Kansas City Fed Examines TIPS Liquidity

April 18th, 2009

The Kansas City Fed has released its 1Q09 Economic Review, with articles:

Again, the Kansas City Fed has copy-protected their PDF … perhaps some kind soul will unlock it for me and send me a copy. One source of liquidity is steady, predictable supply of new issues.

Two Weeks Until Seminar on Floating Rate Preferreds

April 17th, 2009

I just want to remind all Assiduous Readers about the next seminar in the the series on the theory and practice of preferred share investing.

These seminars are aimed at active and potential preferred share investors who wish to review relative valuation techniques in preferred share analysis.

All seminars will be presented by James Hymas, who has written extensively on the subject of preferred share investment and has been referred to as a "top expert" on the subject.

Questions are encouraged throughout the seminars, as well as in informal discussion at the end of the session.

Each seminar is two hours in length; coffee and tea will be served. The cost of attendance is $100, but a discount of $50 will be given to participants who have an annual subscription to PrefLetter with at least one issue remaining at the time of the seminar.

All seminars will be video-recorded for future distribution.

Thursday, April 30

Floating Rate Issues: Theory & Practice

"Floating Rate Issues" are popular with investors who:

  • wish to obtain tax-advantaged income
  • want protection against future inflation

These issues are characterized by:

  • Issued by Operating companies
    • Extant issues are non-financial
  • Dividends are paid by reference to Canada Prime
  • An exchange option may exist to lock in a rate for five years on a given date
  • Issues are Perpetual

This seminar will review the theory of Floating Rate Preferred evaluation, including:

  • Credit Quality
  • Embedded calls
  • Exchange Options
  • The importance of ex-Dividend dates
  • Investment characteristics relative to
    • money market instruments
    • other perpetual instruments

Examples of relative valuation in current markets will be supplied and discussed. Note that Floating Rate issues include the HIMIPref™ Indices:

  • Ratchet
  • FixedFloater
  • Floater

. "FixedReset" issues will not be discussed as part of this seminar.

Attendence is limited; a reservation will avoid disappointment.

Location: Days Hotel & Conference Center, (at Carlton & College, downtown Toronto) Yorkville Room (see map).

Time: April 30, 2009, 6pm-8pm.

Reservations: Please visit the PrefLetter Seminar Page.

Prior Seminars on Video: The video and resource materials for the seminar on PerpetualDiscounts is available via the PrefLetter Video Seminar Page.

Market Rally: Nearly Back to September Levels

April 17th, 2009

I have graphed the performance of the HIMIPref™ indices back to August 29 … remember that these are Total Return indices, not Price Indices.

April 17, 2009

April 17th, 2009

The first round of the Abitibi CDS auction showed extremely low recovery:

Credit-default swaps traders set an initial value of 3.75 cents on the dollar for bonds of an AbitibiBowater Inc. unit to settle derivatives linked to the newsprint maker that’s now in bankruptcy protection.

Royal Bank has announced:

that it expects to record a goodwill impairment charge (on both a pre and after tax basis) of approximately US$850 million for the second quarter ending April 30, 2009. While the charge will reduce second quarter reported earnings by approximately US$850 million, it is a non-cash item and an accounting adjustment, and will not affect our ongoing operations, or our Tier 1 and Total capital ratios.

It does not affect the capital ratios because goodwill is already deducted from capital. The market yawned. What a difference six months makes, eh? If this announcement had been made at the height of the panic, Royal Bank stock … might have felt some effects.

