2010 16.78   +0.11%
Quarterly Return +5.36%

Claymore currently holds $486,846,162 (advisor & common combined) in CPD assets, up about $24-million from the $462,433,680 reported last month and up about $113-million from the $373,729,364 reported at year-end. The monthly increase in AUM of about 5% is larger than the total return of +0.72%, implying that the ETF experienced significant net subscriptions in August.

The DPS.UN NAV for September 1 has been published so we may calculate the approximate August returns.

p

DPS.UN NAV Return, August-ish 2010
Date NAV Distribution Return for sub-period Return for period
July 28, 2010 20.21      
September 1, 2010 20.57     +1.78%
Estimated July Ending Stub -0.24% **
Estimated September Beginning Stub -0.24% *
Estimated August Return +1.29% ***
*CPD had a NAVPU of 16.82 on September 1 and 16.78 on August 31, hence the total return for the period for CPD was +0.24%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal.
**CPD had a NAVPU of 16.62 on July 28 and 16.66 on July 30, hence the total return for the period for CPD was +0.24%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal.
*** The estimated August return for DPS.UN’s NAV is therefore the product of three period returns, +1.78%, -0.24% and -0.24% to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month of +1.29%

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for June and July:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-August-ish, 2010
June-ish +3.42%
July-ish +2.05%
Augusts-ish +1.29%
Three-months-ish +6.90%

Sentry Select is now publishing performance data for DPS.UN, but this appears to be price-based, rather than NAV-based. I will continue to report NAV-based figures.

Issue Comments

Best & Worst Performers: August 2010

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

August 2010
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “August 31”)
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) -3.93% Recently downgraded. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.23% based on a bid of 18.12 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.D FixedReset Pfd-2(high) -3.73% Recently downgraded. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.88% based on a call 2014-7-19 at 25.00./td>
BAM.PR.K Floater Pfd-2(low) -3.55%  
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) -3.29%  
MFC.PR.E FixedReset Pfd-2(high) -2.74% Recently downgraded. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.66% based on a bid of 25.82 and a call 2014-10-19 at 25.00.
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +4.71% Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 20.89 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +5.03% Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 21.09 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +5.06% Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 20.55 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) +5.26% Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 20.10 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2 +6.20% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 22.08 and a limitMaturity.
Market Action

September 3, 2010

Mr Thomas C Baxter, Jr, Executive Vice President and General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission regarding the Lehman bankruptcy:

As of that Friday, there were two prospective Lehman acquirers: Bank of America and Barclays. On Saturday, September 13, Bank of America abandoned the potential acquisition of Lehman and reached an agreement to acquire Merrill Lynch. Barclays was the only remaining suitor. On Sunday, September 14, with the consortium financing committed, we learned for the first time that Barclays would not be able to deliver a key document to carry the merger to conclusion: a guarantee of Lehman’s trading obligations between the signing of the merger agreement and its closing.

The Bear Stearns transaction taught us the importance of the guarantee to a successful rescue. A guarantee maintains the ability of the troubled company to operate as a going concern and, thus, preserves value. It does this by providing protection to counterparties during an especially vulnerable period – the period between merger contract and merger closing. Without such a guarantee, the creditors and counterparties of the firm would be at risk in the event that the merger fell apart because of a failed shareholder vote or some other contingency. Consequently, as a market matter, the guarantee is an indispensable part of any such rescue operation.

On Sunday, September 14, we learned that Barclays could not proffer the needed guarantee without a shareholder vote. This vote would take days, if not weeks or months, and there was no way to predict if the shareholders would even vote for the transaction to proceed. I explored with counsel whether the U.K. government, or one of its instrumentalities like the FSA, might waive this U.K. requirement, such that the guarantee could be delivered and the rescue effected. I learned that the U.K. authorities were not amenable to a waiver. Thus, Barclays ceased to be available as the willing buyer that we needed to rescue Lehman, and there was no other interest from any firm of sufficient size and capability that could acquire Lehman, a company with consolidated assets of about $600 billion.

