HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : February, 2004

November 27th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2004-02-27
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,358.5 1 2.00 2.55% 20.9 83M 2.57%
FixedFloater 2,199.0 8 2.00 2.41% 18.9 60M 5.14%
Floater 1,943.7 7 2.00 0.00% 0.10 89M 3.23%
OpRet 1,745.6 24 1.43 3.29% 3.9 120M 4.80%
SplitShare 1,740.6 14 1.78 2.84% 3.0 41M 5.42%
Interest-Bearing 2,111.9 10 2.00 4.42% 0.7 122M 7.37%
Perpetual-Premium 1,379.6 32 1.65 4.40% 3.8 150M 5.35%
Perpetual-Discount 1,588.7 0 0 0 0 0 0

Index Constitution, 2004-02-27, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2004-02-27, Post-rebalancing

S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index to Remove SplitShares

November 27th, 2007

Well – they added them in July … and now it looks like they’re coming out.

I am advised by an Assiduous Reader that:

Standard & Poor’s Canadian Index Services announces that, effective with the December, 2007, semi-annual review of the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index, there will be a change to the universe of eligible securities for this index. Split preferred shares, which are packaged securities linked to baskets of stocks (or single stocks), will no longer be eligible for inclusion in the index. Split preferred shares that are current constituents of the index will be removed in the upcoming index review, which will become effective after the close of Friday, January 18, 2008.Spit Shares affected: ALB.PR.A, BNA.PR.C, DFN.PR.A, FBS.PR.B, FIG.PR.A, LBS.PR.A, PIC.PR.A, RPA.PR.A, RPB.PR.A, WFS.PR.A

I am advised that this is due to liquidity concerns. I will post a link to a proper press release as soon as I find one … but S&P/TSX just hates giving anything useful away for free!

Update: The press release is on S&P’s site – I missed it earlier because I thought it was entirely about the equity indices. The title is Standard & Poor’s Announces Changes in S&P/TSX Canadian Indices, dated 2007-11-26. The list of split shares affected appears to have been appended by my correspondent; I have checked it against the constituent list and agree.

Update, 2007-11-28: I have spoken to a very pleasant and patient woman at S&P, who confirms my correspondent’s indication that split shares are being removed due to liquidity issues. From the published methodology:

Volume. The preferred stocks must have a minimum trailing three-month average daily value traded of C$100,000 at the time of the rebalancing.

As of November 27, HIMIPref™ calculates the average daily value as:

Split Share
Average Trading Value
Issue A T V
ALB.PR.A 121,670
BNA.PR.C 159,859
DFN.PR.A 105,638
FBS.PR.B 134,628
FIG.PR.A 117,981
LBS.PR.A 107,586
PIC.PR.A 155,473
RPA.PR.A Not Tracked
RPB.PR.A Not Tracked
WFS.PR.A 127,613

Click the link for the HIMIPref™ definition of Average Trading Value; it’s not a “trailing three month average”, but will almost always be less than this figure, due to the imposition of caps on the daily change in the average, put in place to prevent a one-day spike in volume (somebody unloading a million shares, for example) distorting a simulation’s estimate of how much one can reasonably expect to do.

So, it looks like the liquidity constraint as published is not the issue; S&P told me they had also talked to some institutional traders and listened to their liquidity concerns. This makes more sense; the split shares have a decent enough daily volume, but they rarely trade in blocks because very few holders actually have a block to trade. Such traders could accumulate enough shares to make up their trades, but it would be spread out, perhaps over several days, and increase the execution risk on the trade.

We may conclude that the change has been made due to the paucity of block-trading in the split-share market. Fair enough! The elimination of split shares will simply make the index easier to beat and I’m fine with that.

BMO Tier 1 Capital – October, 2007

November 27th, 2007

BMO has released its Fourth Quarter Report and Supplementary Package, so it’s time to recalculate how much room they have to issue new preferred shares – assuming they want to, in this environment!

Step One is to analyze their Tier 1 Capital, reproducing the summary I prepared last year:

BMO Capital Structure
October, 2007
& October 2006
  2007 2006
Total Tier 1 Capital 16,994 16,641
Common Shareholders’ Equity 83.8% 86.9%
Preferred Shares 8.5% 6.3%
Innovative Tier 1 Capital Instruments 14.3% 13.2%
Non-Controlling Interests in Subsidiaries 0.2% 0.2%
Goodwill -6.7% -6.6%

Next, the issuance capacity (from Part 3 of last year’s series):

BMO
Tier 1 Issuance Capacity
October 2007
& October 2006
  2007 2006
Equity Capital (A) 13,126 13,403
Non-Equity Tier 1 Limit (B=A/3) 4,375 4,468
Innovative Tier 1 Capital (C) 2,422 2,192
Preferred Limit (D=B-C) 1,953 2,276
Preferred Y/E Actual (E) 1,446 1,046
New Issuance Capacity (F=D-E) 507 880
 Items A, C & E are taken from the table
“Capital and Risk Weighted Assets”
of the supplementary information;
Note that Item A includes Goodwill and non-controlling interest

Item B is as per OSFI Guidelines
Items D & F are my calculations

and the all important Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios!

BMO
Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios
October 2007
& October 2007
  Note 2007 2006
Equity Capital A 13,126 13,403
Risk-Weighted Assets B 178,687 162,794 
Equity/RWA C=A/B 7.35%  8.23% 
Tier 1 Ratio D 9.51%  10.22% 
Capital Ratio E 11.74%  11.76% 
 A is taken from the table “Issuance Capacity”, above
B, D & E are taken from BMO’s Supplementary Report
C is my calculation.