Yet another strong day on elevated volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 2.0238 % 955.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 2.0238 % 1,545.3
Floater 5.11 % 5.13 % 70,028 15.30 2 2.0238 % 1,193.8
OpRet 5.10 % 4.34 % 143,663 3.87 15 0.2687 % 2,131.3
SplitShare 6.67 % 9.36 % 47,273 5.64 3 0.3616 % 1,732.9
Interest-Bearing 6.15 % 9.71 % 27,727 0.68 1 0.4115 % 1,939.5
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4645 % 1,631.3
Perpetual-Discount 6.69 % 6.80 % 146,750 12.85 71 0.4645 % 1,502.4
FixedReset 5.93 % 5.38 % 687,638 4.57 35 0.1668 % 1,898.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 14.28
Evaluated at bid price : 14.28
Bid-YTW : 8.44 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 6.97 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 22.74
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.02
Bid-YTW : 6.59 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 23.48
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 6.41 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 17.80
Evaluated at bid price : 17.80
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 22.20
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 22.77
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 6.40 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 24.05
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 7.02 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 17.90
Evaluated at bid price : 17.90
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 17.70
Evaluated at bid price : 17.70
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 17.86
Evaluated at bid price : 17.86
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 17.53
Evaluated at bid price : 17.53
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-07-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.37
Bid-YTW : 1.39 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 8.61
Evaluated at bid price : 8.61
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 15.92
Evaluated at bid price : 15.92
Bid-YTW : 7.32 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 16.52
Evaluated at bid price : 16.52
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 20.45
Evaluated at bid price : 20.45
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 2.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 20.31
Evaluated at bid price : 20.31
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 16.16
Evaluated at bid price : 16.16
Bid-YTW : 7.05 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 22.32
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 6.99 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount 2.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 21.96
Evaluated at bid price : 22.05
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.77 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 8.53
Evaluated at bid price : 8.53
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 2.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 7.61 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.X FixedReset 87,046 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 82,200 TD bought 21,000 from Anonymous at 26.42. The HIMIPref™ calculation of YTW will be controversial, but it is the same situation as has been previously discussed.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 23.56
Evaluated at bid price : 26.40
Bid-YTW : 5.25 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 72,465 TD crossed 15,000 at 18.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-17
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 59,436 Scotia bought two blocks of 10,000 shares each from National, both at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 55,069 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 51,520 Desjardins bought 16,500 from RBC at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.84
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
There were 43 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

POW Issues 30-Year Debs at 8.577%

April 17th, 2009

Power Corporation has announced:

that it has priced the issuance of an aggregate principal amount of $400 million debentures (the “Debentures”) consisting of $250 million principal amount of 7.57% debentures due April 22, 2019 (the “10 Year Debentures”) and $150 million principal amount of 8.57% debentures due April 22, 2039 (the “30 Year Debentures”). The Debentures will be offered through a group of agents to be led by BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. and Scotia Capital Inc.

The 30 Year Debentures will be dated April 20, 2009 and will mature on April 22, 2039. Interest on the 30 Year Debentures at the rate of 8.57% per annum will be payable semi-annually in arrears in April and October in each year, commencing October 22, 2009, until April 22, 2039. The 30 Year Debentures have been priced to provide a yield to maturity of 8.577%.

The credit rating for senior unsecured Power debentures assigned by S&P is A and by DBRS is A(High)

The offering of Debentures is expected to close on or about April 20, 2009. The net proceeds will be used to supplement the Corporation’s financial resources and for general corporate purposes.

IIROC has not yet issued a ruling regarding whether or not this price is fair, so investors of all kinds will just have to guess … if they’re allowed to buy it at all.

At the close last night, Power’s PerpetualDiscounts were quoted at:

Power PerpetualDiscounts
Quotations for 2009-4-16 Close
Ticker Price Quote Yield-To-Worst
POW.PR.A 20.12-23 7.02%-6.98%
POW.PR.B 18.84-99 7.16%-7.10%
POW.PR.C 20.95-01 6.98%-6.96%
POW.PR.D 18.01-11 7.00%-6.96%

So let’s say that the indicative bid-side YTW for a generic POW PerpetualDiscount is 7% … at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x, this is equivalent to 9.80% as interest, implying a pre-tax interest-equivalent spread of a mere 122bp. These bonds look cheap to me. Relative to the Preferreds, anyway, even after giving the Prefs a bonus for their capital gains potential!

Update, 2009-4-19: Note that this issue has a Canada Call:

“Canada Yield Price” for any Debentures, means a price equal to the price of such Debentures calculated to provide an annual yield from the date of redemption to April 22, 2019 in the case of the 2019 Debentures and April 22, 2039 in the case of the 2039 Debentures, equal to the Government of Canada Yield plus 116 basis points for the 2019 Debentures and 122.5 basis points for the 2039 Debentures, compounded semi-annually and calculated in accordance with generally accepted financial practice on the business day preceding the date on which the Corporation gives notice of redemption pursuant to the Trust Indentures.