I’m suspicious of any portfolio management model that includes the word “regression”, but there’s occasionally a good idea in there. Econbrowser‘s James Hamilton highlights his recent paper in a post Policy tools that could lower interest rates further:

Our starting point was a framework developed by Vayanos and Vila (2009), who interpret the term structure of interest rates as arising from the behavior of risk-averse arbitrageurs. This model is one way to capture formally the portfolio balance channel that Fed Chairman Bernanke indicated is central to the Fed’s understanding of how nonstandard monetary operations might affect the economy. Vayanos and Vila’s framework has previously been applied to our question by Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) and Doh (2010). One of our contributions is to develop specific measures of how the available supplies of Treasury securities of different maturities might be expected to influence the pricing of level, slope, and curvature risk of the term structure. Although I began as a skeptic of the claim that bond supplies would make much difference, we found pretty strong evidence that historically they have. For example, we found that over the 1990-2007 period, we could predict the excess return from holding a 2-year bond over a 1-year bond with an R2 of 71% on the basis of the level, slope, and curvature of the yield curve along with our 3 Treasury supply factors.

The full research paper is The Effectiveness of Alternative Monetary Policy Tools in a Zero Lower Bound Environment.

Just when you thought that nothing good could be said about Russian politicians, they prove you wrong:

Speaking as the Russian government announces plan to raise duty on alcohol and cigarettes, [Russian Finance Minister] Alexei Kudrin said that by smoking a pack, “you are giving more to help solve social problems such as boosting demographics, developing other social services and upholding birth rates”.

“People should understand: Those who drink, those who smoke are doing more to help the state,” he told the Interfax news agency.

He’s got my vote.

It was a solid day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 5bp and FixedResets gaining 3bp on average volume. There has been a lot of volume in MFC lately, presumably due to continued rebalancing after the downgrade.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3414 % 2,034.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3414 % 3,082.7
Floater 2.73 % 3.24 % 57,446 19.07 3 0.3414 % 2,197.2
OpRet 4.88 % 3.46 % 99,458 0.24 9 0.0472 % 2,357.5
SplitShare 5.99 % -38.02 % 68,324 0.09 2 0.2277 % 2,350.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0472 % 2,155.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.57 % 123,528 5.39 14 0.0113 % 1,969.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.69 % 5.76 % 187,422 14.22 63 0.0513 % 1,911.8
FixedReset 5.26 % 3.11 % 281,286 3.34 47 0.0282 % 2,256.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-03
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-03
Maturity Price : 22.80
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-03
Maturity Price : 21.66
Evaluated at bid price : 21.98
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 161,950 Nesbitt crossed 160,000 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 131,059 TD crossed blocks of 83,400 and 25,100, both at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.93
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 71,180 Nesbitt crossed 35,000 at 18.36.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-03
Maturity Price : 18.34
Evaluated at bid price : 18.34
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 66,062 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 26.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.57
Bid-YTW : 4.77 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 57,987 RBC crossed blocks of 10,000 and 38,500, both at 28.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.30
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 56,502 RBC bought 19,700 from Scotia at 25.86.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

GWL.PR.O To Be Redeemed

Great-West Life Assurance has announced:

that it intends to redeem all of its outstanding 5.55% Series O Preferred Shares (GWL.PR.O) on October 31, 2010. The redemption price will be $25.00 for each Series O Preferred Share plus an amount equal to all declared and unpaid dividends, less any tax required to be deducted and withheld by the Company. The paid-up capital of the Series O Preferred Shares is $17.26 per share.

A formal notice and instructions for the redemption of the Series O Preferred Shares will be sent to shareholders in accordance with the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attached to the Series O Preferred Shares.

Holders should very carefully examine the sentence about paid-up capital! When the issue is redeemed, holders will be taxed as if there is a capital loss from their purchase price to the paid-up capital of $17.26, with a deemed dividend equal to the difference between the $25.00 paid and this paid-up capital, or $7.74 (in addition to the dividends paid that actually look like dividends, of course). There will be many holders who hold it on the redemption date without knowing this, and there will be a great wailing and a gnashing of teeth when they do their taxes.