Note that while the Equity/RWA ratio and Tier 1 Ratio have both deteriorated over the year, BMO’s Total Capital Ratio has remained constant. This is due to issuance of about $1-billion in Subordinated Debt, which is junior to deposits, but senior to Tier 1 Capital.

It is disappointing to see the deterioration in the Equity/RWA ratio over the year – I consider this to be a measure of the safety of the preferred shares, as it is the “total risk” of the bank’s assets (as defined by the regulators) divided by the value of capital junior to preferreds (which therefore takes the first loss). It is by no means anything to lose a lot of sleep over, as it still remains strong – the preferreds are better protected than the sub-debt of a lot of global banks – but … geez, the direction’s wrong!

I won’t discuss the annual results to any great extent – there will be innumerable reports over the next few months released by analysts with a great deal more time to spend on the matter than I have (although their focus will not be the prospects for the preferred shares), but there is one snippet from the fourth quarter report that bears highlighting:

In the fourth quarter, BMO recorded $318 million ($211 million after tax) of charges for certain trading activities and valuation adjustments related to deterioration in capital markets. The charges included $160 million in respect of trading and structured-credit related positions and preferred shares; $134 million related to Canadian asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP); and $15 million related to capital notes in the Links Finance Corporation (Links) and Parkland Finance Corporation (Parkland) structured investment vehicles.

Well! It isn’t often that preferred share trading & underwriting have enough influence on profit to be worth a mention! It’s a pity they didn’t break out this amount; but investors who have sufferred through a horrendous time for the past six months in the preferred share market may at least take comfort that BMO took a good hit as well!

GWO Finances Putnam Purchase!

November 27th, 2007

Well, it took them long enough! GWO has announced it:

is selling its U.S. health-care business to Cigna Corp. in a deal valued at US$2.25 billion, a move its CEO says is part of a strategy to focus more on the financial services sector.

After taxes and write-offs, Great-West Lifeco said it will have approximately US$1.6 billion from the sale that will be used to repay bridge financing related to its purchase of Boston-based Putnam Investments, LLC, which closed in August.

After a bond issue in June the refinancing of the bridge debt languished. The original intention had been to issue hybrids (probably prefs); not only has this source of supply been removed, the issuer bid for GWO.PR.E / GWO.PR.X might see a bit more activity now.

GWO has the following direct issues outstanding: GWO.PR.E, GWO.PR.F, GWO.PR.G, GWO.PR.H, GWO.PR.I & GWO.PR.X. Related issuers are POW, PWF & CL.

November 26, 2007

November 26th, 2007

The big news today was Quebecor World’s suspension of preferred dividends; but that has its own post.

There was a fair bit of news on the MLEC/Super-conduit front. HSBC is bailing out its SIVs, taking $35-45-billion onto its balance sheet to avoid a fire-sale of the assets. It has been reported:

The SuperSIV is “is all good and well, but it’s not big enough,” said Tom Jenkins, a credit analyst at Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc in London. “If you have a large SIV, you’re going to need to find another solution.”

Cullinan’s net asset value, the amount left over after selling all its assets and repaying debt, fell to 69 percent of its capital, Moody’s Investors Service said Nov. 7. Asscher’s net asset value has declined to 71 percent, Moody’s said.

HSBC plans to make a formal offer to investors in the SIVs’ lower-ranking mezzanine and income notes later this year or early 2008. It expects to complete the restructuring by August 2008.

“HSBC believes there is not likely to be a near-term resolution of the funding problems faced by the SIV sector,” the bank said.

It will be most interesting to see what kind of bid the capital noteholders will see – I bet HSBC sticks it to them!

Meanwhile, there is a report that marketting of the Super-Conduit is about to commence in earnest … but one can detect a certain jeering tone in the commentary:

“Why should we put something on our balance sheet that is going to result in further writedowns?” is how most contributors will respond, [Punk Ziegel & Co. analyst Richard] Bove said in an interview. “The job of the Treasury isn’t to go out and defraud investors.”

Bank of America “has far more to gain down the road” with regulators by backing SuperSIV, said Tony Plath, a financial professor at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, who expects the plan to fail. “They are setting themselves up so they aren’t criticized when this thing falls apart.”

The fund’s lack of disclosure makes it “a necessary failure,” Bill Gross, manager of the world’s biggest bond fund at Newport Beach, California-based Pacific Investment Management Co., said in an Oct. 31 interview. “Transparency is what the Treasury and Fed are supposedly all about.”

Loomis Sayles & Co. declined to invest after receiving one of 16 invitations for a personal meeting last week with current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, said Daniel Fuss, who oversees $22 billion as chief investment officer at the Boston-based firm. The Securities Industries Financial Markets Association trade group extended the invitations, Fuss said.

“It’s so nice to get a personal invitation to go to Washington and have a one-hour visit with Ben Bernanke,” said Fuss, who decided participating wasn’t worth the risk to his firm. “Oh, boy, did I feel important for about 27 seconds, and then you smell a rat.”