“Government of Canada Yield” on any date means the yield to maturity on such date, compounded semiannually and calculated in accordance with generally accepted financial practice, which a non-callable Government of Canada Bond would carry if issued, in Canadian dollars in Canada, at 100% of its principal amount on such date with a term to maturity equal to the remaining term to April 22, 2019, in the case of the 2019 Debentures and April 22, 2039, in the case of the 2039 Debentures. In calculating the Government of Canada Yield for purposes of a redemption of the Debentures, the Corporation will use the average of the yields provided by two major Canadian investment dealers selected by the Corporation.

Power may, at its option, redeem the Debentures in whole or in part from time to time, on not less than 30 nor more
than 60 days’ prior notice to the registered holder, at a redemption price which is equal to the greater of the Canada Yield Price (as defined herein) and par, together in each case with accrued and unpaid interest to the date fixed for redemption. In cases of partial redemption, the Debentures to be redeemed will be selected by the Trustee (as defined herein) pro rata or in such other manner as it shall deem appropriate. Any Debentures that are redeemed by the Corporation will be cancelled and will not be reissued.

There is also Change of Control protection:

The Trust Indentures will each contain provisions to the effect that if a Change of Control Triggering Event (as defined below) occurs, unless the Corporation has exercised its optional right to redeem all of the Debentures, the Corporation will be required to make an offer to repurchase all or, at the option of each Debentureholder, any part (equal to $1,000 or an integral multiple thereof) of each Debentureholder’s Debentures pursuant to the offer described below (the “Change of Control Offer”), at a purchase price payable in cash equal to 101% of the outstanding principal amount of Debentures together with accrued and unpaid interest, if any, to the date of purchase.

There is also credit rating protection:

“Rating Event” means the rating on the Debentures is lowered to below an Investment Grade Rating by each of the Specified Rating Agencies, if there are less than three Specified Rating Agencies, or by two out of three of the Specified Rating Agencies, if there are three Specified Rating Agencies (the “Required Threshold”), on any day within the 60-day period (which 60-day period will be extended so long as the rating of the Debentures is under publicly announced consideration for a possible downgrade by such number of the Specified Rating Agencies which, together with Specified Rating Agencies which have already lowered their ratings on the Debentures as aforesaid, would aggregate in number the Required Threshold, but only to the extent that, and for so long as, a Change of Control Triggering Event would result if such downgrade were to occur) after the earlier of (a) the occurrence of a Change of Control and (b) public notice of the occurrence of a Change of Control or of the Corporation’s intention or agreement to effect a Change of Control.

Update, 2009-4-20: Closed on schedule.

IIROC Publishes Proposed Retail Bond Rules

April 17th, 2009

The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada has announced:

a proposed rule and guidance note to address fair pricing of over-the-counter (OTC) traded securities including fixed income securities such as bonds. The proposal would amend existing trade confirmation requirements by mandating yield disclosure for fixed income securities. It will require firms to disclose on confirmations sent to retail clients for OTC transactions if the dealer’s remuneration has been added to the price in the case of a purchase or deducted in the case of a sale. The general purpose of these proposed amendments is to enhance the fairness of pricing and transparency of OTC market transactions.

The text of the proposed rule states that, generally speaking:

the proposed amendments will:
• Require Dealer Members to fairly and reasonably price securities traded in OTC markets;
• Require Dealer Members to disclose yield to maturity on trade confirmations for fixed-income securities and notations for callable and variable rate securities; and
• Require Dealer Members to include on trade confirmations sent to retail clients in respect of OTC transactions a statement indicating that they have earned remuneration on those transactions unless the amount of any mark-up or mark-down, commissions and other service charges is disclosed on the confirmation.

These are rules only a regulator could love. They note, for instance, that:

the pricing mechanisms used for fixed income securities are less understood by retail clients. Specifically, retail clients may not understand the inverse relationship between price and yield or the various factors that can affect yield calculations and the relative risk of a particular fixed income security. All these factors contribute to the difficulty retail investors are faced with when determining whether a particular fixed income security is fairly priced (and therefore offers an appropriate yield) and of appropriate risk. IIROC therefore wishes to underscore the responsibility of Dealer Member firms to use their professional judgment and market expertise to diligently ascertain and provide fair prices to clients in all circumstances, particularly in situations where the Dealer Member must determine inferred market price because the most recent market price does not accurately reflect market value of that security.

