PrefLetter

April PrefLetter Released!

The April, 2023, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The April edition contains a short appendix showing the algebraic proof that the Modified Duration of a perpetual, non-callable annuity is the inverse of its yield.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “previous” edition will refer to the April, 2023, issue, while the “next” edition will be the May, 2023, issue scheduled to be prepared as of the close May 12, and emailed to subscribers prior to the market-opening on May 15. Prefletter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: There have been problems lately with corporate eMail protection systems that substitute “safe” links for the links sent in the eMails; the problem being that the “safe” links do not work and an error is generated by my software. To avoid possible problems and delays, please subscribe through an eMail account that is not “protected” by such software.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

Note: Assiduous Reader DG informs me:

In case you have any other Apple users: you need to install a free App from the apple store called “FileApp”. It comes with it’s own tutorial and allows you to download and save a PDF file.

However, Assiduous Reader Adrian informs me in the comments to the January 2015 release:

Some nitpicking for DG:
FileApp costs $1.19 in the Apple Store.

But Adrian2 now advises:

Well, as of now, FileApp is free (again?).

Issue Comments

CGI.PR.D To Be Redeemed

Morgan Meighen & Associates has announced:

Canadian General Investments, Limited (“CGI”) announced today that it has provided notice to holders of its $75,000,000 3.75% Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preference Shares, Series 4 (the “Series 4 Shares”) that in accordance with the terms of the Series 4 Shares it will redeem all of the issued and outstanding Series 4 Shares on June 12, 2023 (the “Redemption Date”), for a price of $25.00 per Series 4 Share plus all accrued and unpaid dividends (from and including the last scheduled dividend payment date, March 15, 2023, to, but excluding, the Redemption Date, and being in the amount of $0.22860 per share).

CGI.PR.D is a SplitShare, 10-Year Retractible, 3.75%, that commenced trading 2013-5-30 after being announced 2013-4-29. The issue has been tracked by HIMIPref™ and despite its excellent credit quality, has been relegated to the Scraps -SplitShares subindex on volume concerns.

Thanks to Assiduous Reader gsp for bringing this to my attention!

Market Action

April 14, 2023

Bonds were very weak today, as economic news filtered through:

On Thursday, the March producer price index declined by 0.5% month-over-month, while economists had expected the measure to remain flat. That followed Wednesday’s lower-than-expected reading on consumer prices.

Weekly jobless claims, meanwhile, came in at 239,00 for the week that ended April 8, above views for 235,000.

Today’s news was similar:

But a slew of mixed economic data including retail sales, industrial production and consumer sentiment cemented expectations that the Fed will hike rates another 25 basis points at next month’s policy meeting.

“Industrial production and capacity utilization came in stronger than expected,” Bruno added. “Both point to an economy that still has some vibrancy, which gives Fed cover to continue its rate hike policy in May possibly into June.”

Those expectations were underscored by Atlanta Fed President Raphael Bostic, who said another 25 basis point hike could allow the Fed to end its tightening cycle, even as Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee called for the central bank to be prudent.

At last glance, financial markets have priced in a 74% likelihood of that happening, according to CME’s FedWatch tool.

BIS published a paper by Biliana Alexandrova Kabadjova, Anton Badev, Saulo Benchimol Bastos, Evangelos Benos, Freddy Cepeda- Lopéz, James Chapman, Martin Diehl, Ioana Duca-Radu, Rodney Garratt, Ronald Heijmans, Anneke Kosse, Antoine Martin, Thomas Nellen, Thomas Nilsson, Jan Paulick, Andrei Pustelnikov, Francisco Rivadeneyra, Mario Rubem do Coutto Bastos and Sara Testi titled Intraday liquidity around the world:

Focus
Banks typically make large payments to each other through large-value payment systems (LVPS). Most LVPS settle payments on a gross basis, which means that banks must fund each payment one by one. While this helps to reduce any credit risk that arises if payments are accumulated and settled on a net basis, it is liquidity-intensive, because banks need to cover any mismatches between incoming and outgoing payments by drawing on their reserves or central bank credit lines. This gives rise to strategic behaviour in how banks manage their intraday liquidity. In this paper, we use a unique cross-country data set to assess intraday liquidity usage by banks around the world.

Contribution
This paper is the first to assemble a data set of payments activity, intraday liquidity usage and institutional characteristics covering LVPS in nine major economies over a long period of time, including the 2007–09 financial crisis. The data let us analyse the effects of the institutional characteristics of an LVPS on intraday liquidity usage, including the effect of so-called liquidity-saving mechanisms (LSM) that many LVPS introduced in the last two decades. As such, this study is valuable for payment system policy makers and operators seeking to update or develop new LVPS and for payment system overseers and bank supervisors that assess intraday liquidity usage in LVPS.

Findings
How banks manage their intraday liquidity depends on the availability and cost of intraday liquidity and LVPS design features. Banks coordinate and recycle their payments less when reserves are higher and the opportunity cost of holding reserves increases. Payment timing, coordination and the resulting level of liquidity efficiency also vary with incentives for early payment submission and specific LSM design features. Such features include the criteria and algorithms used to prioritise/deprioritise or offset payments in a payment system queue. Another key insight is that banks appear to condition their payment behaviour on specific design features, which may weaken some of the features’ intended liquidity-saving effects.

Abstract
We study intraday liquidity usage and its determinants using a unique cross-country data set on large-value payments. We document that the amount of intraday liquidity that financial institutions around the world use each day equals, on average, 15% of their total daily payment values or 2.8% of their countries’ GDP. We then define and calculate system-level measures of liquidity efficiency and inequality in liquidity provision. We show that these measures vary systematically with the degree of payment coordination among payment system participants, the quantity and opportunity cost of central bank reserves and institutional characteristics, such as incentives for early payment submission and liquidity saving mechanism (LSM) design. Our results are consistent with the notion that payment system participants behave strategically and manage intraday liquidity actively. Participants also appear to condition their payment behaviour on specific LSM characteristics, which may weaken some of the LSMs’ intended effects.

The Bank of Canada has released a Staff Working Paper by Alistair Macaulay and Wenting Song titled Narrative-Driven Fluctuations in Sentiment: Evidence Linking Traditional and Social Media:

This paper studies the role of narratives for macroeconomic fluctuations. We micro-found narratives as directed acyclic graphs and show how exposure to different narratives can affect expectations in an otherwise standard macroeconomic model. We capture such competing narratives in news media’s reports on a US yield curve inversion by using techniques in natural language processing. Linking these media narratives to social media data, we show that exposure to a recessionary narrative is associated with a more pessimistic sentiment, while exposure to a nonrecessionary narrative implies no such change in sentiment. In a model with financial frictions, narrative-driven beliefs create a trade-off for quantitative easing: extended periods of quantitative easing make narrative-driven waves of pessimism more frequent, but smaller in magnitude.

We collect news articles devoted to an economic event and use topic models from natural language processing to extract narratives surrounding the event. We obtain empirical estimates of both the prevailing narratives and each article’s reliance on the narratives. Using these narratives, we provide empirical evidence on the importance of narratives for sentiment fluctuations. To isolate the effects of narratives, we focus on an episode of yield curve in version in 2019–—a popular recession indicator in the US with a nebulous theoretical foundation. Two competing narratives emanate from major news outlets: a “recession” narrative that links the inverted yield curve to an imminent recession, and a “nonrecession” narrative that makes no such connection.

Using these identified narratives, we provide empirical evidence on the importance of narratives for sentiment fluctuations. To isolate the effects of narratives, we focus on an episode of yield curve in version in 2019–—a popular recession indicator in the US with a nebulous theoretical foundation. Two competing narratives emanate from major news outlets: a “recession” narrative that links the inverted yield curve to an imminent recession and a “nonrecession” narrative that makes no such connection.

Our main analysis studies the effects of narratives on the readers who are exposed. The most novel part of our data is the link from narratives in newspaper coverage to rich social network data from Twitter, which allows us to measure the spread of narratives. We use retweeting activities on Twitter to trace whether a Twitter user has engaged with news articles containing certain narratives. We find that after users are exposed to the recessionary narrative, their posted tweets display a more pessimistic sentiment, while exposure to the more neutral, nonrecessionary narrative has no such effect. The drop in sentiment following engagement with a recessionary narrative is persistent, remaining significant 30 days after the retweet. In addition, we apply our empirical framework to study recent inflation narratives. We document the rising prevalence of a narrative that emphasizes the connection of inflation to the real economy. Such a narrative is associated with sentiment declines during high inflation periods.

Formalizing narratives as directed acyclic graphs, we show that certain groups of narratives will, in fact, have exactly the same effect on expectations. In the context of the inversion of the US yield curve in 2019, the distinguishing feature between a “recession” narrative and a “nonrecession narrative” is, therefore, whether there is a link connecting the inverted yield curve with an upcoming recession.\

Standard tools from topic modeling in natural language processing are well suited to making this distinction. We do this in a large corpus of articles from traditional news media, which is a key source of macroeconomic narratives (Andre et al., 2022b). Linking these articles with rich data on Twitter activity, we find that engaging with an article advancing a “recession” narrative causes a significant and persistent decline in the sentiment of that Twitter user, as embodied in their other activity on the social media site at the time. In contrast, engaging with a “nonrecession” narrative has no such effect on sentiment. This is precisely what would be predicted by models in which viral narratives affect aggregate behavior by shifting expectations. It also suggests a powerful role for the media in influencing aggregate sentiment (highlighted, for example, in Nimark, 2014).

We confirm this aggregate implication in a quantitative model informed by our empirical results. Yield curve inversions cause declines in expected incomes among households holding narratives in which such events are linked to recessions. This implies that extended periods of quantitative easing generate two novel offsetting effects: by flattening the yield curve, they make such narrative-driven fluctuations in sentiment more frequent. However, they
also reduce the prevalence of the “recession” narrative, reducing the magnitude of those fluctuations.