Well … we shall see! But it is certain that a certain amount of forceful statements need to be made by the sponsors if there is to be any funding extended … but, on the other hand, if the idea is to stick it to the SIVs that are in trouble, how much sales will be needed? Given a choice between defaulting on their senior debt and getting a fistful of Super-Conduit term senior FRNs and capital notes, sponsors of troubled SIVs will find themselves between a rock and hard place. Naked Capitalism notes that Larry Summers writes in the Financial Times:

The priority now has to be maintaining the flow of credit. The current main policy thrust – the so-called “super conduit”, in which banks co-operate to take on the assets of troubled investment vehicles – has never been publicly explained in any detail by the US Treasury. On the information available, the “super conduit” has worrying similarities with Japanese banking practices of the 1990s that aroused criticism from American authorities for their lack of transparency, suppression of genuine market pricing of bad credits, and inhibiting effect on new lending. Perhaps there is a strong case for it, but that case has yet to be made.

Mr. Summers predicts a recession, but many disagree with him … for now:

Even bulls say that the biggest rally in government debt since 2002 has pushed yields on 10-year notes so low that they can only decline if the economy shrinks. None of the 68 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News from Nov. 1 to Nov. 8 expect the economy to contract before the end of 2008.

Prof. Stephen Cecchetti of Brandeis has been quoted here on August 27 (blaming rating agencies) and November 19 (wanting as much trading as possible on regulated exchanges) and has now commenced a four part series for VoxEU. In Part 1 he notes that:

Financial institutions have been allowed to reduce the capital that they hold by shifting assets to various legal entities that they did not own – what we now know refer to as “conduits” and “special investment vehicles” (SIV). (Every financial crisis seems to come with a new vocabulary.) Instead of owning the assets, which would have attracted a capital charge, the banks issued various guarantees to the SIVs; guarantees that did not require the banks to hold capital.

but does not suggest a solution, noting that:

under any system of rules, clever (and very highly paid) bankers will always develop strategies for holding the risks that they wanted as cheaply as they can, thereby minimizing their capital.

I have suggested that the 10% charge for a liquidity guarantee should (almost certainly) be increased; to avoid the next evasion, regulators should deem these guarantees to be in place if the bank is merely sponsoring the SIV without a guarantee; or if it has an economic interest in the survival of the SIV. Or maybe X% for an arm’s-length guarantee, double that if the bank has an economic interest.

Yes, it’s a bit like trying to plug a seive (hah!). But you do what you can.

He admits that another problem defies solution in this wicked world:

Think about the manager of a pension fund who is looking for a place to put some cash. Rules, both governmental and institutional, restrict the choices to high-rated fixed-income securities. The manager finds some AAA-rated bond that has a slightly higher yield than the rest. Because of differences in liquidity risk, for example, one bond might have a yield that is 20 or 30 basis points (0.30 or 0.30 percentage points) higher. Looking at this higher-yielding option, the pension-fund manager notices that there is a very slightly higher probability of a loss. But, on closer examination, he sees that this higher-yielding bond will only start experiencing difficulties if there is a system-wide catastrophe. Knowing that in the event of crisis, he will have bigger problems that just this one bond, the manager buys it; thereby beating the benchmark against which his performance is measured.I submit that there is no way to stop this. Managers of financial institutions will always search for the boundaries defined by the regulatory apparatus, and they will find them.

I don’t have much of a solution either! Enforcement of the Prudent Man Rule can only go so far … and if some paper defaults, it’s very difficult to show that the chance of this happening was underestimated at time of purchase. But … Prudent Man Rule will help, anyway!

Remember the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) mentioned here on October 30? It seems that FHLB Atlanta has credit policies that would be considered somewhat unusual in the private sector:

Countrywide Financial Corp. fell more than 10 percent in New York Stock Exchange trading after U.S. Senator Charles Schumer urged the regulator of the Federal Home Loan Bank system to probe cash advances to the largest U.S. mortgage lender.

Schumer said he was alarmed by the volume of advances the system’s Atlanta bank has made to Countrywide considering “the rapid deterioration” in the credit quality of some of the Calabasas, California-based company’s mortgages. Schumer expressed his concerns in a letter sent today to Federal Housing Finance Board Chairman Ronald Rosenfeld.

The Atlanta bank has made $51.1 billion in advances to Countrywide as of Sept. 30, representing 37 percent of the bank’s total outstanding advances, Schumer wrote, citing U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filings.

In more cheerful news, Naked Capitalism reports on a hedge fund that’s hit a ten-bagger betting against sub-prime and Ed Yardeni, of Millennium Bug fame, offers up nine reasons to be thankful:

(1) The S&P 500 is up 53% since Thanksgiving 2002. The current bull market has been the third best since 1960.
(2) The 10-year Treasury yield was near 5.5% in early 2002. It is down to 4.0% this morning.
(3) The core CPI inflation rate in the US has been remarkably steady around 2%, and down from 2.6% to 1.8% on average among the 30 members of the OECD, despite the soaring price of crude oil, which is up from $27 a barrel to $99 a barrel since Thanksgiving 2002, based on West Texas Intermediate price.
(4) Notwithstanding all the nonsense about outsourcing, the unemployment rate was down to 4.7% in October vs. 5.7% five years ago as payroll employment rose 8.1 million to a record high of 138.4 million.
(5) Real disposable personal income was at a record high in September, up 16.0% since September 2002. Real per capita income is also at a record high and up 2.1% per year, on average, over the past five years.
(6) Real GDP is up 15.3% over the past five years.
(7) In the US, since the end of 2002, household net worth is up nearly 50% to a record $57.9 trillion.
(8) World exports have doubled since November 2002. The OECD world industrial production index is up 30% since then. Today, roughly three billion people around the world are aspiring and perspiring to improve their standards of living.
(9) Alan Greenspan’s book tour is over.