If a client does not understand the inverse relationship between price and yield, THE CLIENT SHOULD NOT BE BUYING BONDS. Full stop.

The underlying purpose of the rules may be deduced from:

Market regulators’ surveillance of fixed income market activity will provide the tools to monitor for patterns and trends in prices and will allow regulators to more effectively identify price outliers. IIROC is currently considering how best to implement such a system to monitor our Dealer Members’ OTC security (both fixed income and equity) trading, which would allow IIROC to identify circumstances where trade prices do not correspond with the prevailing market at that time.

In other words, somebody at IIROC wants to expand his empire. Or, maybe, has looked at his career prospects and decided that a good future job title would be “Compliance Manager, Retail Bond Desk, Very Big Brokerage Inc.”

Rules 2 (Yield disclosure) and 3 (Compensation disclosure) are derisory; the latter simply requires a statement that the dealer is making money (or hoping to, anyway), something that most people are able to deduce from the fact that the confirmations already state that it’s a principal transaction.

Rule 1, however, is more complex. IIROC has drafted a Guidance Note:

When executing an OTC trade as agent for a customer, a Dealer Member will have to use diligence to ascertain a fair price. For example, in the context of an illiquid security this “reasonable efforts” requirement may require the Dealer Member to canvass various parties to source the availability and the price of the specific security. Passive acceptance of the first price quoted to a Dealer Member executing an agency transaction will not be sufficient.

This will kill the market, such as it is. Why would they bother, when they can just say “No offer” or “No bid”? If they do bother, and they do go through this canvassing process, and they do charge a fair price for their efforts, is the price still going to be halfway reasonable? I doubt it.

Most insidiously:

It is important to note that the fair pricing responsibility of Dealer Members requires attention both to the market value of the security as well as to the reasonableness of compensation. Excessive commissions, mark-ups or mark-downs obviously may cause a violation of the fair pricing standards described above. However, it is also possible for a Dealer Member to restrict its profit on transactions to reasonable levels and still violate the Rule because of inattention to market value. For example, a Dealer Member may fail to assess the market value of a security when acquiring it from another dealer or customer and in consequence may pay a price well above market value. It would be a violation of fair pricing responsibilities for the Dealer Member to pass on this misjudgment to another customer, as either principal or agent, even if the Dealer Member makes little or no profit on the trade.

So, in other words, you could make a good faith misjudgement of a market price – such as, for instance, a bond market professional makes all the time – and be subject to regulatory action. Not to mention being liable (forever) for the difference between the price at which you offset the client transaction and the price some regulator decides is fair.

Just in case there are some people out their with the belief that these rules might actually result in a net improvement to the retail bond market:

IIROC expects Dealer Members to maintain adequate documentation to support the pricing of OTC securities transactions. In most instances, existing transactions records, including audio recordings, will allow Dealer Members to reconstruct the basis on which an OTC transaction price was determined to be fair, and will therefore suffice for purposes of supporting the fairness of a transaction. IIROC anticipates that hard-to-value transactions, are likely to require additional supporting documentation. Proper documentation of such transactions may be the subject of IIROC trading reviews, and the failure to maintain documentation to support the fairness of pricing of hard-to-value transactions will be a consideration in any potential enforcement actions.

It is rather sweet that IIROC believes we can reach a Nirvana through imposition of more rules, but all this stuff simply betrays total lack of comprehension of how the bond market – retail or institutional – works. These rules are the product of people who have never in their lives got on the ‘phone in a cold sweat and said “Done”; it is the product of people who believe they know everything on the basis of their two-year Ryerson certificate in Boxtickingology.

My brief remarks when the gist of the rules was leaked on April 14 attracted comments, both on the post and in my eMail. One Assiduous Reader writes in and says:

I have a similar observation over the few years for bond with short maturity (1 – 5 years). Could you explain some of the factors why retail brokerages seem to be offering a better deal on GIC? Is the difference between a retail bond offering and a GIC the cost of “liquidity” (ability to sell before maturity) and the markup by the brokerage?