Another BoC Staff Working Paper by Ajit Desai, Zhentong Lu, Hiru Rodrigo, Jacob Sharples, Phoebe Tian and Nellie Zhang was titled From LVTS to Lynx: Quantitative Assessment of Payment System Transition:

Modernizing Canada’s wholesale payments system to Lynx from the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) brings two key changes: (1) the settlement model shifts from a hybrid system that combined components of both real-time gross settlement (RTGS) and deferred net settlement (DNS) to an RTGS system; (2) the policy regarding queue usage changes from discouraging it to encouraging the adoption of the new liquidity-saving mechanism. We utilize this unique opportunity to quantitatively assess the effects of those changes on the behaviour of participants in the high-value payments system. Our analysis reveals the following: (1) At the system level, most payments are settled in a single stream with the liquidity-savings mechanism in Lynx—facilitating liquidity pooling and leading to higher efficiency than LVTS where payments were distributed in two streams. Moreover, due to Lynx’s liquidity-saving mechanism, many payments arrive earlier than those in LVTS, providing more opportunities for liquidity saving at the cost of slightly increased payment delay. (2) At the participant level, the responses are rather heterogeneous; however, our analysis suggests that liquidity efficiency is improved for several participants, and most experience slightly longer payment delays in Lynx than in LVTS.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5795 % 2,308.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5795 % 4,427.5
Floater 9.76 % 9.91 % 40,179 9.62 2 -0.5795 % 2,551.6
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2517 % 3,348.2
SplitShare 5.02 % 7.25 % 44,995 2.63 7 0.2517 % 3,998.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2517 % 3,119.8
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0724 % 2,760.5
Perpetual-Discount 6.18 % 6.20 % 54,910 13.60 34 -0.0724 % 3,010.2
FixedReset Disc 5.76 % 7.81 % 90,039 11.96 63 0.2438 % 2,140.9
Insurance Straight 6.07 % 6.14 % 74,449 13.72 19 0.0283 % 2,962.2
FloatingReset 10.43 % 10.95 % 37,448 8.84 2 -0.6406 % 2,392.0
FixedReset Prem 6.92 % 6.52 % 319,829 3.93 1 0.0000 % 2,336.6
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2438 % 2,188.4
FixedReset Ins Non 6.01 % 7.80 % 68,257 11.77 11 0.0000 % 2,304.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.Q FixedReset Ins Non -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 18.91
Evaluated at bid price : 18.91
Bid-YTW : 7.80 %
PWF.PF.A Perpetual-Discount -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 18.28
Evaluated at bid price : 18.28
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
GWO.PR.Y Insurance Straight -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 18.41
Evaluated at bid price : 18.41
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
MIC.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 6.83 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Disc -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 17.20
Evaluated at bid price : 17.20
Bid-YTW : 7.96 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 14.60
Evaluated at bid price : 14.60
Bid-YTW : 10.25 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset Disc -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 10.69
Evaluated at bid price : 10.69
Bid-YTW : 9.55 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset Disc -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 13.93
Evaluated at bid price : 13.93
Bid-YTW : 9.02 %
BN.PF.I FixedReset Disc -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 8.48 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset Ins Non -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 17.26
Evaluated at bid price : 17.26
Bid-YTW : 7.24 %
BN.PF.A FixedReset Disc -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 18.36
Evaluated at bid price : 18.36
Bid-YTW : 8.47 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset Ins Non -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 11.88
Evaluated at bid price : 11.88
Bid-YTW : 8.50 %
NA.PR.E FixedReset Disc 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 7.31 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset Ins Non 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 16.62
Evaluated at bid price : 16.62
Bid-YTW : 8.24 %
BMO.PR.Y FixedReset Disc 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 18.30
Evaluated at bid price : 18.30
Bid-YTW : 7.62 %
BIP.PR.A FixedReset Disc 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 17.10
Evaluated at bid price : 17.10
Bid-YTW : 9.37 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset Ins Non 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 16.35
Evaluated at bid price : 16.35
Bid-YTW : 8.21 %
CM.PR.P FixedReset Disc 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 7.81 %
CM.PR.Q FixedReset Disc 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 18.25
Evaluated at bid price : 18.25
Bid-YTW : 7.64 %
BIK.PR.A FixedReset Disc 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 21.94
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 8.01 %
BMO.PR.E FixedReset Disc 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 21.02
Evaluated at bid price : 21.02
Bid-YTW : 7.15 %
CU.PR.I FixedReset Disc 2.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 22.41
Evaluated at bid price : 22.88
Bid-YTW : 7.21 %
TRP.PR.G FixedReset Disc 2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 16.84
Evaluated at bid price : 16.84
Bid-YTW : 8.47 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Disc 46,700 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 12.45
Evaluated at bid price : 12.45
Bid-YTW : 8.66 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset Disc 43,150 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 7.80 %
TD.PF.C FixedReset Disc 34,800 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 16.94
Evaluated at bid price : 16.94
Bid-YTW : 7.84 %
NA.PR.E FixedReset Disc 25,500 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 7.31 %
SLF.PR.C Insurance Straight 21,805 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 18.94
Evaluated at bid price : 18.94
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
BN.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 17,600 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 18.40
Evaluated at bid price : 18.40
Bid-YTW : 6.52 %
There were 9 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CU.PR.C FixedReset Disc Quote: 19.00 – 22.72
Spot Rate : 3.7200
Average : 2.0030

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 7.41 %

BN.PR.Z FixedReset Disc Quote: 19.71 – 21.50
Spot Rate : 1.7900
Average : 1.0166

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 19.71
Evaluated at bid price : 19.71
Bid-YTW : 7.94 %

MIC.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.00 – 21.25
Spot Rate : 1.2500
Average : 0.9258

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 6.83 %

PWF.PR.Z Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.85 – 21.79
Spot Rate : 0.9400
Average : 0.6167

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 20.85
Evaluated at bid price : 20.85
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %

GWO.PR.H Insurance Straight Quote: 19.80 – 20.58
Spot Rate : 0.7800
Average : 0.4784

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %

BIP.PR.B FixedReset Disc Quote: 21.75 – 22.75
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.7100

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-14
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 8.52 %

Market Action

April 13, 2023

François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, gave a speech titled How central banks should face instability and fragmentation:

French and European banks benefit from a well-diversified and profitable business base, be it on the deposits or on the credit side, unlike SVB. The increase in interest rates has even started to boost their net interest income, which grew by 12.7 % in 2022 at the twenty main Euro area banks – this should also raise questions over the alleged trade off between price stability and financial stability.

This trade off is a fashionable idea at the moment, but I find it overdone. The goals are not necessarily incompatible, and we have separate instruments to achieve them. For the great majority of European banks, higher interest rates are beneficial. If however action were needed on financial stability, this would be effected chiefly through temporary liquidity instruments, which would not conflict with the increase in interest rates needed to ensure price stability.

Be they energy price pressures or financial spill-overs, the challenges currently faced by central banks require more than individual actions – they call for strong and effective multilateral impetus. I say it here in Washington, during the IMF Spring Meetings.

However, the tide has been turning the other way since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As geopolitical rifts deepen and trust fades, it is becoming more and more difficult for the G20 to deliver on its mandate, despite remarkable efforts from the Indonesian and now the Indian presidency. We need to find pragmatic ways forward to overcome deadlocks in global action and adapt to the new realities.

Alternatives to multilateral cooperation, such as regionalism, “minilateralism”,ii or “polylateralism”iii can usefully supplement it. Working on smaller scales, or relying on non-state actors could help achieve breakthroughs. Yet they cannot replace it. They lack the global reach of international state cooperation.iv Hence my call for a focused or pragmatic multilateralism. v The principle is simple: rather than pursuing an exaggerated ambition, focus at present multilateral efforts on a few selected global issues, where there are clear common interests. In my view, without pretending to be exhaustive, these global issues on which interests and deliverables could converge encompass the following three “Cs”: climate, crypto-assets, cross-border payments.

The BoC has released a Staff Working Paper by Andrew Glover and Jacob Short titled Demographic Origins of the Decline in Labor’s Share:

Since 1980, the earnings share of older workers has risen in the United States. At the same time, labor’s share of income has declined significantly. We hypothesize that an aging workforce has contributed to the decline in labor’s share of income. We formalize this hypothesis in an onthe-job search model in which employers of older workers may have substantial monopsony power due to the decline in labor market dynamism that accompanies aging. The greater monopsony power manifests as a growing wedge between a worker’s earnings and their marginal product over the life cycle. We estimate the profile of these wedges using crossindustry variation in labor’s share and the age distribution of earnings. We find that a 60-yearold worker receives half the marginal product relative to when they were 20. Together with recent demographic trends, this can account for 59% of the recent decline in labor’s share of earnings in the United States.

And the BoC has released a Staff Working Paper by Stephen Ayerst, Faisal Ibrahim, Gaelan MacKenzie and Swapnika Rachapalli titled Trade and Diffusion of Embodied Technology: An Empirical Analysis:

Using data from patents, citations, inter-sectoral sales and customs, we examine the international diffusion of technology through imports of sectoral knowledge and production inputs. We construct measures of the flow of technology embodied in imports. These measures are weighted by inter-sectoral knowledge and production input-output linkages that capture the relevance of this technology for generating new innovations in different sectors in importing countries. We develop an instrumental variable strategy to identify the causal effects of technology embodied in imports on innovation and diffusion outcomes. For sectors in importing countries, increases in both knowledge- and production-weighted embodied technology imports lead to technology diffusion (measured using backward citations in new patent applications) and increases in the rate of new innovations (measured using the forward citations those patents receive). Effects are substantially larger for knowledge-weighted imports of embodied technology, which also lead to improvements in the average quality of new innovations.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1658 % 2,321.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1658 % 4,453.3
Floater 9.71 % 9.84 % 53,153 9.68 2 0.1658 % 2,566.5
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4887 % 3,339.8
SplitShare 5.03 % 7.32 % 43,932 2.63 7 -0.4887 % 3,988.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4887 % 3,111.9
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0711 % 2,762.5
Perpetual-Discount 6.18 % 6.22 % 53,528 13.57 34 0.0711 % 3,012.4
FixedReset Disc 5.77 % 7.56 % 89,811 12.15 63 0.3320 % 2,135.7
Insurance Straight 6.07 % 6.11 % 74,820 13.74 19 0.0928 % 2,961.3
FloatingReset 10.36 % 10.96 % 36,161 8.84 2 0.6789 % 2,407.4
FixedReset Prem 6.92 % 6.45 % 321,608 12.96 1 0.0000 % 2,336.6
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3320 % 2,183.1
FixedReset Ins Non 5.99 % 7.41 % 70,665 12.04 11 0.1516 % 2,304.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MIC.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -3.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 20.31
Evaluated at bid price : 20.31
Bid-YTW : 6.72 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset Disc -2.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 12.20
Evaluated at bid price : 12.20
Bid-YTW : 8.39 %
PVS.PR.H SplitShare -1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2027-02-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 7.61 %
BN.PF.B FixedReset Disc -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 16.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.00
Bid-YTW : 8.88 %
PVS.PR.G SplitShare -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2026-02-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 7.40 %
BMO.PR.F FixedReset Disc 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 23.50
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 6.83 %
BIP.PR.E FixedReset Disc 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.80
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
BN.PF.A FixedReset Disc 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 18.55
Evaluated at bid price : 18.55
Bid-YTW : 8.11 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset Disc 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 16.81
Evaluated at bid price : 16.81
Bid-YTW : 8.10 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset Disc 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 16.20
Evaluated at bid price : 16.20
Bid-YTW : 7.92 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset Ins Non 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 12.00
Evaluated at bid price : 12.00
Bid-YTW : 8.11 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Disc 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 17.45
Evaluated at bid price : 17.45
Bid-YTW : 7.55 %
CCS.PR.C Insurance Straight 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 20.16
Evaluated at bid price : 20.16
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
TD.PF.K FixedReset Disc 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 6.95 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 14.81
Evaluated at bid price : 14.81
Bid-YTW : 10.10 %
PWF.PF.A Perpetual-Discount 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 18.57
Evaluated at bid price : 18.57
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
MFC.PR.Q FixedReset Ins Non 1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 19.21
Evaluated at bid price : 19.21
Bid-YTW : 7.41 %
BIP.PR.F FixedReset Disc 2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 7.75 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset Disc 2.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 10.84
Evaluated at bid price : 10.84
Bid-YTW : 9.07 %
BIP.PR.B FixedReset Disc 2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 8.28 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
NA.PR.C FixedReset Prem 130,083 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 23.32
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 6.45 %
TD.PF.C FixedReset Disc 54,900 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 16.83
Evaluated at bid price : 16.83
Bid-YTW : 7.63 %
CU.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 45,542 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 19.44
Evaluated at bid price : 19.44
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset Disc 34,496 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 18.21
Evaluated at bid price : 18.21
Bid-YTW : 7.56 %
CM.PR.Y FixedReset Disc 31,513 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 22.78
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 7.04 %
BN.PF.I FixedReset Disc 31,300 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 19.97
Evaluated at bid price : 19.97
Bid-YTW : 8.21 %
There were 14 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BIP.PR.A FixedReset Disc Quote: 16.91 – 19.10
Spot Rate : 2.1900
Average : 1.1963