The New York Fed made headlines, pumping $8-billion into the term-repo market, stating:

In response to heightened pressures in money markets for funding through the year-end, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Open Market Trading Desk plans to conduct a series of term repurchase agreements that will extend into the new year.

The first such operation will be arranged and settle on Wednesday, November 28, and mature on January 10, 2008, for an amount of about $8 billion. The timing and amounts of subsequent term operations spanning the year-end will be influenced by market and reserve developments.

In addition, the Desk plans to provide sufficient reserves to resist upward pressures on the federal funds rate above the FOMC’s target rate around year-end.

The Bloomberg story seems a bit peculiar – they claim that:

Fed officials acted after the average U.S. overnight lending rate between banks exceeded their target seven of the past eight days, suggesting a reluctance to lend amid mounting subprime mortgage losses. In most years, banks face year-end pressures as they adjust their books to show ample liquidity and at the same time meet a jump in demand for cash from consumers.

While there may well be pressures, Fed Funds Data show that, in terms of averages, we’re only talking about a basis point or so. However, the maintenance period ended November 21 was clearly tighter than the period ended November 4 – and we don’t know what they had to do to keep the actual rate so well aligned with target. They may well have been influenced by the fearsome size of the TED spread:

The cost of borrowing dollars for three months rose as banks hoarded cash to cover their commitments through the end of the year. The London interbank offered rate, or Libor, for dollars rose 1 basis point to 5.05 percent, for a four-week high and the ninth straight day of gains, the British Bankers’ Association said today.

That pushed the “TED” spread, or the difference between three-month Treasury bill yields and Libor, to 1.92 percentage points from 1.82 percentage points on Nov. 23. The yield on the three-month bill fell 9 basis points to 3.12 percent.

Preferreds saw heavy volume today and violent random (as far as I can tell!) price movements based on the latest headlines. PerpetualDiscounts hit a new post-2006-6-30 low, as did SplitShares, the latter now having provided negative return since the start of these temporary indices.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.81% 4.82% 124,920 15.76 2 +0.1229% 1,045.6
Fixed-Floater 4.88% 4.88% 86,257 15.69 8 -0.0180% 1,040.3
Floater 4.78% 4.83% 59,270 15.72 3 -0.6483% 984.3
Op. Retract 4.87% 3.68% 76,907 3.67 16 -0.1070% 1,031.6
Split-Share 5.46% 6.24% 92,732 4.04 15 -0.9907% 993.5
Interest Bearing 6.32% 6.77% 66,740 3.70 4 +0.1436% 1,048.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.87% 5.65% 83,316 7.29 11 -0.0237% 1,004.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.63% 5.67% 335,737 14.38 55 -0.2240% 900.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -5.6180% Asset coverage of just under 4.0:1 as of October 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.60% based on a bid of 21.00 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. This will make arbitrageurs happy! The yield may be compared with 6.66% on BNA.PR.A (2010-9-30 maturity) and 8.66% on BNA.PR.C (2019-1-10 maturity).
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -3.5088% Presumably a reaction to the the SIV bail-out, but holy smokes, the common was only down 1.9%! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 20.90 and a limitMaturity. HSB.PR.C, a comparable issue with a little less upside, was unchanged and yields 5.78%.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -2.9428% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.94% based on a bid of 17.48 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -2.2959% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.04% based on a bid of 19.15 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -2.2284% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.91% based on a bid of 17.55 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.1312% Asset coverage of just under 4.0:1 as of October 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.66% (interest equivalent of 12.12%!) based on a bid of 17.45 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
PIC.PR.A SplitShare -1.8767% Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of November 15 according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.87% based on a bid of 14.64 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00.
BNA.PR.A SplitShare -1.5139% Asset coverage of just under 4.0:1 as of October 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.66% based on a bid of 24.72 and a hardMaturity 2010-9-30 at 25.00.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.4907% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 24.45 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.D OpRet -1.2879% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.34% based on a bid of 26.06 and a softMaturity 2012-10-30 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.1494% Because it’s BAM or because it’s a floater? Your guess is as good as mine … but volume was only 1,500 shares.
BCE.PR.S Ratchet -1.1382%  
BCE.PR.R FixFloat -1.0976%  
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.0526% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 22.56 and a limitMaturity.
FIG.PR.A InterestBearing -1.0417% Asset coverage of just under 2.2:1 as of November 23 according to Faircourt. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.40% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.50 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-31 at 10.00.
DFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.0000% Asset coverage of 2.7+:1 as of November 15, according to Quadravest. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 9.90 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.2225% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 20.70 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A FixFloat -1.0976% Asset coverage of just under 1.7:1 according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.04% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.56 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
IQW.PR.C Scraps (would be OpRet but there are urgent and pressing credit concerns) 222,586 ITG (who?) bought 10,000 from Nesbitt at 16.50. Defaulted today. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 278.53% (annualized) based on a bid of 16.15 and a softMaturity 2008-2-29 at 25.00.
IQW.PR.D Scraps (would be FixFloat, but there are urgent and pressing credit concerns) 169,285 Defaulted today.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 95,559 National Bank crossed 80,000 at 21.36. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 21.39 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount 86,695 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 24.25 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 60,104 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.94% based on a bid of 17.48 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 46,250 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.02% based on a bid of 17.20 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 45,494 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 20.70 and a limitMaturity.