GICs are completely easy for the brokerages to offer. They get a feed from the issuer showing the rates, they can offer all they like at those rates in any wierd quantity desired, they get a commission, click, bang, done. A little bit of profit, no market exposure at any time for the brokerage, and the so-called trader can be any eighteen year old teller with the requisite CSI course.

Best of all, when the issuer runs into difficulties and gets its name in the headlines, they don’t have to deal with thousands of desperate, angry, confused clients who don’t understand why the brokerage doesn’t want to buy back every single piece of paper they’ve ever sold at the original price.

There has also been some discussion on Financial WebRing:

On the other hand, we require all sorts of disclosures for mutual fund investors, presumably targeted at unsophisticated investors. If that holds for mutual funds, why not for bonds?

Because mutual funds are sold on the basis that you are hiring somebody – and paying them – to exercise their best efforts. Bonds are sold on the basis that you don’t want to pay exhorbitant management fees on something so simple as bonds, and are therefore buying them yourself as principal and saving all kinds of money, yay!

Definitely agree that bonds should be on more of a transparent exchange than presently. If more complicated forms of debt such as pref shares and debentures can be exchange-traded, why not plain and simple bonds?

Because there are thousands and thousands and thousands of bonds, all but a few of which trade by appointment only. I don’t want to pay listing fees for something that’s going to trade three times a year; you can if you like.

Update: I was quoted by Bloomberg:

“The net effect of these proposed rules will be to decrease the choice of retail offerings even further,” said James Hymas, a fixed-income and preferred-share specialist at Hymas Investment Management Inc. in Toronto. “There’s a lot of overhead for the brokers. They may simply choose to limit the number of offerings they make.”

April 16, 2009

April 16th, 2009

OSFI has announced:

the results of its latest solvency testing of federally regulated private pension plans.

As part of its regular monitoring activities, OSFI tracks the ratio of plan assets to plan liabilities for the 400 defined benefit plans it regulates. The results show that the average estimated solvency ratio of federally regulated defined benefit private pension plans at December 31, 2008 was 0.85, a decrease from 0.98 as reported in June 2008.

One of my favourite examples of boneheaded compensation schemes has always been the Soviet system for evaluating tractor factories’ meeting of goals set in five year plans. They weren’t evaluated on quality of tractors. They weren’t evaluated on quantity of tractors. They were evaluated on weight of tractors. Guess which world economy had the heaviest tractors?

But maybe now I have a new favourite: the SEC system for evaluation of case officers:

The SEC and Finra receive thousands of complaints each year. SEC enforcement offices were evaluated on the number of cases, or “stats,” they brought in, rather than on the seriousness or difficulty of action, said Walter Ricciardi, the agency’s deputy chief of enforcement from 2005 through 2008, in a speech April 1 in New York.

“So if you brought an Enron, that’s one,” Ricciardi said. “If you brought a WorldCom, that’s two.” Delisting 135 defunct companies in a week for failing to file annual reports gave an enforcer 135 cases to count, he said.

But there’s some good news in the bond world, anyway:

JPMorgan Chase & Co., the second- largest U.S. bank by assets, plans to sell dollar-denominated debt without the backing of the U.S. government for the first time since August, according to a person familiar with the transaction.

The New York-based bank plans to sell 10-year notes in a benchmark offering, said the person, who declined to be identified because terms aren’t set. Benchmark typically means at least $500 million.

There are rumours about that the objective of this issue is not so much as to get the money as to establish a market clearing price.

But naturally, recessions mean there are some losers: General Growth and Abitibi have filed for creditor protection.