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 16.91
Evaluated at bid price : 16.91
Bid-YTW : 9.23 %

MFC.PR.C Insurance Straight Quote: 18.75 – 19.70
Spot Rate : 0.9500
Average : 0.5991

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 18.75
Evaluated at bid price : 18.75
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %

CCS.PR.C Insurance Straight Quote: 20.16 – 21.00
Spot Rate : 0.8400
Average : 0.5437

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 20.16
Evaluated at bid price : 20.16
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %

NA.PR.S FixedReset Disc Quote: 17.10 – 17.77
Spot Rate : 0.6700
Average : 0.4110

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 17.10
Evaluated at bid price : 17.10
Bid-YTW : 7.86 %

PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.26 – 22.00
Spot Rate : 0.7400
Average : 0.4991

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 21.26
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %

IFC.PR.F Insurance Straight Quote: 22.20 – 23.10
Spot Rate : 0.9000
Average : 0.7016

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-13
Maturity Price : 21.86
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %

Market Action

April 12, 2023

The BoC kept the policy rate steady:

The Bank of Canada today held its target for the overnight rate at 4½%, with the Bank Rate at 4¾% and the deposit rate at 4½%. The Bank is also continuing its policy of quantitative tightening.

Inflation in many countries is easing in the face of lower energy prices, normalizing global supply chains, and tighter monetary policy. At the same time, labour markets remain tight and measures of core inflation in many advanced economies suggest persistent price pressures, especially for services.

Global economic growth has been stronger than anticipated. Growth in the United States and Europe has surprised on the upside, but is expected to weaken as tighter monetary policy continues to feed through those economies. In the United States, recent stress in the banking sector has tightened credit conditions further. US growth is expected to slow considerably in the coming months, with particular weakness in sectors that are important for Canadian exports. Meanwhile, activity in China’s economy has rebounded, particularly in services. Overall, commodity prices are close to their January levels. The Bank’s April Monetary Policy Report (MPR) projects global growth of 2.6% this year, 2.1% in 2024, and 2.8% in 2025.

In Canada, demand is still exceeding supply and the labour market remains tight. Economic growth in the first quarter looks to be stronger than was projected in January, with a bounce in exports and solid consumption growth. While the Bank’s Business Outlook Survey suggests acute labour shortages are starting to ease, wage growth is still elevated relative to productivity growth. Strong population gains are adding to labour supply and supporting employment growth while also boosting aggregate consumption. Housing market activity remains subdued.

As more households renew their mortgages at higher rates and restrictive monetary policy works its way through the economy more broadly, consumption is expected to moderate this year. Softening foreign demand is expected to restrain exports and business investment. Overall, GDP growth is projected to be weak through the remainder of this year before strengthening gradually next year. This implies the economy will move into excess supply in the second half of this year. The Bank now projects Canada’s economy to grow by 1.4% this year and 1.3% in 2024 before picking up to 2.5% in 2025.

CPI inflation eased to 5.2% in February, and the Bank’s preferred measures of core inflation were just under 5%. The Bank expects CPI inflation to fall quickly to around 3% in the middle of this year and then decline more gradually to the 2% target by the end of 2024. Recent data is reinforcing Governing Council’s confidence that inflation will continue to decline in the next few months. However, getting inflation the rest of the way back to 2% could prove to be more difficult because inflation expectations are coming down slowly, service price inflation and wage growth remain elevated, and corporate pricing behaviour has yet to normalize. As it sets monetary policy, Governing Council will be particularly focused on these indicators, and the evolution of core inflation, to gauge the progress of CPI inflation back to target.

In light of its outlook for growth and inflation, Governing Council decided to maintain the policy rate at 4½%. Quantitative tightening continues to complement this restrictive stance. Governing Council continues to assess whether monetary policy is sufficiently restrictive to relieve price pressures and remains prepared to raise the policy rate further if needed to return inflation to the 2% target. The Bank remains resolute in its commitment to restoring price stability for Canadians.

Mark Rendell comments in the Globe:

The bank’s updated inflation forecast is little changed from January. It expects the annual rate of inflation to drop to around 3 per cent by the middle of the year, from 5.2 per cent in February. Inflation is then expected to decline gradually to 2 per cent by the end of 2024.

Meanwhile, the bank revised its GDP growth forecast to reflect the resilience of the Canadian economy at the start of the year. It now expects 1.4 per cent GDP growth in 2023, up from 1 per cent forecast in January. It downgraded its 2024 GDP growth forecast to 1.3 per cent from 1.8 per cent.

The annual rate of consumer price index inflation peaked at a four-decade high of 8.1 per cent last June. It has fallen steadily since then, thanks to lower energy prices and a slowdown in durable goods inflation as global transportation costs have receded.

Service price inflation is proving stickier. This is closely tied to the ongoing tightness in labour markets, which is pushing up wages.

“The limited tightening in financial conditions due to the recent banking sector stress has been embedded into the base case,” the bank said in its Monetary Policy Report, published Wednesday.

“However, if global banking stresses intensify further, global credit conditions could tighten significantly. If this risk materializes, a more severe global slowdown and sharply lower commodity prices could follow.”

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has released its Interest Rate Risk Statistics Report:

This report provides statistics for different bank populations. The OCC calculated exposures and risk
limits for the most commonly modeled target accounts in different interest rate stress scenarios. The
OCC also calculated key NMD assumptions for different NMD types. This report provides tables with
statistics on

  • • projected changes in 12-month net interest income (NII) in parallel interest rate shock scenarios ranging from –200 basis points to +400 basis points.
  • • projected changes in economic value of equity (EVE) in parallel interest rate shock scenarios ranging from –200 basis points to +400 basis points.
  • • banks’ policy limits for changes in NII and EVE in parallel interest rate shock scenarios ranging from –200 basis points to +400 basis points.
  • • NMD repricing rates and average lives for different account types.


The statistics in this report are based on data from 899 banks. The as-of date of the data ranges from March 31, 2021, to December 31, 2022.

Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England, gave a speech:

Moving on, let me now point to an area where we are at risk of contradicting ourselves. I said that assured value was a key principle of digital money. How does this fit with the idea that we could resolve failed banks and allow deposits (inside money) to take a haircut? One answer is that it depends on the size of the deposit above a certain threshold. The idea behind deposit protection is to set a level below which the assurance of value holds, and above which it does not. Practice, I would suggest, points to the difficulty of this principle.

In seeking to solve too big to fail we have tackled this problem by requesting an additional slice of subordinated liabilities which can explicitly bear losses by being converted into equity in the event of a resolution. I’m not talking here about AT1 securities, but what comes further up the hierarchy – what in Europe we call ‘Eligible Liabilities’. The point is that for large banks we have reinforced the assurance of deposits by requiring a bigger cushion of loss absorbing liabilities.

But smaller banks find it harder to issue marketable long-term debt securities that can count as Eligible Liabilities. I think the answer here lies in the world of deposit insurance.

The US authorities have announced a review of their deposit insurance system. In the UK, the Bank is also considering improvements to our approach to depositor pay-outs for smaller banks which do not have Eligible Liabilities. Our work has thus far focused on the speed of pay-outs. Going further and considering increasing deposit protection limits could have cost implications for the banking sector as a whole. As with all things relating to bank resolution, there is no free lunch.

Given the increase in bank regulation required in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it is not surprising that the last decade has seen a relative and absolute increase in non-bank finance.

Continuing the theme developed earlier, one important way to look at the bank versus
non-bank world is that in the former there is assurance on the value of money as the main liability of banks, while in the latter the value of investments explicitly and deliberately is not assured.

This is important, but we also have to recognise that the growth of non-bank finance has led to the significant expansion of the landscape of systemic risk since the crisis.

In other words, we have seen that the non-bank world can transmit risk into the bank world, and other parts of the core of the financial system, like central counterparties. Consequently, the relative focus of our financial stability work has shifted to the risks posed by non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).

Moreover, we have seen a common theme running through incidents that have occurred – the dash for cash in 2020, the Archegos Collapse, the LDI pension fund issue, the nickel metals case – namely that for firms to understand and respond to the full risk implications they would have had to observe and respond to a much larger picture of risks than they did observe, and from that came potentially larger risks.

There is a challenge of breadth and depth in the NBFI world. It is a very large and disparate landscape with many activities and entities. As a result, we have to survey a lot of ground to look out for risks. But in order to understand these risks, we need to get into the detail, hence the depth issue. LDI was a good case study of this. The LDI fund world comprised 85% of the larger so-called segregated funds, and 15% of the smaller pooled funds. Our stress testing work focussed on the 85%, but the problem arose in the 15%.

In some ways the issues around NBFI bear a striking resemblance to ages old challenges in finance, such as leverage, and inter connectivity with other parts of the financial system, creating the scope for spill-overs and systemic consequences. But the heterogeneity of the landscape means that there is no single magic number for leverage as we have with banks, and the inter connectivity can be hard to map, reflecting the recent incidents.