There were forty other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : January, 2004

November 26th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2004-01-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,353.1 1 2.00 2.72% 20.5 68M 2.73%
FixedFloater 2,183.0 8 2.00 2.60% 18.5 69M 5.18%
Floater 1,922.4 6 2.00 3.00% 19.2 88M 3.29%
OpRet 1,733.3 24 1.42 3.47% 3.9 121M 4.82%
SplitShare 1,708.1 10 1.90 3.78% 1.6 57M 5.63%
Interest-Bearing 2,100.2 9 2.00 4.32% 0.7 116M 7.56%
Perpetual-Premium 1,362.5 31 1.64 4.64% 4.2 144M 5.40%
Perpetual-Discount 1,569.0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Index Constitution, 2004-01-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2004-01-30, Post-rebalancing

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : December, 2003

November 26th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2003-12-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,374.1 1 2.00 2.94% 19.9 65M 2.96%
FixedFloater 2,154.8 8 2.00 2.88% 18.2 75M 5.21%
Floater 1,921.9 6 2.00 3.19% 18.7 99M 3.48%
OpRet 1,715.8 27 1.45 3.70% 3.6 96M 4.49%
SplitShare 1,698.6 12 1.75 3.87% 3.2 44M 5.54%
Interest-Bearing 2,091.2 9 2.00 4.39% 0.8 123M 7.59%
Perpetual-Premium 1,347.6 32 1.68 4.84% 5.8 156M 5.44%
Perpetual-Discount 1,551.9 0 0 0 0 0 0

Index Constitution, 2003-12-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2003-12-31, Post-rebalancing

IQW.PR.C & IQW.PR.D : Dividends Suspended

November 26th, 2007

When writing about the recent Quebecor World downgrade I noted:

At Pfd-5, there’s not much further IQW.PR.C / IQW.PR.D can go!

Well, now they’re taking that last step:

Quebecor World Inc. (TSX: IQW, NYSE: IQW) (the “Company”) announced today that it is suspending dividend payments on its Series 3 and Series 5 Preferred Shares. While the Company has  the  funds available to pay such dividends, it has been advised by counsel that as a result of recent developments, the Company may be prevented from paying dividends to holders of its preferred shares because it may not satisfy the applicable capital adequacy test contained in the Canada Business Corporations Act («CBCA»). In order to rectify this situation, the Company intends to propose to its shareholders at its next annual shareholders meeting scheduled for May 2008 a reduction of stated capital as permitted under the CBCA to allow the Company to resume paying dividends, including accrued, unpaid dividends. The Company notes that the dividends on the Series 3 and Series 5 preferred shares (including dividends that were to be paid on December 1, 2007) are cumulative and holders will be entitled to receive unpaid dividends, when declared by the Board of Directors, at such time as the Company is permitted to resume the payment of dividends.

It is not clear to me what effect, if any, this will have on the softMaturity of the IQW.PR.C which will occur prior to the meeting; and I’m not sure why they would choose to default on the IQW.PR.C rather than convert to common.

Sure, they don’t want to dilute the common, but why is this so much worse than defaulting?

Update: For those who are interested, here is the DBRS rating history of Quebecor World (and its predecessor corporation):

Quebecor World DBRS Rating History
Date Rating
April 17, 1998 Pfd-2
October 1, 1998 Pfd-2(low)
“high” & “low” appendages
had not previously been used.
September 20, 1999 Pfd-3(high)
June 3, 2003 Pfd-3
October 24, 2003 Pfd-3(low)
December 23, 2005 Pfd-4(high)
August 9, 2006 Pfd-4
August 30, 2007 Pfd-5(high)
October 4, 2007 Pfd-5
November 26, 2007 D

Update #2, 2007-11-26: DBRS has downgraded the preferreds to “D” (surprise!):

While the cumulative nature of the Series 3 and Series 5 preferred shares affords Quebecor World the flexibility to suspend dividends, provided dividends are paid in arrears, DBRS notes preferred shareholders maintain a level of expectation that these dividends will be paid in a timely manner, and this expectation is reflected in the preferred share ratings. Having not met the expectation of preferred shareholders, DBRS notes the preferred shares are more reflective of a “D” rating.

DBRS expects the conversion feature on the Series 5 preferred shares, which become convertible at the option of the Company on December 1, 2007, and at the holder’s option on March 1, 2008, will not be affected by the dividend suspension, and the conversion calculation will adjust to include accrued and unpaid dividends in the numerator of the equation, as per the Series 5 prospectus document dated August 3, 2001.

What's Up with BNA.PR.C ? Yield!

November 24th, 2007

The following has been copied from November 23, 2007 

I continue to be utterly amazed by the yield on BNA.PR.C, which had yet another rough ride today, down 0.9444% to close at 17.83 bid, yield 8.39% to maturity. 8.39%! Basically, 11.75% interest equivalent!

I confess, I thought for a fleeting moment today that it might be inventory overhang from a barely successful underwriting … but that doesn’t seem to fit the data. They started trading January 10 and hung around at the $25.00 level until early May, when they – quite reasonably – got caught up in the downdraft. Markets were strong in the first part of the year – if the dealers had been left holding the baby, surely they would have, and could have, blown it out the door at $24.00 in, say, March.

The fund has a position in this issue and I’m getting killed on it. But how can it possibly be fairly valued at 160bp over the similar-and-parri-passu BNA.PR.B? On the bright side, looking at the price chart is highly entertaining … I’ve found a new illustration for the word “parabola”.