Yet another solidly positive day for preferred shares on continued relatively heavy volume. PerpetualDiscounts outperformed – as might be expected, given that their duration is now officially well in excess of the FixedResets.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5988 % 936.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5988 % 1,514.7
Floater 5.21 % 5.19 % 70,376 15.19 2 0.5988 % 1,170.1
OpRet 5.12 % 4.63 % 144,882 3.88 15 0.4263 % 2,125.6
SplitShare 6.69 % 9.84 % 45,204 5.64 3 0.7985 % 1,726.7
Interest-Bearing 6.17 % 10.29 % 28,087 0.68 1 0.1030 % 1,931.6
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6993 % 1,623.7
Perpetual-Discount 6.72 % 6.82 % 147,512 12.83 71 0.6993 % 1,495.4
FixedReset 5.94 % 5.37 % 694,673 4.59 35 0.3152 % 1,895.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 21.26
Evaluated at bid price : 21.54
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 18.22
Evaluated at bid price : 18.22
Bid-YTW : 7.04 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 14.30
Evaluated at bid price : 14.30
Bid-YTW : 8.42 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 21.39
Evaluated at bid price : 21.71
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 18.40
Evaluated at bid price : 18.40
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 22.72
Evaluated at bid price : 22.85
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 20.76
Evaluated at bid price : 20.76
Bid-YTW : 6.96 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 21.26
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 17.50
Evaluated at bid price : 17.50
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 18.84
Evaluated at bid price : 18.84
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 8.43 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 17.31
Evaluated at bid price : 17.31
Bid-YTW : 7.02 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 17.64
Evaluated at bid price : 17.64
Bid-YTW : 6.41 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 15.70
Evaluated at bid price : 15.70
Bid-YTW : 7.42 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 18.01
Evaluated at bid price : 18.01
Bid-YTW : 7.00 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 16.95
Evaluated at bid price : 16.95
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 14.65
Evaluated at bid price : 14.65
Bid-YTW : 8.19 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 17.65
Evaluated at bid price : 17.65
Bid-YTW : 6.41 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 17.61
Evaluated at bid price : 17.61
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 20.81
Evaluated at bid price : 20.81
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 18.35
Evaluated at bid price : 18.35
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 2.03 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28, according to the company … which really should have updated their website by now. Asset Coverage is probably 1.8+:1 by now, based on BAM.A’s improvement from 16.88 to 18.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 13.06
Bid-YTW : 13.45 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 18.66
Evaluated at bid price : 18.66
Bid-YTW : 6.91 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 21.70
Evaluated at bid price : 21.70
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 2.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 23.57
Evaluated at bid price : 23.61
Bid-YTW : 4.59 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 2.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 14.50
Evaluated at bid price : 14.50
Bid-YTW : 8.30 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 3.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.32
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 3.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 20.12
Evaluated at bid price : 20.12
Bid-YTW : 7.02 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 4.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-16
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 94,057 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 25.47.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 91,502 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 79,619 Nesbitt crossed 24,600 at 25.95; CIBC crossed 38,000 at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.83
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
NA.PR.P FixedReset 76,610 CIBC crossed 38,000 at 25.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.78
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 75,721 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.37
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 75,635 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
There were 38 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

IQW.PR.C, IQW.PR.D: Suspended from Trading

April 16th, 2009

Quebecor World has announced:

that it has received a written request from the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) that trading in all of Quebecor World’s outstanding classes and series of securities currently listed on the TSX be suspended. In the request letter, the TSX stated its view that, following the Company’s announcement on April 8, 2009 regarding the agreement in principle between Quebecor World and its key creditor constituencies on the material terms and conditions of a consolidated restructuring plan that would form the basis of a comprehensive plan of reorganization, arrangement or compromise, it is inappropriate for Quebecor World’s securities to continue to trade on the TSX. As the Company has consistently stated, it is highly unlikely that its existing Multiple Voting Shares, Redeemable First Preferred Shares and Subordinate Voting Shares will have any value following the implementation of any such plan of reorganization, arrangement or compromise. Based on the foregoing, and in response to the TSX’s written request, the Company has indicated to the TSX that it does not object to the TSX’s position and will comply with its request that all trading in Quebecor World’s securities on the TSX be suspended.

Consequently, effective after the close of markets on Friday, April 17, 2009, Quebecor World’s Subordinate Voting Shares (“IQW”), Series 3 Preferred Shares (“IQW.PD”) and Series 5 Preferred Shares (“IQW.PC”) will be suspended from trading on the TSX, which suspension will remain in place until the effectiveness of any reorganization, arrangement or compromise relating to Quebecor World and its subsidiaries under the ongoing insolvency proceedings.

Shareholders may contact their financial institutions, brokers or financial advisors to obtain more details on trading alternatives including the over-the-counter market.

The bare fact of suspension has been rather tersely confirmed by the TSX.

Both issues were last mentioned on PrefBlog in response to inquiries about their possible value subsequent to reorganization.

HIMIPref™ no longer tracks IQW.PR.C or IQW.PR.D, as the low price was causing “sanity checks” in the programming to indicate errors.