And the New York Fed updated the Underlying Inflation Gauge:

  • The UIG “full data set” measure for March is currently estimated at 4.3%, a 0.5 percentage point decrease from the current estimate of the previous month.
  • The “prices-only” measure for March is currently estimated at 3.6%, a 0.3 percentage point decrease from the current estimate of the previous month.
  • The twelve-month change in the March CPI was +5.0%, a 1.0 percentage point decrease from the previous month.
    • -For March 2023, trend CPI inflation is estimated to be in the 3.6% to 4.3% range, a lower and slightly narrower range than February, with a 0.3 percentage point decrease on its lower bound and a 0.5 percentage point decrease on its upper bound.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.24%, equivalent to 8.11% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates yielded 4.95% on 2023-4-6 and since then the closing price has changed from 15.32 to 15.25, a decrease of 46bp in price, with a Duration of 12.42 (BMO doesn’t specify whether this is Macaulay or Modified Duration; I will assume Modified) which implies an increase in yield of about 4bp since 3/31 to 4.99%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) has widened slightly (and perhaps spuriously) to about 310bp from the 305bp reported April 5.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2077 % 2,318.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2077 % 4,446.0
Floater 9.72 % 9.84 % 53,980 9.68 2 0.2077 % 2,562.2
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1769 % 3,356.2
SplitShare 5.01 % 7.16 % 42,225 2.64 7 -0.1769 % 4,008.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1769 % 3,127.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0298 % 2,760.5
Perpetual-Discount 6.18 % 6.24 % 53,244 13.57 34 -0.0298 % 3,010.2
FixedReset Disc 5.79 % 7.59 % 88,675 12.16 63 0.2523 % 2,128.6
Insurance Straight 6.08 % 6.13 % 75,042 13.72 19 0.2585 % 2,958.6
FloatingReset 10.43 % 10.96 % 35,613 8.84 2 0.0340 % 2,391.1
FixedReset Prem 6.92 % 6.45 % 297,776 12.97 1 -0.0394 % 2,336.6
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2523 % 2,175.9
FixedReset Ins Non 6.00 % 7.51 % 70,652 11.97 11 -0.0157 % 2,301.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset Disc -1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 15.17
Evaluated at bid price : 15.17
Bid-YTW : 8.67 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 18.50
Evaluated at bid price : 18.50
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset Ins Non -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 16.10
Evaluated at bid price : 16.10
Bid-YTW : 8.04 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset Disc 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 14.05
Evaluated at bid price : 14.05
Bid-YTW : 8.63 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset Disc 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 18.85
Evaluated at bid price : 18.85
Bid-YTW : 7.27 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset Disc 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 16.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.00
Bid-YTW : 8.02 %
BIP.PR.E FixedReset Disc 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 21.55
Evaluated at bid price : 21.55
Bid-YTW : 7.11 %
IFC.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 21.29
Evaluated at bid price : 21.58
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset Disc 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 16.61
Evaluated at bid price : 16.61
Bid-YTW : 8.19 %
BN.PF.J FixedReset Disc 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 21.47
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 7.17 %
BN.PF.I FixedReset Disc 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 19.82
Evaluated at bid price : 19.82
Bid-YTW : 8.27 %
BN.PF.G FixedReset Disc 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 14.72
Evaluated at bid price : 14.72
Bid-YTW : 9.35 %
TD.PF.J FixedReset Disc 1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 21.60
Evaluated at bid price : 21.95
Bid-YTW : 6.57 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.H FixedReset Disc 45,037 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 17.33
Evaluated at bid price : 17.33
Bid-YTW : 7.59 %
NA.PR.W FixedReset Disc 41,600 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 16.45
Evaluated at bid price : 16.45
Bid-YTW : 7.81 %
BMO.PR.E FixedReset Disc 37,055 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 20.56
Evaluated at bid price : 20.56
Bid-YTW : 7.07 %
NA.PR.C FixedReset Prem 37,042 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 23.32
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 6.45 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset Ins Non 34,453 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 22.16
Evaluated at bid price : 22.74
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
RY.PR.S FixedReset Disc 31,359 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 19.83
Evaluated at bid price : 19.83
Bid-YTW : 6.94 %
There were 19 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
SLF.PR.D Insurance Straight Quote: 18.84 – 19.89
Spot Rate : 1.0500
Average : 0.7612

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 18.84
Evaluated at bid price : 18.84
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %

BMO.PR.W FixedReset Disc Quote: 17.04 – 18.00
Spot Rate : 0.9600
Average : 0.6923

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 17.04
Evaluated at bid price : 17.04
Bid-YTW : 7.65 %

BN.PR.X FixedReset Disc Quote: 14.70 – 15.47
Spot Rate : 0.7700
Average : 0.5869

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 14.70
Evaluated at bid price : 14.70
Bid-YTW : 8.24 %

PWF.PF.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 18.26 – 18.92
Spot Rate : 0.6600
Average : 0.4821

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 18.26
Evaluated at bid price : 18.26
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %

CU.PR.I FixedReset Disc Quote: 22.35 – 23.00
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.4728

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 22.04
Evaluated at bid price : 22.35
Bid-YTW : 7.20 %

PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.90 – 22.45
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.4066

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-12
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %

Market Action

April 11, 2023

Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain, gave a speech titled Latest monetary policy developments in the euro area:

We also provided more detail on what will guide our assessment of the inflation outlook and, therefore, our monetary policy decisions. In particular, we announced that this assessment will depend on three main factors. First, incoming economic and financial data. Second, the of underlying inflation dynamics. And lastly, the strength of monetary policy transmission.

I will now elaborate on these three factors.

The first is our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data. This assessment will be informed primarily by our staff macroeconomic projections, on which all data are incorporated in a coherent manner.

In this regard, the staff March forecast pointed to a weakening of activity in 2023, with real euro area GDP expected to grow by 1% in 2023 (compared with 3.6% in 2022). This scenario is somewhat more optimistic than that of the previous projections (published in December), reflecting better than expected recent economic data and the fall in the cost of energy, so that real income losses are lower. Growth is expected to pick up, to 1.6%.

Headline inflation is expected to remain high for the rest of 2023, albeit on a downward path that will take it to 2.8% in the last quarter of the year. This drop in inflation is mainly explained by the energy component, while underlying inflation is expected to remain elevated. Specifically, the ECB projections point to inflation averaging 5.3% in 2023, before decreasing to 2.9% in 2024 and to 2.1% in 2025. This downward trend would be underpinned by the gradual disappearance of upward pressures from the reopening of the economy, previous supply-side shocks (supply bottlenecks and high energy prices) and euro depreciation, reinforced by increasing pass-through of the recent fall in energy prices and exchange rate appreciation. The fall in inflation in the medium term is also explained by a moderation in domestic demand pressures, owing inter alia to increasing dampening effects of our monetary policy decisions.

A third element that adds a certain degree of complexity to the inflation outlook relates to fiscal policy. In 2022 and 2023, euro area countries significantly increased their fiscal policy support measures to protect businesses and households from rising energy prices and inflation, bringing the total gross stimulus to close to 2% of euro area GDP in both years. While these measures helped to contain inflation in 2022 and are expected to do so in 2023, the extent of their impact this year is still uncertain. And the withdrawal of these measures will push consumer prices upwards in the coming years, especially in 2024.3 In this regard, it is important to stress that, in the current high inflation setting, an appropriate policy mix requires a fiscal stance that, at the aggregate euro area level, is not at odds with the tightening of our monetary policy. This means that government support measures should be temporary, targeted and tailored to preserving incentives to consume less energy, and they should be gradually rolled back as energy prices fall. Otherwise, we are at risk of driving up medium-term inflationary pressures, which
could call for a stronger monetary policy response.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.9052 % 2,313.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.9052 % 4,436.8
Floater 9.74 % 9.88 % 54,244 9.65 2 1.9052 % 2,556.9
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2874 % 3,362.2
SplitShare 5.00 % 7.01 % 42,748 2.64 7 0.2874 % 4,015.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2874 % 3,132.8
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0170 % 2,761.3
Perpetual-Discount 6.18 % 6.22 % 54,277 13.60 34 -0.0170 % 3,011.1
FixedReset Disc 5.80 % 7.58 % 88,668 12.17 63 0.0912 % 2,123.3
Insurance Straight 6.09 % 6.13 % 74,319 13.71 19 -0.1368 % 2,951.0
FloatingReset 10.43 % 10.92 % 33,023 8.87 2 -0.1695 % 2,390.3
FixedReset Prem 6.91 % 6.45 % 284,548 12.98 1 0.1972 % 2,337.6
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0912 % 2,170.4
FixedReset Ins Non 5.99 % 7.49 % 71,558 11.99 11 0.1204 % 2,301.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.P Insurance Straight -2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 21.38
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
BN.PF.G FixedReset Disc -1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 14.50
Evaluated at bid price : 14.50
Bid-YTW : 9.48 %
BN.PF.H FixedReset Disc -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 20.85
Evaluated at bid price : 20.85
Bid-YTW : 8.24 %
PWF.PF.A Perpetual-Discount -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 18.25
Evaluated at bid price : 18.25
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
BN.PR.X FixedReset Disc -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 14.56
Evaluated at bid price : 14.56
Bid-YTW : 8.32 %
IFC.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 21.32
Evaluated at bid price : 21.32
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
GWO.PR.Q Insurance Straight -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 20.67
Evaluated at bid price : 20.67
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset Disc -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 15.82
Evaluated at bid price : 15.82
Bid-YTW : 8.11 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset Ins Non -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 11.80
Evaluated at bid price : 11.80
Bid-YTW : 8.23 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Disc -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 17.37
Evaluated at bid price : 17.37
Bid-YTW : 7.58 %
MFC.PR.Q FixedReset Ins Non 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 7.49 %
BIP.PR.E FixedReset Disc 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.30
Bid-YTW : 7.19 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 22.78
Evaluated at bid price : 23.06
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset Disc 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 17.95
Evaluated at bid price : 17.95
Bid-YTW : 7.48 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset Disc 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 18.25
Evaluated at bid price : 18.25
Bid-YTW : 7.54 %
TD.PF.K FixedReset Disc 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 7.05 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset Disc 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 15.40
Evaluated at bid price : 15.40
Bid-YTW : 8.54 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset Disc 1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 18.66
Evaluated at bid price : 18.66
Bid-YTW : 7.35 %
TD.PF.J FixedReset Disc 1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 21.55
Evaluated at bid price : 21.55
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
BN.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 2.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 19.25
Evaluated at bid price : 19.25
Bid-YTW : 6.43 %
BN.PR.B Floater 3.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 12.05
Evaluated at bid price : 12.05
Bid-YTW : 9.88 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Ins Non 33,699 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 17.81
Evaluated at bid price : 17.81
Bid-YTW : 7.49 %
MFC.PR.Q FixedReset Ins Non 33,141 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 7.49 %
BMO.PR.E FixedReset Disc 30,128 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 20.62
Evaluated at bid price : 20.62
Bid-YTW : 7.05 %
NA.PR.W FixedReset Disc 29,590 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 16.44
Evaluated at bid price : 16.44
Bid-YTW : 7.81 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset Disc 26,704 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 17.31
Evaluated at bid price : 17.31
Bid-YTW : 7.59 %
NA.PR.S FixedReset Disc 23,997 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 7.91 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.T FixedReset Disc Quote: 17.09 – 19.27
Spot Rate : 2.1800
Average : 1.5677

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 17.09
Evaluated at bid price : 17.09
Bid-YTW : 7.87 %

BN.PF.C Perpetual-Discount Quote: 18.85 – 20.58
Spot Rate : 1.7300
Average : 1.2777

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 18.85
Evaluated at bid price : 18.85
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %

BN.PF.H FixedReset Disc Quote: 20.85 – 22.25
Spot Rate : 1.4000
Average : 1.0077

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 20.85
Evaluated at bid price : 20.85
Bid-YTW : 8.24 %

BN.PF.J FixedReset Disc Quote: 21.45 – 22.40
Spot Rate : 0.9500
Average : 0.6453

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 7.29 %

CM.PR.T FixedReset Disc Quote: 23.00 – 24.00
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.8056

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 22.50
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %

IFC.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.32 – 22.25
Spot Rate : 0.9300
Average : 0.7811

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-11
Maturity Price : 21.32
Evaluated at bid price : 21.32
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %

Market Action

April 10, 2023

Jobs, jobs, jobs (US Version)!