GWL.PR.O was last mentioned on PrefBlog when I discussed its particulars. GWL.PR.O is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is currently a member of the PerpetualPremium index.

Update, 2010-9-15: Bolding above is a correction to a stenographical error.

Market Action

September 2, 2010

Nothing happened in the financial markets today, so today the entire market update will be devoted to Canadian politics. Ain’t you lucky? But the integrity of the judicial system is important, as minority shareholders in Mascan Corp. can testify.

There’s a kerfuffle about a judge whose husband posted risque pictures of her on the Internet that has come to light because some little twerp has seen a chance for some legalized blackmail. There’s no indication the judge herself did anything wrong; unless you believe that allowing your spouse to take risque pictures of you is wrong. The whole story is no big deal, except for one incredible quote:

“If pictures of you naked end up on an internet site, it’s quite difficult to say you have the credibility to be a judge,” said Sébastien Grammond, dean of civil law at the University of Ottawa.

On the basis of what has been disclosed, I have no qualms about the credibility or ability of Associate Chief Justice Lori Douglas. However, I have deep qualms about the ability of Sébastien Grammond to think things through and to be responsible for the education of the next generation of lawyers. He should be removed from his post immediately.

Similarly:

“I think that no judge who has a cloud of scandal hanging over their heads is able to … act effectively as a member of the judiciary,” said Annalise Acorn, a law professor at the University of Alberta who specializes in ethics.

“I simply think it’s not consistent with the image of dignity and authority that the judiciary needs to have.”

Prof. Acorn said she would be “flabbergasted” if Judge Douglas stays on as a judge, and expects she might resign in the coming days.

It’s easy to tell member of a profession who are completely unable to do the work – they specialize in ethics. After all, how can you ever actually prove they’re wrong? It’s very convenient. The only surprising thing is that some authorities are actually willing to pay these people.

Alice Woolley claims that:

The problem is that her knowledge of those pictures prior to her appointment undermines the already fragile legitimacy of our appointments process. Applicants for judgeships are asked, “is there anything in your past or present which could reflect negatively on yourself or the judiciary, and which should be disclosed?” The question asks applicants to provide the committee with the information necessary to make a fair and appropriate assessment of the applicant’s qualifications to be a judge.

In this instance Douglas had to answer “yes” to that question.

It is not even about whether she would be a good judge. It is about whether people appearing before her could feel confident that their cases were being heard fairly and dispassionately. If those people included a black man, or a white woman divorcing a black man, or a Mexican family dealing with a child apprehension case, those people could reasonably wonder whether the racial stereotyping that the website reflects is one that Douglas shares, and that will impact her judgment.

The last sentence is pure bullshit. These people could wonder, complain and appeal, but not reasonably. If they wanted, they could always demand that the judge recuse herself. It’s just another legal manoevre.

But wait! We have not yet finished plumbing the depths of Alice Woolley’s ignorance. Clearly, Douglas’ behaviour is not, in and of itself, a factor. So what if … what if she’d be sunbathing topless and her husband had posted those pictures? What if it wasn’t her husband, but a voyeur posted pictures of her on the internet? What if he had identified her? What if he had claimed he could arrange sexual liasons with her? What if he claimed she liked Mexicans, wink-wink nudge-nudge? What if it wasn’t even a topless picture, it was her official picture taken during her investiture?

Alice Woolley’s series of assertions – they are far too childish to be honoured with the sobriquet of “argument” – work equally well in any of these situations.

We can go further. What if a tireless research finds that, while in high school, Douglas answered a Teen Queen Magazeen quiz by circling the “tall dark and handsome” choice for ‘Guy you want’. When we consider this situation, we’re at least looking at something she did herself, not something done by a third party without her knowledge or consent. Does this expression of preference make her forever unfit to be a judge? What if she hears a case involving some short, fair, average-looking guy? In Alice Woolley’s anarchic dream world, in which assertion of bias is deemed equivalent to proof of bias, such a thing would bar her – and, basically, every living, breathing human on the planet – from the judiciary.