April 15, 2009

April 15th, 2009

Amidst all the shock and horror about American lending practices, the Boston Fed has published an examination of credit availability to recent bankrupts by Ethan Cohen-Cole, Burcu Duygan-Bump, and Judit Montoriol-Garriga: Forgive and Forget: Who Gets Credit after Bankruptcy and Why?:

Conventional wisdom about individuals who have gone bankrupt is that they find it very difficult to get credit for at least some time after their bankruptcy. However, there is very little non-survey based empirical evidence on the availability of credit post-bankruptcy. This paper makes two contributions using data from one of the largest credit bureaus in the US. First, we show that individuals who file for bankruptcy can indeed get credit very quickly after they file. Indeed, 90% of individuals have access to some sort of credit within the 18 months after filing for bankruptcy, and 66% have unsecured credit. Second, we show that those individuals who are effectively the least punished and can get the easiest access to credit after bankruptcy tend to be the ones who have shown the least ability and propensity to repay their debt prior to declaring bankruptcy. In fact, a significant fraction of individuals at the bottom of the credit quality spectrum seem to receive more credit after filing than before. We interpret the widespread credit access and the difference in credit provision across borrower types as evidence that lenders target at-risk borrowers. By means of a simple stylized model we show that this observation is consistent with a profit maximizing lender whose optimal strategy involves segmenting borrowers by observable credit quality and bankruptcy status and that offers credit contracts to each group. This interpretation is also in line with survey evidence that shows that lenders repeatedly solicit debtors to borrow after bankruptcy, with unsecured credit card being the easiest one to obtain.

Holy smokes, the preferred share market is on fire! Up strongly again today, continuing the two week rally highlighted yesterday, with volume still above normal levels.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.87%, equivalent to 9.62% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x, compared to Long Corporates which continue mired in their range of 7.50% … this time, maybe a hair below, but no more than a hair. The pre-tax interest-equivalent spread has thus narrowed to about 212bp, which is starting to look normal … normal, at least, by Credit Crunch standards, still well above the un-stressedl range of 100-150bp.

It is noteworthy that the Median Duration (YTW) of the HIMIPref™ Fixed-Reset index is now a mere 4.59 Years.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1199 % 931.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1199 % 1,505.7
Floater 5.24 % 5.22 % 66,433 15.14 2 0.1199 % 1,163.1
OpRet 5.14 % 4.67 % 143,523 3.88 15 0.4145 % 2,116.6
SplitShare 6.75 % 10.45 % 45,282 5.65 3 0.1391 % 1,713.0
Interest-Bearing 6.18 % 10.40 % 28,045 0.68 1 -0.9184 % 1,929.6
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6967 % 1,612.4
Perpetual-Discount 6.76 % 6.87 % 148,906 12.75 71 0.6967 % 1,485.0
FixedReset 5.96 % 5.45 % 668,892 4.59 35 0.4780 % 1,889.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 18.21
Evaluated at bid price : 18.21
Bid-YTW : 7.09 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 20.12
Evaluated at bid price : 20.12
Bid-YTW : 7.27 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 8.25
Evaluated at bid price : 8.25
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.36
Evaluated at bid price : 17.36
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.60
Evaluated at bid price : 17.60
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 22.96
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 18.20
Evaluated at bid price : 18.20
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.30
Evaluated at bid price : 17.30
Bid-YTW : 7.09 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 15.50
Evaluated at bid price : 15.50
Bid-YTW : 7.51 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.15
Evaluated at bid price : 17.15
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.85
Evaluated at bid price : 17.85
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.83
Evaluated at bid price : 17.83
Bid-YTW : 6.43 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.60
Evaluated at bid price : 17.60
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 20.26
Evaluated at bid price : 20.26
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 20.07
Evaluated at bid price : 20.07
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.85
Evaluated at bid price : 17.85
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 15.67
Evaluated at bid price : 15.67
Bid-YTW : 7.19 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.75
Evaluated at bid price : 17.75
Bid-YTW : 6.39 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 8.45
Evaluated at bid price : 8.45
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 21.15
Evaluated at bid price : 21.15
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 16.25
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 8.23 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 14.43
Evaluated at bid price : 14.43
Bid-YTW : 8.31 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 16.15
Evaluated at bid price : 16.15
Bid-YTW : 7.05 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.42
Evaluated at bid price : 17.42
Bid-YTW : 6.49 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 21.15
Evaluated at bid price : 21.15
Bid-YTW : 7.06 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 6.40 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 18.39
Evaluated at bid price : 18.39
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 7.07 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 22.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.76
Evaluated at bid price : 17.76
Bid-YTW : 7.12 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 2.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 15.95
Evaluated at bid price : 15.95
Bid-YTW : 7.14 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 2.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.84
Evaluated at bid price : 17.84
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 16.71
Evaluated at bid price : 16.71
Bid-YTW : 6.83 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 2.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 20.45
Evaluated at bid price : 20.45
Bid-YTW : 6.45 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 2.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 21.82
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 2.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 17.10
Evaluated at bid price : 17.10
Bid-YTW : 7.10 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 6.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 7.95 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.K FixedReset 166,774 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 151,439 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.79
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 102,593 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 68,275 National Bank crossed 30,000 at 26.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.42
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 63,705 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 25.30
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 6.40 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 61,400 RBC crossed 44,500 at 17.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-15
Maturity Price : 16.71
Evaluated at bid price : 16.71
Bid-YTW : 6.83 %
There were 41 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