This ends the copy. The rest is new!

I have thought of a perfectly appalling possibility, predicated by my bewilderment at the difference in yields between BNA.PR.B and BNA.PR.C … is it possible that the market has forgetten that they will mature?

Current Yields of BNA Issues
A bogus calculation that the market might be making
  BNA.PR.B BNA.PR.C
Dividend 1.2375 1.0875
Bid  22.25 17.83
Current
Yield
5.56% 6.10%

It should be noted that Current Yield is a thoroughly bogus calculation – it ignores the amortization of the discount until maturity.

On the basis of Current Yield, the issues are much more equal …. is it at all possible that this is how they’re being traded? I’m grasping at straws here!

I should also note that while the price of the issue suffered on the first trading day, the volume was heavy. This indicates that the underwriting, in terms of getting the issue out the door, was a success, which makes the whole “overhang” theory even more unlikely.

Prefhound in the comments has some interesting things to say, as always. I will be responding in the comments, so stay tuned!

Update, 2007-11-24: Note that there is more discussion about Split-Shares in general and BNA.PR.C in particular in the post (and comments) : SplitShare & OpRet Yields.

Update #2, 2007-11-24: Sometimes I despair. I looked on Hank Cunningham’s blog, In Your Best Interest, and found Blackmont Capital’s Preferred Share Report, which – in the absence of any copyright notice telling me not to – I have uploaded here for wider distribution. Blackmont makes two rather surprising claims in this report:

  • that BNA.PR.B is a Perp. False. The prospectus (March 13, 2004 on SEDAR) clearly states: The Company will redeem all outstanding Series 1 Preferred Shares on March 25, 2016 (the ‘‘Redemption Date’’).
  • that the yield on BNA.PR.C is 5.85%. False. It appears that they have reported the current yield, being the annual dividend of 1.088 divided by the “last” price of $18.60. They have not accounted for the fact that the issue’s redemption price is $25.00.

The Blackmont report is riddled with errors – just looking at it very casually, I note that they list GWO.PR.E and GWO.PR.X as perpetuals.

Update, 2008-1-23 I have received an inquiry from a Canadian Moneysaver subscriber who asks if the dividends on this issue are cumulative.

First off … let’s check my “information summary site”, PrefInfo … yes they are.

Now, I think this is a well-researched and well-proofread site that dispenses highly accurate information to the yearning masses …. but I still recommend looking at the prospectus before actually plunking any money down. The prospectus is on SEDAR, company name “BAM Split”, dated January, 2007 and we see on the front page:

Holders of the Series 3 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly fixed cumulative preferential dividends of $0.2719 per Series 3 Preferred Share.

… and on page four of the PDF (which is also page four of the prospectus):

Holders of the Series 3 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly fixed cumulative preferential dividends equal to $0.2719 per Series 3 Preferred Share.

Series 3 Preferred Share dividends will be funded from the dividends received on the BAM Shares. Based on the current dividends paid on the BAM Shares, it is expected that the Company will have approximately 1.08 times coverage on the dividends to be paid on all Preferred Shares. As such, the dividends paid on the Series 3 Preferred Shares will constitute ordinary dividends to the holders of the Series 3 Preferred Shares. If for any reason, the dividends received by the Company on the BAM Shares are insufficient to fully fund the Preferred Share dividends, the Company will sell BAM Shares or write covered call options on its BAM Shares to the extent necessary to fund any shortfall.
See ‘‘Dividend Policy’’ and ‘‘Details of Offering — Series 3 Preferred Shares —
Dividends’’.

…. so …. I think it’s fair to say: “Yes. The dividends are cumulative.”

November 23, 2007

November 23rd, 2007

Today’s phrase is “Minsky Moment” and today’s question is “Have we arrived at one?”.

Prof. Charles W. Calomiris of Columbia explains a “Minsky Moment” with:

The late Hyman Minsky developed theories of financial crises as macroeconomic events. The economic logic he focused on starts with unrealistically high asset prices and buildups of leverage based on momentum effects, myopic expectations and widespread overleveraging of consumers and firms. When asset prices collapse, the negative wealth effect on aggregate demand is amplified by a “financial accelerator”; that is, collapsing credit feeds and feeds on falling aggregate demand credit. A severe economic decline is the outcome. Many bloggers refer to this as a “Minsky moment” (see Minsky 1975 for the real thing.)

… in other words, a self-feeding collapse of the economy.

In an paper posted at VoxEU which summarizes his Not (yet) a Minsky Moment paper published by the American Enterprise Institute, he says (as one may surmise by the title) that we’re not there yet and provides eight reasons. Naked Capitalism takes violent exception to this view … so, let’s have a look at the reasons.

Calomiris: Housing prices may not be falling by as much as some economists say they are.

Smith: Real estate industry participants who have an incentive to say things are fine are instead saying they are terrible.

This is simply the old story: forecasts vs. experience. Neither player is particularly convincing.

Calomiris:Although the inventory of homes for sale has risen, housing construction activity has fallen substantially.

Smith: Per these charts, overhang is much worse than in 1988-1989, and rental vacancies are considerably higher as well. So you can’t take too much comfort from the fall off in housing starts.

I’ll award that point to Smith. Calomiris (both in the summary and the full paper) simply states that the trend in housing starts is in the proper direction; he performs no analysis of how long it will take to work of the excess inventory he acknowledges exists.