The economy in March continued its descent from dizzying heights, with employment growing at a healthy rate but one that nonetheless signifies employers are pulling back as steadily rising interest rates take their toll.

Employers added 236,000 jobs last month, the Labor Department reported on Friday, while the unemployment rate decreased to 3.5 percent, from 3.6 percent in February.

The range of industries beginning to fade has widened, as warehousing, retail, manufacturing, construction and financial activities — those more sensitive to borrowing costs — either lost jobs or stayed flat over the month.

  • Year-over-year growth in average hourly earnings slowed slightly in March, to 4.2 percent, a sign the Federal Reserve has been looking for as it seeks to quell inflation. The report reflected a labor market that is gently decelerating, a sign of the kind of soft economic landing that the Fed has been shooting for.
  • The U.S. labor force added nearly half a million workers in March and the share of Americans considered in their prime working age rose to 80.7 percent, the highest rate since 2001. So much for “nobody wants to work anymore.”
  • The report delivered welcome news for President Biden, who has said that the job market needed to cool to tame high inflation. But analysts warn that the outbreak of banking sector turmoil means that the coming months could bring a more rapid deceleration in hiring.
  • Bond yields jumped in response to the fresh data, as investors added to bets that interest rates would rise. Stock markets were closed on Friday for the Easter holiday but the bond market opened for a shortened session, during which yields continued to record unusually big swings.

So this year’s tussle is between the economists and the players! Who will win?

The Bank of Canada will keep its key interest rate steady at 4.50 per cent through 2023, according to most economists polled by Reuters, with an even smaller minority now expecting an interest-rate cut by year-end than a poll taken a month ago.

Markets still expect more than 50 basis points of cuts, pricing fuelled by fears last month over stresses in the U.S. and European banking sector, despite Canada’s economy and labour market performing better than expected.

In March, the BoC was the first major central bank to stop its aggressive hiking cycle and is on what it calls a conditional pause. So all 33 economists polled March 31-April 6 said it will hold its overnight rate at 4.50 per cent on April 12.

A majority of forecasters, 23 of 31, said the rate would remain unchanged for the rest of 2023. Only seven expected at least one 25-basis-point rate cut by end-year, down from 13 in a survey taken about a month ago.

The IMF has released its Global Financial Stability Report which includes a chapter on Geopolitics and Financial Fragmentation: Implications for Macro-Financial Stability:

Rising geopolitical tensions among major economies have intensified concerns about global economic and financial fragmentation, which could have potentially important implications for global financial stability. Fragmentation induced by geopolitical tensions could affect the cross-border allocation of capital, international payment systems, and asset prices. This could pose macro-financial stability risks by increasing banks’ funding costs, reducing their profitability, and lowering the provision of credit to the private sector. Greater financial fragmentation could also exacerbate capital flow and macro-financial volatility by limiting international risk diversification. Policymakers need to be aware of potential financial stability risks associated with a rise in geopolitical tensions and assess and quantify geopolitical shock transmission to financial institutions. Financial institutions may need to hold adequate capital and liquidity buffers against rising geopolitical risks. The global financial safety net also needs to be buttressed through adequate levels of international reserves held by countries, central bank liquidity swap arrangements, and precautionary credit lines from international financial institutions.

One grudge the private-school boys at the major dealers have against market-making hedge funds is that they pull their capital out of the market when things get hairy. So, it turns out, do private mortgage lenders:

Private mortgage lenders are refusing to renew loans to their existing borrowers, leaving indebted homeowners without a source of funding.

Canadian Mortgages Inc., CMLS Financial, New Haven Mortgage Corp. and individual private lenders are some of those who have turned down requests to renew some of their borrowers’ loans after home prices tanked over this past year.

This is taking place in areas where home prices have dropped significantly. That includes Owen Sound, Bowmanville, Orillia, Timmins, Hamilton and Brampton in Ontario and Prince Rupert in British Columbia.

Private lenders are nervous they won’t be able to recoup their capital if borrowers are unable to make their monthly payments. Private lending is typically determined using a metric called the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, which measures how much the homeowner owes relative to the appraised value of the property.

Currently, many private lenders are only willing to lend up to 75 per cent of the property’s value – also known as an LTV ratio of 75 per cent. When home prices were soaring in 2021, private lenders were willing to offer loans with an LTV ratio of 90 per cent.

Now that home prices have dropped, that has increased the risk to the lender and they are no longer willing to renew loans. When borrowers try to renew their mortgage, the lender is either refusing to renew their loan or telling borrowers that their properties need to be reappraised. And when the property is reappraised, it has a much lower value.

The New York Fed has released its Survey of Consumer Expectations:

Inflation

  • Median inflation expectations increased by 0.5 percentage point at the one-year-ahead horizon to 4.7%, marking the first increase in the series since October 2022. Median inflation expectations increased by 0.1 percentage point at the three-year-ahead horizon to 2.8%, but decreased by 0.1 percentage point at the five-year-ahead horizon to 2.5%. The survey’s measure of disagreement across respondents (the difference between the 75th and 25th percentile of inflation expectations) increased at all three horizons.
  • Median inflation uncertainty—or the uncertainty expressed regarding future inflation outcomes—increased at the one-year-ahead horizon, decreased at the three-year-ahead horizon, and remained unchanged at the five-year-ahead horizon.
  • Median home price growth expectations increased by 0.4 percentage point to 1.8% in March, remaining far below the 12-month trailing average of 3.0% as well as their pre-pandemic levels. The increase was most pronounced among respondents with no more than a high school education and for those who live in the Midwest Census region.
  • Median year-ahead expected price changes declined by 0.1 percentage point for gas (to 4.6%), 1.4 percentage point for food (to 5.9%), 0.1 percentage point for the cost of medical care (to 9.3%), and 0.2 percentage point for the cost of rent (to 9.2%). Median year-ahead expected cost of college education increased by 0.8 percentage point (to 8.9%). All commodity price expectations remain well above their pre-pandemic (March 2020) levels.

Labor Market

  • Median one-year-ahead expected earnings growth remained unchanged at 3.0% in March. The series has been moving between a narrow range of 2.8% to 3.0% since September 2021; March marked the fourth consecutive month it remained at 3.0%.
  • Mean unemployment expectations—or the mean probability that the U.S. unemployment rate will be higher one year from now—increased by 1.3 percentage point to 40.7%. The increase was more pronounced for respondents with at least some college education, those between the ages of 40 and 60, and those with annual household incomes between $50k and $100k.
  • The mean perceived probability of losing one’s job in the next 12 months decreased by 0.4 percentage point to 11.4%. The mean probability of leaving one’s job voluntarily in the next 12 months also declined by 1.5 percentage point to 19.3%.
  • The mean perceived probability of finding a job (if one’s current job was lost) declined by 0.3 percentage point to 57.6% in March. The series has been moving between a narrow range of 57.2% to 58.2% since August 2022.

Something peculiar is happening at Emerge Canada Inc.:

Regulators have slapped the entire family of exchange-traded funds from Emerge Canada Inc. with a trading halt because the company has failed to find an auditor to review its financial statements.

Toronto-based Emerge revealed in mid-December that, nearly six weeks earlier, BDO Canada LLP had resigned as the auditors of the Emerge Funds. At the time, Emerge said it was “working expeditiously to appoint a successor auditor.”

Monday, Emerge acknowledged it has yet to find a new auditor. Lacking one, it failed to file audited annual financial statements for its funds by a March 31 deadline. As a result, the Ontario Securities Commission issued a cease-trade order on Thursday for all the Emerge funds.

In its December 14 filing, Emerge said BDO “resigned, on its own initiative” on Nov. 3. Emerge said BDO Canada LLP had no reservations in its reports for the Emerge Funds for the two most recently completed financial years, which were 2020 and 2021. Also, there no were no “reportable events,” which are types of disagreements with auditors or other accounting issues that are defined in securities law.

The next day, in a filing to all provincial securities regulators, BDO said “We agree with the statements made in the Change of Auditor Notice pertaining to our firm.”

And we should all Raise a glass to Bing Newcomb:

Mr. Newcomb, who co-founded the company E*Trade and wrote the computer code that made it work, died on Jan. 29 at his home in Palo Alto, Calif. He was 79.

In 1980, Mr. Newcomb and William A. Porter were introduced by a mutual friend at a Halloween party in Palo Alto. Mr. Porter, a onetime cowboy turned electronics whiz, had just purchased an Apple II personal computer, the company’s first model aimed at consumers. How, he wondered, could he and other individuals use the new technology to buy and sell stocks from home?

Mr. Newcomb, who had been working as a freelance computer programmer, hiring himself out to banks and other businesses that needed a guide to emerging digital technologies, provided the answers.

In 1982, with $15,000 in capital, the partners started TradePlus, one of the first electronic trading platforms. Its first trade was made on July 11, 1983, by a Michigan dentist.

By 1994, revenues had risen geometrically, from $850,000 only two years earlier to nearly $11 million. A business journal proclaimed the firm to be the fastest-growing private company in Silicon Valley. It went public as the E*Trade Group in 1996.