RPA.PR.A RPB.PR.B & RPQ.PR.A: Credit Event & a Restatement of Financials

April 15th, 2009

CC&L Group announced on March 31:

ROC Pref II Corp., ROC Pref III Corp. and Connor, Clark & Lunn ROC Pref Corp. (collectively the “Companies”) announced that the decision by Idearc Inc. to voluntarily file petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is expected to constitute a credit event under the credit linked note (“CLN”) issued by their respective counterparties.

Idearc was created through a spin-off from Verizon Communications Inc. in November 2006. The Reference Portfolios of the Companies have exposure to Idearc Inc. at a half-weight as opposed to a full weight as a result of the spin-off. Idearc operates yellow pages directories in the U.S. The economic recession has negatively affected spending on directories advertising with customer cancellations due to credit deterioration and lower customer renewal rates resulting in declining cash flows thereby reducing Idearc’s ability to support its current level of debt.

The impact of the Idearc credit event on ROC Pref II Corp. and Connor, Clark & Lunn ROC Pref Corp. will be known when the recovery rate is determined within the next several weeks. The recovery rate for ROC Pref III Corp. is fixed at 40%. As a result, the Idearc credit event is expected to reduce the number of additional defaults that ROC Pref III Corp. can sustain before the payment of $25.00 per Preferred Share at maturity is adversely affected by approximately 0.5 to 2.6.

ROC Pref II Corp., ROC Pref III Corp. and Connor, Clark & Lunn ROC Pref Corp. are listed for trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols RPA.PR.A, RPB.PR.B and RPQ.PR.A, respectively.

Additionally, RPQ.PR.A is restating its financials:

the Company has restated and refiled its interim financial statements and management report of fund performance for the six months ended December 31, 2008.

In November 2008, the Company announced the implementation of restructuring initiatives designed to increase the likelihood that the Company will be able to repay the $25.00 Preferred Share issue price on the redemption of the Preferred Shares on June 30, 2011. As part of these initiatives, the next three quarters’ coupons on the underlying credit linked note (“CLN”) were sold to The Bank of Nova Scotia (“BNS”) (the issuer of the CLN) in return for additional subordination so that the number of defaults the CLN can sustain before principal and interest payments are adversely affected was increased.

In March 2009, the Manager determined that the 2008 fourth quarter CLN coupon payment had mistakenly been made by BNS resulting in an overstatement of Credit Trust IV’s and the Company’s net asset value. At the same time, the Manager also revisited the assumptions used to calculate the deferred management fee. The net impact of the two adjustments was a decrease in net assets by $0.07 per Preferred Share as at December 31, 2008. The Company has been reimbursed for the excess amounts paid out on the redemption of Preferred Shares as a result of the higher Preferred Share value.

It never rains but it pours!

RPQ.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog in connection with the downgrade of the credit linked note (or, at least, what I think is the credit linked note). All three issues were mentioned with respect to the Tribune Credit Event in December.

None of these issues are tracked by HIMIPref™.