However, I would like to see more work done to relate the overhang to affordability. The latest NAHB Housing Affordability Index (MS-Excel File) shows a nationwide value of 43.1%. According to the NAHB:

“The latest HOI indicates that 43.1 percent of new and existing homes that were sold in the United States during this year’s second quarter were affordable to families earning the national median income,” said NAHB President Brian Catalde, a home builder from El Segundo, Calif.

… which is good enough, but I’m looking for something more like RBC’s Affordability Analysis, which indicates the percentage of household income taken up by ownership costs. Even this isn’t really good enough because what we are really interested in is the potential take-up of housing by those who don’t currently own houses. There must be somebody, somewhere, who’s devoted his life to the analysis of the work-out of housing inventory overhangs! Let’s find out who he is and talk to him … but I bet he’s a pretty popular guy at the moment.

Calomiris: The shock to the availability of credit has been concentrated primarily in securitisations rather than in credit markets defined more broadly (for example, in asset-backed commercial paper but not generally in the commercial paper market).

Smith Securitization has been taking market share from traditional credit intermediation (bank lending) for the last 30 years. Corporate lending, commercial and residential real estate loans, auto and credit card receivables and LBO loans are all securitized to a considerble degree. Residential real estate now depends on securitization; if there is no rebound in securitization, we will see a heap of trouble. That’s why policymakers are so keen to revive it.

Point to Calomiris. He is arguing that there is still credit around – albeit at a higher price – and (with the exception of Northern Rock) there are plenty of buyers around for commercial paper, provided the seller is willing to discount the price. Smith does not address the point raised.

Calomiris: Aggregate financial market indicators improved substantially in September and subsequently.

Smith: Events subsequent to the writing of his paper prove make this view inaccurate. The S&P 500 is on the verge of giving up its gains for the year. Bloomberg today reports that Treasuries are enjoying their longest rally in 5 years as investors seek safety.

Point to Calomiris. The fact that the S&P 500 “is on the verge of giving up its gains for the year” isn’t the most terrible thing that could happen, and hardly supports the idea that we have entered a self-feeding collapse. The point about Treasuries is stronger, but while spreads have widened, yields on mid-term bank & finance paper have more or less stayed the same.

Calomiris: nonfinancial firms are highly liquid and not overleveraged. Thus, many firms have the capacity to invest using their own resources, even if bank credit supply were to contract.

Smith: I’m not sure what his sample is. Average ratings of corporate issuers have declined, with nearly half the bonds now junk rated.

Point to Calomiris. He disclosed his sample, Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1, Table B.102, and Smith’s other points are irrelevant. They may be a cause for concern about the stability of the financial system, but they do not indicate that we are now in the midst of a collapse.

Calomiris: households’ wealth is at an all-time high and continues to grow. So long as employment remains strong, consumption may continue to grow despite housing sector problems.

Smith:  It won’t be for very long if housing continues on the trajectory that most anticipate, and will decline even more if the stock market follows.

Easy point to Calomiris (I should even consider giving him a bonus point). Smith is mistaking the existence of gloomy forecasts for evidence of horrible current conditions.

Calomiris: Of central importance is the healthy condition of banks.

Smith: Many are believed to be otherwise. Financial stocks hare dropped sharply this year, and large banks are now paying as much as 6% in dividends when Treasuries yield a mere 4%.

Point to Calomiris. Market prices – Smith’s idol – are down, but Tier 1 capital ratios are not showing evidence of disaster. Tough times are not a disaster. Citigroup is getting hammered – the stock is down 40% over the past year – but what’s really going on?

Deutsche Bank AG analyst Michael Mayo wrote in a report yesterday that Citigroup shares may fall to $29. He reiterated his “sell” rating and said the company may be prevented by regulators from making acquisitions because “recent risk management mishaps seem to violate” terms of an earlier agreement.

“It looks to us that recent problems with CDOs and their lack of disclosure reflect a serious risk management breakdown,” Mayo said. At $29, Citigroup would trade at eight times estimated earnings for 2008, he said.

‘Sell the stock!’ cries Mayo, ‘The earnings yield’s less than 12%!’ There may be no growth, and there may be more risks than were previously deemed to be the case, but Citigroup is still making lots of money. Dividends won’t grow much over the next few years as they rebuild their balance sheet … but this is not the end of the world. It’s a pause.

Calomiris: Banks hold much more diversified portfolios today than they used to. They are less exposed to real estate risk than in the 1980s, and much less exposed to local real estate risk, although US banks’ exposure to residential real estate has been rising since 2000

Smith: Not directly addressed.

Full point by default to Calomiris.

So I score the match 6-1 to Calomiris, with one point considered lost by both. And what’s more, I agree with him – which may, of course, have influenced my scoring. Times are tough. There’s a big indigestible mass of dubious debt on the books all over the place, but – as far as I can see – the financial system is not melting down and we are not in a depression. I’ll simply repeat what I’ve been saying for the past several months: Times are tough. Firms that have been living on the edge may find they fall off. There may even be a spectacular blow-up or two, if a financial institution finds out its risk controls aren’t what they might have wished them to be. And I most certainly would not want to be earning my living as a casual labourer in the US housing industry. But it’s a pause, nothing more.

There has been some news of interest to the carrion feeders: remember CPDOs? One of them is liquidating after a mark-to-market breached the terms of the deal. That’s the trouble with these things – it’s a great strategy, as long as there aren’t any margin calls or mark-to-markets. Moody’s assigned them a Aaa long term rating on July 6, 2007, put them under review for possible downgrade on August 21, and now they’ve defaulted. I hope UBS took its management fee in advance!