Mr. Newcomb, who had been the company’s chief system architect and vice president for research and development, retired with 2.4 million shares of the company in 1997, when the price per share was about $23.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.3967 % 2,270.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.3967 % 4,353.8
Floater 9.93 % 9.90 % 40,160 9.64 2 -2.3967 % 2,509.1
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1405 % 3,352.5
SplitShare 5.01 % 7.26 % 44,407 2.64 7 -0.1405 % 4,003.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1405 % 3,123.8
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0270 % 2,761.8
Perpetual-Discount 6.18 % 6.21 % 54,153 13.60 34 -0.0270 % 3,011.6
FixedReset Disc 5.81 % 7.59 % 88,688 12.15 63 0.1308 % 2,121.3
Insurance Straight 6.09 % 6.14 % 73,735 13.70 19 -0.2087 % 2,955.0
FloatingReset 10.42 % 10.95 % 31,083 8.85 2 -0.8403 % 2,394.4
FixedReset Prem 6.93 % 6.46 % 285,741 12.96 1 0.1975 % 2,333.0
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1308 % 2,168.4
FixedReset Ins Non 6.00 % 7.54 % 70,333 12.04 11 -0.4430 % 2,298.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BN.PR.B Floater -4.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 11.60
Evaluated at bid price : 11.60
Bid-YTW : 10.26 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -4.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 17.99
Evaluated at bid price : 17.99
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Ins Non -3.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 17.70
Evaluated at bid price : 17.70
Bid-YTW : 7.54 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset Disc -2.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 18.35
Evaluated at bid price : 18.35
Bid-YTW : 7.47 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Disc -1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 12.45
Evaluated at bid price : 12.45
Bid-YTW : 8.33 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset -1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 14.65
Evaluated at bid price : 14.65
Bid-YTW : 10.20 %
PWF.PR.T FixedReset Disc -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 7.91 %
GWO.PR.R Insurance Straight -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 19.50
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
GWO.PR.S Insurance Straight -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 21.15
Evaluated at bid price : 21.15
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
CU.PR.I FixedReset Disc -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 22.09
Evaluated at bid price : 22.42
Bid-YTW : 7.17 %
TD.PF.L FixedReset Disc -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 22.68
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
BN.PF.D Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 18.80
Evaluated at bid price : 18.80
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 20.56
Evaluated at bid price : 20.56
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
BN.PF.G FixedReset Disc 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 14.75
Evaluated at bid price : 14.75
Bid-YTW : 9.33 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset Disc 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 15.16
Evaluated at bid price : 15.16
Bid-YTW : 8.67 %
MFC.PR.Q FixedReset Ins Non 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 7.56 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset Disc 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 17.71
Evaluated at bid price : 17.71
Bid-YTW : 7.58 %
BN.PR.X FixedReset Disc 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 14.75
Evaluated at bid price : 14.75
Bid-YTW : 8.21 %
BIP.PR.E FixedReset Disc 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 21.07
Evaluated at bid price : 21.07
Bid-YTW : 7.27 %
TD.PF.C FixedReset Disc 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 16.90
Evaluated at bid price : 16.90
Bid-YTW : 7.60 %
MIC.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 20.90
Evaluated at bid price : 20.90
Bid-YTW : 6.52 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 23.36
Evaluated at bid price : 23.65
Bid-YTW : 6.25 %
GWO.PR.P Insurance Straight 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 21.86
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset Disc 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 10.70
Evaluated at bid price : 10.70
Bid-YTW : 9.18 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset Disc 1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 15.75
Evaluated at bid price : 15.75
Bid-YTW : 8.52 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset Disc 2.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 11.40
Evaluated at bid price : 11.40
Bid-YTW : 8.90 %
BN.PF.F FixedReset Disc 2.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 16.17
Evaluated at bid price : 16.17
Bid-YTW : 8.94 %
BN.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 2.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 18.51
Evaluated at bid price : 18.51
Bid-YTW : 6.48 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 4.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 20.66
Evaluated at bid price : 20.66
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.W FixedReset Disc 42,470 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 16.98
Evaluated at bid price : 16.98
Bid-YTW : 7.67 %
GWO.PR.H Insurance Straight 40,392 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 19.70
Evaluated at bid price : 19.70
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
GWO.PR.G Insurance Straight 37,404 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset Disc 36,265 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 17.30
Evaluated at bid price : 17.30
Bid-YTW : 7.58 %
TD.PF.L FixedReset Disc 22,111 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 22.68
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
SLF.PR.C Insurance Straight 21,721 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 18.95
Evaluated at bid price : 18.95
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
There were 15 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.Q FixedReset Ins Non Quote: 18.81 – 22.50
Spot Rate : 3.6900
Average : 2.9888

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 7.56 %

TRP.PR.E FixedReset Disc Quote: 15.16 – 17.45
Spot Rate : 2.2900
Average : 1.6563

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 15.16
Evaluated at bid price : 15.16
Bid-YTW : 8.67 %

SLF.PR.D Insurance Straight Quote: 18.78 – 19.89
Spot Rate : 1.1100
Average : 0.6690

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 18.78
Evaluated at bid price : 18.78
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %

CM.PR.T FixedReset Disc Quote: 23.05 – 24.00
Spot Rate : 0.9500
Average : 0.5925

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 22.54
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 6.82 %

GWO.PR.H Insurance Straight Quote: 19.70 – 20.58
Spot Rate : 0.8800
Average : 0.5262

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 19.70
Evaluated at bid price : 19.70
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %

BMO.PR.W FixedReset Disc Quote: 16.98 – 18.00
Spot Rate : 1.0200
Average : 0.7482

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-10
Maturity Price : 16.98
Evaluated at bid price : 16.98
Bid-YTW : 7.67 %

MAPF

MAPF Performance: March, 2023

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close March 31, 2023, was $8.0788.

Performance was helped this month by the fund’s overweight holdings in FixedResets, which underperformed PerpetualDiscounts during the month (the Solactive Laddered Canadian Preferred Share Index returned -5.75% while TXPR, which includes a significant weight in Straight Preferreds, returned -3.74%). More particularly, TRP.PR.A [reversing last month] underperformed at -7.42%; as did BN.PR.R (-7.05%) and NA.PR.S (-6.03%). This was mitigated by good performance from MIC.PR.A (+4.76%) [reversing last month], PWF.PR.P (-1.45%) and BMO.PR.S (+2.35%) [small holdings are not considered for mention here].

There is still a pronounced ‘risk-off’ sentiment in the market, but I feel it is only a matter of time before investors start paying attention to the fundamental risk of these instruments compared to their eye-popping interest-equivalent yields.

FixedResets continue to yield more, in general, than PerpetualDiscounts; on March 31, I reported median YTWs of 7.41% and 6.22%, respectively, for these two indices. RY.PR.J is calculated by HIMIPref™ as having a yield of 7.41% at monthend; priced at 18.17, resetting 2025-5-24 at a spread of 274bp over GOC-5 (assumed to be constant at 2.93%) and currently paying 0.80 p.a. (3.20% annually). The next pay-date is 2023-5-24.

If we plug the above data into the yield calculator for resets (which is discussed here), we arrive at a quarterly annualized yield of 7.28% for RY.PR.J (this is quarterly compounded yield, not semi-annually as in HIMIPref™ there are also implementation differences). To take this down to 13bp below the PerpetualDiscount median index yield of 6.22% (to account for the calculation methodological differences), which is to say 6.09%, requires the assumption that GOC-5 will be 2.05% forever, as opposed the ‘constant rate’ assumption of 2.93%. Well … pays yer money and take yer chances, gents! Assiduous Readers with long memories will liken this to all the calculations of Break-even Rate Shock when the puzzle represented the same problem with a different sign!

Returns to March 31, 2023
Period MAPF TXPR*
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month -4.29% -3.74% N/A
Three Months +2.21% +2.27% N/A
One Year -19.46% -14.05% -14.42%
Two Years (annualized) -4.47% -4.15% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +18.72% +11.19% +10.55%
Four Years (annualized) +4.06% +2.09% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +0.22% +0.26% -0.31%
Six Years (annualized) +2.30% +1.11% N/A
Seven Years (annualized) +6.17% +3.85% N/A
Eight Years (annualized) +2.32% +1.19% N/A
Nine Years (annualized) +2.31% +0.94% N/A
Ten Years (annualized) +1.95% +0.60% +0.13%
Eleven Years (annualized) +2.68% +1.15%  
Twelve Years (annualized) +2.63% +1.42%  
Thirteen Years (annualized) +4.06% +2.16%  
Fourteen Years (annualized) +6.60% +3.47%  
Fifteen Years (annualized) +6.67% +2.22%  
Sixteen Years (annualized) +6.13%    
Seventeen Years (annualized) +6.09%    
Eighteen Years (annualized) +6.19%    
Nineteen Years (annualized) +6.18%    
Twenty Years (annualized) +7.66%    
Twenty-One Years (annualized) +7.10%    
Twenty-Two Years (annualized) +7.49%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
The BMO Capital Markets “50” Preferred Share Index is no longer being calculated. The final performance report incorporating this venerable index was published as of December, 2020.
“TXPR” is the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index. It is calculated without accounting for fees, but does assume reinvestment of dividends.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses. Reinvestment of dividends is assumed.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -3.38%, +2.05% and -15.11%, respectively, according to Globe & Mail / Fundata after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +12.68%; five year is +1.24%; ten year is +1.61%.

Figures from Morningstar are no longer conveniently available.

Manulife Preferred Income Class Adv has been terminated by Manulife. The performance of this fund was last reported here in March, 2018.
Figures for Horizons Active Preferred Share ETF (HPR) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -3.46%, +2.10% & -14.97%, respectively. Three year performance is +13.48%, five-year is +0.14%, ten year is +1.38%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are -3.67%, +1.83% and -15.34% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively. Three year performance is +13.37%; five-year is +0.21%; ten-year is +1.15%

Acccording to the fund’s fact sheet as of June 30, 2016, the fund’s inception date was October 30, 2015. I do not know how they justify this nonsensical statement, but will assume that prior performance is being suppressed in some perfectly legal manner that somebody at National considers ethical.

The last time Altamira Preferred Equity Fund’s performance was reported here was April, 2014; performance under the National Bank banner was first reported here May, 2014.

The figures for the NAV of BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF (ZPR) is -15.14% for the past twelve months. Two year performance is -4.15%, three year is +13.09%, five year is +0.09%, ten year is -0.44%
Figures for Fiera Canadian Preferred Share Class Cg Series F, (formerly Natixis Canadian Preferred Share Class Series F) (formerly NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund) are no longer available as the Fund is now the property of Canoe Financial. The last reported performance for the merged fund was May 2020.
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund (advisor series) according to BMO are -3.46%, +1.23% and -15.82% for the past one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively. Two year performance is -6.36%; three year is +10.00%; five-year is -2.12%.
Figures for PowerShares Canadian Preferred Share Index Class, Series F (PPS) are -11.43% for the past twelve months. The three-year figure is +12.36%; five years is +0.32%; ten-year is +0.79%
Figures for the First Asset Preferred Share Investment Trust (PSF.UN) are no longer available since the fund has merged with First Asset Preferred Share ETF (FPR).

Performance for the fund was last reported here in September, 2016; the first report of unavailability was in October, 2016.

Figures for Lysander-Slater Preferred Share Dividend Fund (Class F) according to the company are -3.0%, +3.5% and -13.6% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. Three year performance is +13.6%, five-year is -0.3%.
Figures for the Desjardins Canadian Preferred Share Fund A Class (A Class), as reported by the company are -3.34%, +1.87% and -14.83% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. Two year performance is -4.71%, three-year is +10.16%, five-year is -1.15%
Figures for the RBC Canadian Preferred Share ETF (RPF) as reported by Morningstar are -5.53%, -0.12% and -16.35% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. Three-year performance is +12.70%; five-year is -0.52%
Figures for the Dynamic Active Preferred Shares ETF (DXP) are -3.0%, +2.7% and -11.2% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. Three-year performance is +15.2%; five-year is +1.8%

The five-year Canada yield rocketted upwards, with the five-year Canada yield (“GOC-5”) crashing from 3.61% at February month-end to 2.93% at March month-end.

The Seniority Spread (between long-term corporate bonds and interest-equivalent PerpetualDiscounts) was 305bp as of 2023-3-29 (chart end-date 2023-3-10) :

The situation with FixedResets is interesting, with the spread between GOC-5 and the interest-adjusted FixedReset (Discount) rate widening significantly from its 2021-11-10 low of 344bp to its current level of 698bp (as of 2023-3-29) … (chart end-date 2023-3-10):

…while at the same time the interest-equivalent spread between FixedReset (Discounts) and PerpetualDiscounts has narrowed to -162bp (as of 2023-3-29) from its 2021-7-28 level of +170bp (chart end-date 2023-3-10):

There is no significant correlation between the Issue Reset Spread and 1-month performance for discounted FixedResets for either the Pfd-2 or Pfd-3 Group issues, which is normal because there is a lot of noise in this inefficient market.