Alice Woolley is a fool – and a dangerous fool at that, for urging standards that will accomplish nothing but making judges easier to blackmail.

Honestly, the howls for Douglas’ head are so shockingly removed from any semblence of intellectual rigour that one has to wonder if the real story is being told – when smart people say dumb things, it’s often because they don’t want to say the sleazy thing, as when doctors claim they won’t give terminal patients sufficient painkillers ‘because there is the chance of addiction’, when the real story is that they don’t want to get a call from the ministry and fill out the painkiller forms. Are the critics going after her for some other, less publicly expressible reason? Was she appointed by the wrong party? In Harper’s Canada, did she find the wrong person liable?

It was another good day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 11bp and FixedResets winning 2bp. Volume and volatility were enough to make the day interesting.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3214 % 2,028.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3214 % 3,072.2
Floater 2.74 % 3.27 % 58,407 19.00 3 -0.3214 % 2,189.7
OpRet 4.89 % 3.59 % 102,951 0.24 9 0.0515 % 2,356.4
SplitShare 6.00 % -36.75 % 70,620 0.09 2 1.1307 % 2,344.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0515 % 2,154.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.55 % 121,928 5.55 14 -0.0169 % 1,969.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.69 % 5.79 % 188,386 14.18 63 0.1103 % 1,910.8
FixedReset 5.27 % 3.13 % 273,360 3.35 47 0.0219 % 2,256.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
GWO.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 24.22
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.24
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 22.42
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.29
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 21.88
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-02
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.01
Bid-YTW : -36.75 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 22.78
Evaluated at bid price : 22.99
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 103,626 Scotia crossed blocks of 25,000 and 40,000, both at 26.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 95,964 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 25.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 67,210 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 10,000, both at 25.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 59,490 RBC crossed blocks of 23,900 and 24,900, both at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.95
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 50,329 TD bought 10,000 from RBC at 22.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 22.52
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 5.40 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 47,418 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 18.35
Evaluated at bid price : 18.35
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
There were 35 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Miscellaneous News

Moody's Warns on Banks' Rating Volatility

Moody’s has released a report on Canadian banks’ risk exposure due to investment banking activities:

While the Canadian banking system outperformed most developed country banking systems during the 2007–2009 credit crisis, the Canadian banks’ expansion of their capital markets platforms, particularly outside Canada, is not without risk, Moody’s Investors Service says in its new report.

The banks’ performance, coupled with the oligopolistic structure of the Canadian system, has allowed them to maintain very high ratings. Nevertheless, the mature domestic market raises a strategic challenge with regards to growth, and the void left by the retrenchment of many global investment banks represents one avenue for growth and revenue diversification. Therefore, several Canadian banks are now expanding their wholesale investment banking (WIB) activities.

Golly, not a word about the beneficial, if not to say brilliant and incisive, supervision by OSFI! I guess they forgot that bit.

Moody’s has previously cited the risks associated with WIB business and noted that even the most well-managed WIBs can suffer from unusual earnings volatility, and when serious risk-management failures occur, significant ratings transitions are possible.

The report is titled, “Capital Markets Activities of Canadian Banks: A Growing Risk”

A few tid-bits are disclosed in a Globe story on the report, Banks take $21.5-billion hit on risk:

Ratings agency Moody’s Investor Services has tallied up the hit Canadian banks took through their capital markets divisions from the start of 2007 to the end of 2009, and the toll has reached nearly $21.5-billion.

That is the amount Moody’s figures the banks would have recorded as profit if not for the writeoffs they took due to their exposure to the markets.

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce topped the list with a $10.5-billion hit during those three years, largely because of bets on U.S. structured debt products that went sour, followed by Royal Bank of Canada at $4.3-billion. Bank of Montreal ($2.9-billion), Bank of Nova Scotia ($2.2-billion) and National Bank of Canada ($1.1-billion) came next. Toronto Dominion Bank took the smallest hit at $727-million, the report says.

Moody’s has raised flags about this exposure in the past, notably when downgrading BMO prefs an extra notch last spring.