Highly leveraged muck – but, of course, when they work, they really work well. The problem with the market is, as always, stockbrokers: they’ll buy anything so long as somebody with a deep voice tells them it’s good. I cannot begin to tell you how much stuff I’ve been offered over the years that (so the salesmen say) may certainly be placed in a fixed income portfolio, but has a payoff based on something that won’t behave like a bond in the slightest. Somehow it sells. 

It’s a lot like buying an GIC from a bank with the return linked to the stock market and pretending to yourself that, because it’s a GIC, it’s really a fixed income instrument. It may be good, it may be bad – but it sure as hell ain’t a bond!

And another CDO is liquidating as the senior note-holders have decided they want their money back. I’ve had a look at the prospectus … I would like to say I can’t understand why anybody would invest in such a thing, but unfortunately, I know only too well. You can offer nice interest if you lever up to hell and gone.

The saga of Canadian ABCP continues, with Alberta Treasury Branches disclosing their write-down. They have assets of $22.5-billion, of which $1.2-billion is in ABCP and they’re taking a hit of 6.6%.

“ATB Financial has year-to-date earnings of $73 million despite absorbing a $79.6-million ABCP provision,” CEO Dave Mowat said in a release.

In more cheery news, there is a school of thought that predicts a takeover of E-Trade:

Ameritrade has an advantage as a potential buyer because it’s 40 percent owned by Toronto-Dominion Bank, Canada’s third- largest bank, Repetto said. “The bank has deep pockets and it has the ability to deal with some of the issues at E*Trade,” he said.

Exactly the kind of thing the bank should be doing … as long as they’re willing to walk away without a deal after starting negotiations.

Bond insurers, which I have discussed yesterday, took heart from the recent French bail-out and were up a lot on the day.

Still, on the lighter side, remember Flaherty and his Big Plans to Help Canadian Consumers? He was told about one of the problems at the time:

Diane Brisebois, of the Retail Council of Canada, said Flaherty should help retailers by cutting duties collected at the border.

“If you bring in sneakers from China, for example, retailers in Canada pay 18 per cent taxes. Retailers in the U.S. pay absolutely nothing,” she said.

So I thought of him today when I read this amusing snippet:

So how did the Buffalo-area mall prepare for the post-Thanksgiving shopping madness?

For one thing, Goodwill collection bins were situated at three entrances for all the clothes and shoes the crowds from the north have been ditching in restrooms and parking lots. Many shoppers have been wearing their new clothes home to avoid paying hefty taxes and duty at the border.

Good volume again in the pref market; Floaters got beat up again. It could be simply a credit thing on BAM; it could be that people are selling other BAM names to buy the perpetuals (and the derivative split share!); it could be that people are just getting out of floaters and picking on BAM to sell for other reasons. Who knows?

I continue to be utterly amazed by the yield on BNA.PR.C, which had yet another rough ride today, down 0.9444% to close at 17.83 bid, yield 8.39% to maturity. 8.39%! Basically, 11.75% interest equivalent!

I confess, I thought for a fleeting moment today that it might be inventory overhang from a barely successful underwriting … but that doesn’t seem to fit the data. They started trading January 10 and hung around at the $25.00 level until early May, when they – quite reasonably – got caught up in the downdraft. Markets were strong in the first part of the year – if the dealers had been left holding the baby, surely they would have, and could have, blown it out the door at $24.00 in, say, March.

The fund has a position in this issue and I’m getting killed on it. But how can it possibly be fairly valued at 160bp over the similar-and-parri-passu BNA.PR.B? On the bright side, looking at the price chart is highly entertaining … I’ve found a new illustration for the word “parabola”.

Such is the life of a preferred share investor …

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.81% 4.82% 128,389 15.77 2 -0.0205% 1,044.3
Fixed-Floater 4.89% 4.88% 84,504 15.70 8 -0.2919% 1,040.5
Floater 4.75% 4.79% 59,536 15.78 3 -0.7146% 990.7
Op. Retract 4.86% 2.64% 76,706 3.35 16 +0.0564% 1,032.7
Split-Share 5.40% 5.98% 92,053 4.07 15 +0.2593% 1,003.4
Interest Bearing 6.33% 6.68% 65,410 3.48 4 -0.1524% 1,046.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.86% 5.64% 82,735 8.23 11 -0.1003% 1,005.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.61% 5.66% 334,137 14.19 55 +0.1703% 902.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G Floater -2.9114%  
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.3605%  
MFC.PR.A OpRet +1.0260% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.73% based on a bid of 25.60 and a hardMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.0541% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
WFS.PR.A SplitShare +1.0638% Asset coverage of just under 2.0:1 according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.16% based on a bid of 9.50 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.1933% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 21.20 and a limitMaturity.
FTN.PR.A SplitShare +1.2146% Asset coverage of just under 2.5:1 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.49% based on a bid of 10.00 and a hardMaturity 2008-12-1 at 10.00.
PIC.PR.A SplitShare +1.4276% Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of November 15, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.13% based on a bid of 14.92 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +2.2785% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.79% based on a bid of 20.20 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 83,580 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 20.90 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.M OpRet 64,250 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.94% based on a bid of 26.10 and a softMaturity 2013-10-30 at 25.00.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 34,065 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 33,253 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount 32,830 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 24.17 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty-five other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.