However, the normally moderate correlations between Issue Reset Spread and three-month performance have disappeared again in this month’s check:

There were no significant correlations for either the Pfd-2 Group or the Pfd-3 Group for 1-Month performance against term-to-reset, despite the massive change in the GOC-5 yield from 3.61% to 2.93%) during the period. A slightly smaller change in the other direction led to significant corellations last month:

… and for three-month performance, there were again no correlations for either the Pfd-2 Group or the Pfd-3 Group; here, the change in GOC-5 was from 3.37% to 2.93%:

It should be noted that to some extent such a dependence (of performance on term-to-reset) can be justified as the nearer-term issues will receive the benefit of higher projected dividend rates sooner as a result of higher GOC-5 yields and therefore, perhaps, for longer. Equations for the relationship between correlation slope and change in GOC-5 were derived in the August PrefLetter.

I keep talking about ‘Sustainable Income’ and nowadays it’s far higher than the dividends that are currently being distributed. This is because Sustainable Income is the average yield-to-worst (YTW) of the portfolio when the YTW is calculated to perpetuity (or to redemption, of course, if the yield to redemption is lower), including resets at the current GOC-5 rate. The sharp increase in GOC-5 in the past year has caused the difference between YTW and Current Yield to skyrocket, but one way or another I expect that these two values will become much closer – slowly at first, but quickening in about two years. We have to wait for the reset date of the MAPF portfolio securities before we see a change in actual cash receipts – and, of course, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the rate used for estimation purposes now will be used for the actual calculation in the future (chart prepared as of 2023-03-10).

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
June 10.5877 5.09% 0.998 5.100% 1.0000 $0.5395
September 10.4601 5.28% 0.997 5.296% 1.0000 $0.5540
December, 2014 10.5701 4.83% 1.009 4.787% 1.0000 $0.5060
March, 2015 9.9573 4.99% 1.001 4.985% 1.0000 $0.4964
June, 2015 9.4181 5.55% 1.002 5.539% 1.0000 $0.5217
September 7.8140 6.98% 0.999 6.987% 1.0000 $0.5460
December, 2015 8.1379 6.85% 0.997 6.871% 1.0000 $0.5592
March, 2016 7.4416 7.79% 0.998 7.805% 1.0000 $0.5808
June 7.6704 7.67% 1.011 7.587% 1.0000 $0.5819
September 8.0590 7.35% 0.993 7.402% 1.0000 $0.5965
December, 2016 8.5844 7.24% 0.990 7.313% 1.0000 $0.6278
March, 2017 9.3984 6.26% 0.994 6.298% 1.0000 $0.5919
June 9.5313 6.41% 0.998 6.423% 1.0000 $0.6122
September 9.7129 6.56% 0.998 6.573% 1.0000 $0.6384
December, 2017 10.0566 6.06% 1.004 6.036% 1.0000 $0.6070
March, 2018 10.2701 6.22% 1.007 6.177% 1.0000 $0.6344
June 10.2518 6.22% 0.995 6.251% 1.0000 $0.6408
September 10.2965 6.62% 1.018 6.503% 1.0000 $0.6696
December, 2018 8.6875 7.16% 0.997 7.182% 1.0000 $0.6240
March, 2019 8.4778 7.09% 1.007 7.041% 1.0000 $0.5969
June 8.0896 7.33% 0.996 7.359% 1.0000 $0.5953
September 7.7948 7.96% 0.998 7.976% 1.0000 $0.6217
December, 2019 8.0900 6.03% 0.995 6.060% 1.0000 $0.4903
March 5.5596 7.04% 1.006 6.998% 1.0000 $0.3891
June 6.3568 6.10% 0.9900 6.162% 1.0000 $0.3917
September 7.2852 5.32% 1.00 5.320% 1.0000 $0.3876
December, 2020 8.3947 4.46% 0.999 4.464% 1.0000 $0.3747
March, 2021 9.6473 4.48% 0.996 4.498% 1.0000 $0.4339
June 10.3712 3.92% 0.985 3.980% 1.0000 $0.4127
September 10.7572 4.08% 1.017 4.012% 1.0000 $0.4316
December, 2021 10.7432 4.31% 0.999 4.314% 1.0000 $0.4635
March, 2022 10.5040 5.53% 1.004 5.508% 1.0000 $0.5786
June 9.3115 7.04% 0.993 7.090% 1.0000 $0.6672
September 8.4093 8.10% 0.997 8.124% 1.0000 $0.6916
December, 2022 7.9921 8.47% 0.996 8.504% 1.0000 $0.6796
March, 2023 8.0788 7.90% 0.997 7.924% 1.0000 $0.6401
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company or the regulator (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies (see below)), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See the Deemed Retractible Review: September 2016 for the rationale behind this analysis.

The same reasoning is also applied to FixedResets from these issuers, other than explicitly defined NVCC from banks.

In November, 2019, the assumption of DeemedRetraction for insurance issues was cancelled in the wake of the IAIS decision included in ICS 2.0. This resulted in a large drop in the yield calculated for these issues

The Deemed Maturity date for insurers was set at 2022-1-31 at the commencement of the process in February, 2011. It was extended to 2025-1-31 in April, 2013 and to 2030-1-31 in December, 2018. In November, 2019, the assumption of DeemedRetraction was cancelled in the wake of the IAIS decision included in ICS 2.0.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Canada Yields Assumed in Calculations
Month-end GOC-5 3-Month Bill
September, 2015 0.78% 0.40%
December, 2015 0.71% 0.46%
March, 2016 0.70% 0.44%
June 0.57% 0.47%
September 0.58% 0.53%
December, 2016 1.16% 0.47%
March, 2017 1.08% 0.55%
June 1.35% 0.69%
September 1.79% 0.97%
December, 2017 1.83% 1.00%
March, 2018 2.06% 1.08%
June 1.95% 1.22%
September 2.33% 1.55%
December, 2018 1.88% 1.65%
March, 2019 1.46% 1.66%
June 1.34% 1.66%
September 1.41% 1.66%
December, 2019 1.68% 1.68%
March, 2020 0.57% 0.21%
June 0.37% 0.21%
September 0.35% 0.14%
December, 2020 0.42% 0.08%
March, 2021 0.94% 0.09%
June 0.93% 0.13%
September 1.07% 0.13%
December, 2021 1.31% 0.16%
March, 2022 2.44% 0.53%
June 3.24% 2.11%
September 3.45% 3.60%
December, 2022 3.37% 4.35%
March, 2023 2.93% 4.44%
Issue Comments

BEP.PR.M To Reset To 6.050%

Brookfield Renewable Partners L.P. has announced:

that it has determined the fixed distribution rate on its Class A Preferred Limited Partnership Units, Series 13 (“Series 13 Units”) (TSX: BEP.PR.M) for the five years commencing May 1, 2023 and ending April 30, 2028.

Series 13 Units and Series 14 Units

If declared, the fixed quarterly distributions on the Series 13 Units during the five years commencing May 1, 2023 will be paid at an annual rate of 6.05% ($0.378125 per unit per quarter).

Holders of Series 13 Units have the right, at their option, exercisable not later than 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on April 17, 2023, to reclassify all or part of their Series 13 Units, on a one-for-one basis, into Class A Preferred Limited Partnership Units, Series 14 (“Series 14 Units”), effective April 30, 2023.

The quarterly floating rate distributions on the Series 14 Units will be paid at an annual rate, calculated for each quarter, of 3.00% over the annual yield on three-month Government of Canada treasury bills. The actual quarterly distribution in respect of the May 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023 distribution period for the Series 14 Units, if declared, will be $0.466743 per unit, payable on July 31, 2023.

Holders of Series 13 Units are not required to elect to reclassify all or any part of their Series 13 Units into Series 14 Units.

As provided in the unit conditions of the Series 13 Units, (i) if Brookfield Renewable determines that there would be fewer than 1,000,000 Series 13 Units outstanding after April 30, 2023, all remaining Series 13 Units will be automatically reclassified into Series 14 Units on a one-for-one basis effective April 30, 2023; or (ii) if Brookfield Renewable determines that there would be fewer than 1,000,000 Series 14 Units outstanding after April 30, 2023, no Series 13 Units will be reclassified into Series 14 Units. There are currently 10,000,000 Series 13 Units outstanding.

The Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) has conditionally approved the listing of the Series 14 Units effective upon reclassification. Listing of the Series 14 Units is subject to Brookfield Renewable fulfilling all the listing requirements of the TSX and, upon approval, the Series 14 Units will be listed on the TSX under the trading symbol “BEP.PR.N”.

BEP.PR.M was issued as a FixedReset 5.00%+300M500 ROC that commenced trading 2018-1-16 after being announced 2018-01-09. The issue has been tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps – FixedReset (Discount) subindex on credit concerns.

Thanks to Assiduous Reader CanSiamCyp for bringing this to my attention!

Market Action

April 6, 2023

Jobs, jobs, jobs!

The Canadian economy added more jobs than expected in March and the unemployment rate remained near a record low for a fourth straight month, data on Thursday showed, a sign of economic resilience ahead of a central bank policy meeting next week.

The economy gained a net 34,700 jobs, almost entirely in the private sector, and the unemployment rate held steady at 5.0 per cent, Statistics Canada reported.

Thursday’s jobs figures as well as robust GDP data released last week are likely to complicate the central bank’s plans to avoid further rate moves. The average hourly wage for permanent employees rose 5.2 per cent in March on a year-over-year basis, down from 5.4 per cent in February.

The bank’s next rate decision is due on Wednesday.

The employment gains last month were driven by the services sector, which added a net 75,500 jobs, mostly in transportation and warehousing as well as support services. Those additions more than offset the decline of 40,900 jobs in the goods sector, which was dragged down by job losses in construction as well as natural resources.

The New York Fed has updated the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index:

  • Global supply chain pressures decreased again in March, falling from .28 to 1.06 standard deviations below the index’s historical average.
  • There were significant downward contributions by many of the factors, with the largest negative contributions from European Area delivery times, European Area backlogs, and Taiwanese purchases.
  • The GSCPI’s recent movements suggest that global supply chain conditions have largely normalized after experiencing temporary setbacks around the turn of the year.

BIS has released a working paper titled Big techs and the credit channel of monetary policy:

Focus
Big techs are lending to small and medium-sized enterprises and vendors on their e-commerce platforms, thus encroaching on financial markets. These changes in financial intermediation could affect monetary policy transmission in at least two ways. First, the business model of big techs depends on using vast amounts of data instead of collateral to solve agency problems between borrowers and lenders. By using machine learning and big data to generate credit scores, big techs can assess a company’s creditworthiness more accurately than traditional credit bureau ratings can. As a result, this may decrease the relevance of the “collateral channel” and, simultaneously, increase the responsiveness of credit to changes in firms’ business conditions. Second, the threat of reputational damage, or of being excluded from the e-commerce platform, serves as an extra-legal but highly effective means of contract enforcement for big tech firms.

Contribution
We view big tech credit through the lens of a model where big techs facilitate matching on the e-commerce platform and extend loans. While bank credit is backed by collateral, big techs reinforce credit repayment by threatening to exclude borrowers from the platform. The most significant difference between big tech credit and bank credit lies in the borrowers’ cost of default. If a firm defaults on bank credit, it loses its collateral, usually real estate. In contrast, if a company defaults on big tech credit, it loses access to the e-commerce platform, thereby jeopardising future profits.

Findings
We find that, first, an improvement in big techs’ matching efficiency on the e-commerce platform raises the value for firms of trading on the platform and accessing big tech credit. Higher future profits ease financing constraints and increase firms’ production, driving aggregate output closer to the efficient level. Second, the response of credit and output to a monetary policy shock depends on how sensitive the firms’ opportunity cost of default on big tech credit (ie the stream of future profits from operating on the big tech platform) is compared with the cost of defaulting on bank credit (ie the value of physical collateral). In our baseline calibration, the introduction of big tech credit mitigates the initial responses of aggregate credit and output to a monetary shock. However, it increases the persistence of the effect of monetary policy on the macroeconomy. Third, big techs’ macroeconomic efficiency gains are limited by the distortionary nature of the fees collected from their users.

Abstract
We document some stylized facts on big tech credit and rationalize them through the lens of a model where big techs facilitate matching on the e-commerce platform and extend loans. The big tech reinforces credit repayment with the threat of exclusion from the platform, while bank credit is secured against collateral. Our model suggests that: (i) a rise in big techs’ matching efficiency increases the value for firms of trading on the platform and the availability of big tech credit; (ii) big tech credit mitigates the initial response of output to a monetary shock, while increasing its persistence; (iii) the efficiency gains generated by big techs are limited by the distortionary fees collected from users.

Our paper aims to shed some light on the effects of big techs’ entry into finance on the macroeconomy and on monetary policy transmission. We develop a model that can replicate two key empirical facts about big techs. First, using macro data for China and the US, and extending previous evidence based on Chinese micro data, we show that big tech credit does not react to changes in asset prices and local economic conditions, unlike bank credit. Second, we use local projections to shed light on the importance of the physical collateral channel relative to the network collateral channel for the transmission of monetary policy. Key drivers of the strength of these channels is the sensitivity of commercial property prices and e-commerce sales to monetary policy. We show that commercial property prices respond more strongly than e-commerce sales to a monetary policy shock, although less persistently.

The crucial difference between big tech credit and bank credit relates to borrowers’ opportunity cost of default. Firms that default on bank credit lose their collateral (real estate). In contrast, those that default on big tech credit lose access to big techs’ e-commerce platform, and hence their future profits. An incentive compatible contract thus limits the total amount of credit to the sum of physical and network collateral. Nominal wages are sticky, and monetary policy affects the real economy. When search frictions in the goods markets and credit frictions in the financial markets are set to zero, the model collapses to the basic New Keynesian model with sticky wages.3

We obtain three sets of results. First, an expansion in big techs, as captured by an increase in matching efficiency on the commerce platform, raises the value for firms of trading in the platform and the availability of big tech credit. This in turn relaxes financing constraints and increases firms’ production, driving aggregate output closer to the efficient level. Second, the reaction of credit and output to a monetary policy shock crucially depends on the sensitivity of firms’ opportunity cost of default on big tech credit (the stream of future profits from operating on the big tech platform) compared to that of defaulting on bank credit (the value of physical collateral). In our baseline calibration, the introduction of big tech credit mitigates the initial responses of aggregate credit and output to a monetary shock, but increases the persistence of the effect of monetary policy on the macroeconomy. Third, big techs’ macroeconomic efficiency gains are limited by the distortionary nature of the fees collected from their users.

AIMCo beat its benchmarks:

Alberta Investment Management Corp. reported a 3.4-per-cent loss last year as falling values for publicly traded stocks and bonds outweighed strong returns from investments in infrastructure and renewable resources.

AIMCo’s 2022 returns were still 1.8-per-cent higher than its internal benchmark in spite of the loss, demonstrating how difficult it was to be an investor last year as high inflation and rapid interest-rate increases shook global markets. Like many of its peers, AIMCo suffered from a rare simultaneous dive in public equities and fixed income markets, which make up a large share of the plan’s assets.

Aimia is facing a shareholder revolt:

Mithaq Capital SPC, a family office based in Saudi Arabia that owns nearly 20 per cent of Toronto-based Aimia, announced plans Thursday to vote against the re-election of the company’s entire board of directors.

In a statement, Mithaq said it has lost confidence in the board and the management team, and that “it would be in the best interests of Aimia to reconstitute the board.”

The reasons underlying Mithaq’s opposition “include concerns previously raised with Aimia regarding capital allocation decisions relating to acquisitions,” the statement said.

Mithaq is not planning to nominate any replacement candidates and declined to comment further on what exactly motivated it, though Aimia has recently made its two largest acquisitions since pivoting away from loyalty programs.

In January, Aimia bought Tufropes Pvt. Ltd. for $253-million. India-based Tufropes makes synthetic fibre ropes and netting for the aquaculture and maritime industries. Then last month, the company paid $332-million for Italian chemical company Giovanni Bozzetto SpA.

Mithaq has amassed a significant portion of its stake in Aimia very recently. While the family office holds 19.9 per cent of Aimia’s outstanding common shares, that figure was only 12.6 per cent as of Feb 1.

Over the course of its transformation, Aimia’s work force has shrunk dramatically to about 20 people as of late 2020 from roughly 450. In its most recent quarter, Aimia reported a net loss of $23.3-million, which was roughly 60-per-cent wider than the $14.6-million loss the company reported during the same period a year earlier.

… and the company is fighting back:

Hours later, the company fired back, alleging what Mithaq really wanted was for Aimia to support its own investments.

“Many of the investments [Mithaq] recommended would have resulted in substantial losses to Aimia (including one target that subsequently filed for bankruptcy),” the company said in a statement released early Thursday afternoon.

Aimia also said Mithaq had “previously lobbied the company to invest in public securities, including some in which they hold an interest.” An unnamed former insider of an Amia affiliate – who the company claimed was recently terminated for allegedly misusing confidential information – lobbied alongside Mithaq for those investments, the statement said.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6160 % 2,325.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6160 % 4,460.7
Floater 9.69 % 9.74 % 56,991 9.78 2 -0.6160 % 2,570.7
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1223 % 3,357.2
SplitShare 5.01 % 7.07 % 46,234 2.65 7 0.1223 % 4,009.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1223 % 3,128.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1536 % 2,762.6
Perpetual-Discount 6.18 % 6.19 % 55,355 13.61 34 0.1536 % 3,012.4
FixedReset Disc 5.81 % 7.52 % 92,174 12.23 63 -0.2347 % 2,118.6
Insurance Straight 6.07 % 6.11 % 71,023 13.76 19 0.1264 % 2,961.2
FloatingReset 10.29 % 9.98 % 26,723 9.58 2 0.6428 % 2,414.7
FixedReset Prem 6.94 % 6.42 % 282,543 13.01 1 0.6362 % 2,328.4
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2347 % 2,165.6
FixedReset Ins Non 5.97 % 7.17 % 71,251 12.36 11 0.3032 % 2,309.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -4.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 19.68
Evaluated at bid price : 19.68
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %
BN.PF.F FixedReset Disc -3.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 15.75
Evaluated at bid price : 15.75
Bid-YTW : 9.07 %
BN.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -2.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 6.66 %
BN.PF.J FixedReset Disc -2.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 21.43
Evaluated at bid price : 21.70
Bid-YTW : 7.12 %
BIP.PR.E FixedReset Disc -2.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 20.80
Evaluated at bid price : 20.80
Bid-YTW : 7.27 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset Disc -1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 17.51
Evaluated at bid price : 17.51
Bid-YTW : 7.57 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset Disc -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 10.53
Evaluated at bid price : 10.53
Bid-YTW : 9.18 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 23.01
Evaluated at bid price : 23.28
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
BN.PR.B Floater -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 12.20
Evaluated at bid price : 12.20
Bid-YTW : 9.74 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 14.85
Evaluated at bid price : 14.85
Bid-YTW : 10.90 %
BN.PF.A FixedReset Disc -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 18.10
Evaluated at bid price : 18.10
Bid-YTW : 8.20 %
SLF.PR.C Insurance Straight -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 18.85
Evaluated at bid price : 18.85
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
RY.PR.S FixedReset Disc -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 19.98
Evaluated at bid price : 19.98
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %
BN.PF.G FixedReset Disc -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 14.60
Evaluated at bid price : 14.60
Bid-YTW : 9.32 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Ins Non 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 18.34
Evaluated at bid price : 18.34
Bid-YTW : 7.17 %
GWO.PR.S Insurance Straight 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 21.46
Evaluated at bid price : 21.46
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset Ins Non 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 17.39
Evaluated at bid price : 17.39
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Disc 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 12.70
Evaluated at bid price : 12.70
Bid-YTW : 8.06 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 20.10
Evaluated at bid price : 20.10
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
BN.PF.H FixedReset Disc 1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 8.10 %
IFC.PR.G FixedReset Ins Non 2.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 7.06 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset 2.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 14.90
Evaluated at bid price : 14.90
Bid-YTW : 9.98 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 4.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
BN.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 6.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 19.01
Evaluated at bid price : 19.01
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.K FixedReset Disc 88,050 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 19.65
Evaluated at bid price : 19.65
Bid-YTW : 7.08 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 49,100 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 22.66
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset Disc 41,726 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 15.45
Evaluated at bid price : 15.45
Bid-YTW : 8.57 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset Disc 40,140 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 16.63
Evaluated at bid price : 16.63
Bid-YTW : 8.08 %
NA.PR.S FixedReset Disc 39,800 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 16.94
Evaluated at bid price : 16.94
Bid-YTW : 7.83 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset Disc 37,333 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 17.20
Evaluated at bid price : 17.20
Bid-YTW : 7.52 %
There were 14 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.Q FixedReset Ins Non Quote: 18.60 – 22.50
Spot Rate : 3.9000
Average : 2.2200

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 18.60
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 7.55 %

BN.PF.C Perpetual-Discount Quote: 18.82 – 20.70
Spot Rate : 1.8800
Average : 1.1675

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 18.82
Evaluated at bid price : 18.82
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %

PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Quote: 19.68 – 21.13
Spot Rate : 1.4500
Average : 0.9146

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 19.68
Evaluated at bid price : 19.68
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %

PWF.PR.T FixedReset Disc Quote: 17.28 – 19.27
Spot Rate : 1.9900
Average : 1.4624

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 17.28
Evaluated at bid price : 17.28
Bid-YTW : 7.68 %

GWO.PR.I Insurance Straight Quote: 18.65 – 19.90
Spot Rate : 1.2500
Average : 0.8201

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 18.65
Evaluated at bid price : 18.65
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %

GWO.PR.T Insurance Straight Quote: 21.05 – 22.40
Spot Rate : 1.3500
Average : 0.9774

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-06
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %